From Algorithmic Game Theory to Ad Auctions: Electronic Markets and Auctions Google Focus Area Grant for Cluster of Israeli Universities Individual PI Research Plan PI Name: Noam NisanUniversity and Department: Hebrew University, School of CSE and Center for RationalityParticipants:- Ilan Nehama -- grad student
- Tali Gutman -- grad student
- I plan to recruit 2 more grad-students/postdocs
Plan:I wish to concentrate on two major topics:- Dynamics in Auctions and Games:Most work in Auction research (as well as most Game Theory and economictheory) focuses on the reached equilibrium, the equilibrium is anidealized notion of what is reached by the dynamics of the auction. Wewish to study several properties of such dynamics: How simple can theybe? How fast do they converge? What incentives do they have? Whathappens when they do not converge?
- Mechanism Design without Quasi-linearity:Due to the Gibbard-Satherswaite impossibility results, most work inauction theory considers settings with “money” -- an unrestricted wayof transferring utility between players and the auctioneer. I wish tostudy what can be recovered without this assumption of “unrestricted”money but rather under weaker assumptions. Examples include: budgetlimits in auctions, approximations in general social choice settings,Fisher Market and cake-cutting settings.
References:Deliverables:- Theexpected deliverable is a collection of academically published researchpapers summarizing our research, where we have succeeded advancing thestate of knowledge.
- Ifwe design an algorithm or mechanism that requires implementation fortesting, then we will develop a prototype implementation as well.
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