Algorithmic Modeling of Human Behavior (James Wright)

Peer Grading: From Theory to Practice (Alice Gao)

Complexity Theory and Algorithmic Game Theory: Some New Connections (Tim Roughgarden)

From Anomalies to Forecasts: Toward a Descriptive Model of Human Choice Behavior (Ido Erev)

Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias (Manish Raghavan)

Calibration, Smooth Calibration, and Game Dynamics (Sergiu Hart)

Complexity of Pricing (Noam Nisan)

The FedEx Problem (Kira Goldner)

Beyond-X: Toward more general Prophet Inequalities and Secretary Problems (Aviad Rubinstein)

Online prediction with selfish experts (Okke Joost Schrijvers)

The law of one price for heterogeneous good (w/ Avinatan Hassidim) (Assaf Romm)

Simultaneous Communication Complexity of Two-party Combinatorial Auctions (Jieming Mao)

Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion (Haifeng Xu)

Testing Choice Theories (Jan Christoph Schlegel)

Approximate Modularity Revisited (Inbal Talgam Cohen)

Learning in Games: Robustness of Fast Convergence (Thodoris Lykouris)

Nash social welfare for strategic agents (Simina Brânzei)

Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present Bias (Manish Raghavan)

Geometric Approaches to Auction Design (Zihe Wang)

A Simple Model for the Top Trading Cycles School Choice Mechanism Using Fluid Approximation (Irene Yuan Lo)

The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models (Rachel Cummings)

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders (Alon Eden)

Spilling Secrets to Competitors: The Value of Information Revelation under Price Competition (Shoshana Vasserman) Joint work with Greg Lewis, and Nageeb Ali.

Efficient Empirical Revenue Maximization in Single-Parameter Auction Environments (Yannai Gonczarowski)

Posted price mechanisms (Michal Feldman)

Recent Progress on Simple Multi-item Auctions (Andrew Yao)

Centralized Clearinghouse Design: A Quantity-Quality Tradeoff (Nick Arnosti)

AI with GT Flavor (Moshe Tennenholtz)

Pricing Social Goods (Tomer Ezra)

Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue? (Christos Tzamos)

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements (Ophir Friedler)