# Pure Sequent Calculi: Analyticity and Decision Procedure 

ORI LAHAV, Tel Aviv University<br>YONI ZOHAR, Stanford University


#### Abstract

Analyticity, also known as the subformula property, typically guarantees decidability of derivability in propositional sequent calculi. To utilize this fact, two substantial gaps have to be addressed: ( $i$ ) what makes a sequent calculus analytic? and (ii) how to obtain an efficient decision procedure for derivability in an analytic calculus? In the first part of this paper we answer these questions for pure calculi-a general family of fully structural propositional sequent calculi whose rules allow arbitrary context formulas. We provide a sufficient syntactic criterion for analyticity in these calculi, as well as a productive method to construct new analytic calculi from given ones. We further introduce a scalable decision procedure for derivability in analytic pure calculi, by showing that it can be (uniformly) reduced to classical satisfiability. In the second part of the paper, we study the extension of pure sequent calculi with modal operators. We show that such extensions preserve the analyticity of the calculus, and identify certain restricted operators (which we call 'Next' operators) that are also amenable for a general reduction of derivability to classical satisfiability. Our proofs are all semantic, utilizing several strong general soundness and completeness theorems with respect to non-deterministic semantic frameworks: bivaluations (for pure calculi) and Kripke models (for their extension with modal operators).


Additional Key Words and Phrases: Sequent Calculi, Analyticity, Subformula property

## 1 INTRODUCTION

More than eighty years after its introduction [25], the framework of sequent calculi is by now a mainstream proof theoretic framework. When a given logic is accompanied with a well-behaved sequent calculus, the latter often provides a useful representation of the logic, which allows one to study various properties of it. For propositional logics, which are the focus of this paper, a sequent calculus may be used to establish decidability, and, in turn, to develop a proof search method. To this end, it is typically required that the calculus is analytic. Roughly speaking, analyticity (a.k.a. the subformula property) ensures that every derivable sequent $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ has a derivation that uses only the syntactic material available inside $\Gamma \cup \Delta .{ }^{1}$

The current paper is devoted to a general and uniform study of propositional sequent calculi, aiming to understand: ( $i$ ) what guarantees that a given sequent calculus is analytic? and (ii) how analyticity can be utilized to obtain an effective decision procedure for derivability in the calculus? Answering these questions may assist future development of sequent calculi and proof search methods, which are traditionally tailored to specific logics.

Our investigation encompasses a wide family of sequent calculi, called pure sequent calculi, as well as the extensions of pure sequent calculi with derivation rules for modal operators. Pure sequent calculi are propositional fully-structural calculi. (By fully-structural, we mean that they include all ordinary structural rules: exchange, contraction and weakening.) In addition, the important restriction on derivation rules in these calculi is that they do not enforce any limitations on the formulas that may be used as context in applications of the rules (following [3], the adjective "pure" stands for this requirement). While being a simple framework, pure calculi were shown

[^0]Authors' addresses: Ori Lahav, Tel Aviv University, orilahav@tau.ac.il; Yoni Zohar, Stanford University, yoniz@cs.stanford. edu.
to be adequate for a wide range of logics, including important three and four valued logics and various paraconsistent logics. By further studying the extension of pure calculi with rules for modal operators, our work covers also multi-modal logics.

We first generalize the usual notion of analyticity by employing a parametrized generalization a subformula. The general notion applies to more calculi (e.g., it may allow one to use $\neg \varphi$ in a proof of $\Rightarrow \varphi$ ), and still inherits the important consequences of analyticity, including decidability. Then, the crux of this paper addresses questions (i) and (ii) above:
(i) We provide a simple syntactic criterion that ensures analyticity, and present a method for constructing analytic sequent calculi. The latter allows one to obtain an analytic-byconstruction calculi by collecting certain instances of logical rules in some given analytic calculus. In particular, this method is useful to obtain calculi for non-classical logics (especially for paraconsistent logics) that are naturally developed as restrictions of classical logic. We also show that the addition of various rules for modal operators preserves analyticity, which provides a uniform approach to analytic calculi for (non-classical) modal logics.
(ii) We show that derivability in analytic pure calculi can be reduced in polynomial time to (the complement of) SAT-the classical satisfiability problem. While SAT is NP-hard, it is considered "easy" when it comes to real-world applications. Indeed, there are many off-theshelf SAT solvers, that, despite an exponential worst-case time complexity, are considered extremely efficient (see, e.g., [27]). Our reduction constitutes a scalable uniform decision procedure for logics that can be represented by analytic pure sequent calculi. We further extend this reduction for the extension of such calculi with Next operators, a restricted type of modal operators used in temporal and access control logics; and identify a subfamily of calculi for which the reduction generates Horn clauses, leading to a linear time decision procedure (using a HORNSAT solver). This provides a systematic approach for developing calculi for particular applications that require extremely efficient decision procedure (as was recently done for an access control logic called "primal infon logic" [19]).
Our main tool to achieve the above is a semantic interpretation of sequent calculi. As observed in [12], there is a simple correspondence between pure sequent calculi and two-valued valuation semantics. We utilize this correspondence and extend it for characterizing derivations that are confined to use only a certain set of formulas. Thus, we obtain a purely semantic equivalent definition of analyticity (roughly speaking, analyticity is equivalent to the ability to extend partial countermodels), which is very useful in our general study of sequent calculi. When considering rules for modal operators, we follow a similar approach, and use a correspondence (i.e., a general soundness and completeness theorem) between pure sequent calculi extended with modal operators and certain Kripke-style models.

## Related Work

Analyticity in subfamilies of pure sequent calculi has been investigated in previous works. A particularly well-behaved subfamily of pure calculi, called canonical calculi, was studied by Avron and Lev [10]. For these calculi, it was shown that analyticity and cut-admissibility are equivalent, and both are precisely characterized by a simple and decidable criterion, called coherence. A similar criterion was later provided by Avron in [7] for an extended subfamily of quasi-canonical calculi. Our results apply for significantly more general family of calculi, allowing us to derive these existing criteria for analyticity as particular instances. In addition, the general framework of Miller and Pimentel [38] allows one to encode all pure calculi in linear logic, and use linear logic to reason about them. Among the pure calculi, it is again only the canonical ones for which a decidable criterion for cut-admissibility is given.

The study of uniform decision procedures parametrized by a given formal calculus is the subject of the LoTREC [24] and MetTeL [43] projects, where the underlying framework is that of Tableuax calculi, rather than sequent calculi, which are the focus of the current work. The decision procedure that we propose here can be seen as a generalization of the one given by Beklemishev and Gurevich [11] for quotations-free primal infon logic. For the case of primal infon logic with quotations, the proposed reduction to SAT produces practically equivalent outputs as the reduction in [13] from this logic to Datalog. A general methodology for translating derivability questions in Hilbertian deductive systems to Datalog was introduced in [14] by Blass and Gurevich. However, this method may produce infinitely many Datalog premises. In contrast, our SAT instances are always finite.

A SAT-based decision procedure for classical modal logics was presented in [26]. The reduction that we present here is different in three aspects. On the one hand, we cover modal logics that are not necessarily classical. On the other hand, the reduction that is presented here is valid only for Next operators, while [26] covers other modal operators. Finally, while our decision procedure is obtained by a "one-shot" reduction to SAT, the procedure of [26] generates several SAT-instances in different part of its algorithm.

A leitmotif of this paper is the use of the semantic approach, which is particularly useful when cut-elimination is beyond the reach and general families of calculi are studied (see also [39]). The general semantic framework that we use here for pure calculi extends bivaluation semantics [12, 16]. The semantic framework that we use here for pure calculi with modal operators closely follows the one developed by Lahav and Avron in [34], adapted and simplified for our needs. To the best of out knowledge, no previous work considered the preservation of analyticity when extending a calculus with modal operators.

Finally, we note that preliminary short versions of different parts of this paper were included in [35] and [36]. Besides the addition of full proofs, we significantly strengthened the previous results so as to cover a more general notion of analyticity, as well as the extension of pure calculi with various rules for modal operators.

## Outline

§2 defines the family of pure sequent calculi and established their semantic interpretation, which plays a major role in subsequent sections. In §3, a generalized analyticity property is defined. §4 describes the reduction of derivability in analytic pure calculi to SAT. Methods for identifying analyticity and for constructing analytic calculi are introduced in §5. Next, §6 extends the theory of pure calculi to accommodate rules for modal operators, and $\S 7$ generalizes the reduction to SAT for pure calculi augmented with modal Next operators. Finally, $\S 8$ includes conclusions and further research questions.

## 2 PURE SEQUENT CALCULI

In this section we define the family of pure sequent calculi (§2.2), provide a uniform semantic interpretation for them (§2.3), and introduce useful transformations on pure calculi that do not affect the induced derivability relation (§2.4).

### 2.1 Preliminaries

In what follows, $\mathcal{L}$ denotes an arbitrary propositional language, consisting of a countable infinite set of atomic variables $A t=\left\{p_{1}, p_{2}, \ldots\right\}$ and a finite set $\diamond_{\mathcal{L}}$ of propositional connectives. For every $n \geq 0$, the set of all $n$-ary connectives of $\mathcal{L}$ is denoted by $\diamond_{\mathcal{L}}^{n}$. Well-formed formulas in a propositional language $\mathcal{L}$ are defined as usual, and we usually identify $\mathcal{L}$ with its set of well-formed formulas (e.g., when writing $\psi \in \mathcal{L}$ ). Given a set $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{L}$, we say that a formula $\psi$ is an $\mathcal{F}$-formula if $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$.

A substitution is a function from $A t$ to some propositional language. A substitution $\sigma$ is extended to formulas by $\sigma\left(\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right)\right)=\diamond\left(\sigma\left(\psi_{1}\right), \ldots, \sigma\left(\psi_{n}\right)\right)$ for every connective $\diamond$, and to sets of formulas by $\sigma(\mathcal{F})=\{\sigma(\psi) \mid \psi \in \mathcal{F}\}$.

A sequent is a pair $\langle\Gamma, \Delta\rangle$, denoted $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$, where $\Gamma$ and $\Delta$ are finite sets of formulas. For a sequent $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$, $\operatorname{frm}(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta)=\Gamma \cup \Delta$. This notation is naturally extended to sets of sequents. A sequent $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ is called an $\mathcal{F}$-sequent if $\operatorname{frm}(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta) \subseteq \mathcal{F}$. We employ the standard sequent notations, e.g., when writing expressions like $\Gamma, \psi \Rightarrow \Delta$ or $\Rightarrow \psi$. The union of sequents is given by $\left(\Gamma_{1} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}\right) \cup\left(\Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \Delta_{2}\right)=\left(\Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(\Delta_{1} \cup \Delta_{2}\right)$. A sequent $\Gamma_{1} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}$ is a subsequent of a sequent $\Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \Delta_{2}$, denoted $\Gamma_{1} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1} \subseteq \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \Delta_{2}$, if $\Gamma_{1} \subseteq \Gamma_{2}$ and $\Delta_{1} \subseteq \Delta_{2}$. Substitutions are also extended to sequents by $\sigma(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta)=\sigma(\Gamma) \Rightarrow \sigma(\Delta)$ and sets of sequents by $\sigma(S)=\{\sigma(s) \mid s \in S\}$.

### 2.2 Pure Sequent Calculi

Roughly speaking, pure sequent calculi are propositional fully-structural calculi (sequent calculi that include all the usual structural rules: exchange, contraction, cut, identity and weakening), whose derivation rules do not enforce any limitations on the side formulas. This family of calculi is a prominent proof-theoretic framework, adequate for many propositional logics, including classical logic, many-valued logics, and various paraconsistent logics.

We start by defining pure rules and their applications, namely the steps that form derivations in pure calculi. Following [10], we find it convenient to use the object propositional language for specifying derivation rules, instead of meta-variables which are often used to present derivation schemes. Accordingly, applications of rules are obtained by applying a substitution on the premises and the conclusion of the rule, and freely adding context formulas.

Definition 2.1. A pure rule is a pair $\langle S, s\rangle$, denoted $S / s$, where $S$ is a finite set of sequents and $s$ is a sequent. The elements of $S$ are called the premises of the rule and $s$ is called the conclusion of the rule. An application of a pure rule $\left\{s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}\right\} / s$ is a pair of the form

$$
\left\langle\left\{\sigma\left(s_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{1}, \ldots, \sigma\left(s_{n}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{n}\right\}, \sigma(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right\rangle
$$

where $\sigma$ is a substitution, $s_{i}^{\prime}$ is a subsequent of $s_{i}$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$, and $c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n}$ are sequents (called context sequents). The sequents $\sigma\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{i}$ are called the premises of the application and the sequent $\sigma(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}$ is called the conclusion of the application. We often denote an application as a derivation step:

$$
\frac{\sigma\left(s_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{1}, \ldots, \sigma\left(s_{n}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{n}}{\sigma(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}}
$$

Example 2.2 (Pure rules for classical implication). The following is a pure rule (we omit the curly braces to improve readability):

$$
p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{2}
$$

Applications of this rule have the following forms:

$$
\frac{\Gamma, \psi_{1} \Rightarrow \psi_{2}, \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \psi_{1} \supset \psi_{2}, \Delta} \quad \frac{\Gamma, \psi_{1} \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \psi_{1} \supset \psi_{2}, \Delta} \quad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \psi_{2}, \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \psi_{1} \supset \psi_{2}, \Delta} \quad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \psi_{1} \supset \psi_{2}, \Delta}
$$

Notice that the first application uses the full sequent in its premise, while the others use proper subsequents of the premises.
Applications of the following rules

$$
\Rightarrow p_{1} ; p_{2} \Rightarrow / p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow \quad / \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{1}
$$

have respectively the forms:

$$
\frac{\Gamma_{1} \Rightarrow \psi_{1}, \Delta_{1} \quad \Gamma_{2}, \psi_{2} \Rightarrow \Delta_{2}}{\Gamma}
$$

$$
\overline{\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2}, \psi_{1} \supset \psi_{2} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}, \Delta_{2}} \quad \Rightarrow \psi \supset \psi
$$

In contrast, the usual rule for introducing implication on the right-hand side in intuitionistic logic is not a pure rule, since it allows only left context formulas.

Applications of rules are multiplicative-allowing a different context sequent in each premise. Since all usual structural rules are assumed, one may equivalently consider additive applications, that require one context sequent in all premises. We freely interchange multiplicative or additive applications in the rest of this paper, as they are equivalent, and each is technically convenient in different contexts. Note that we allow applications of pure rules to make use of subsequents of the premises, and not necessarily the full premises (i.e., by defining an application of a rule $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s$ to have the form $\left.\sigma\left(s_{1}\right) \cup c_{1}, \ldots, \sigma\left(s_{n}\right) \cup c_{n} / \sigma(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)$. While this is technically convenient (e.g., in §2.4), again, using the structural rules, both options are equivalent.

Pure sequent calculi are finite sets of pure rules. To make them fully-structural (in addition to defining sequents as pairs of sets), the weakening rule, the identity axiom and the cut rule may be used in derivations. A derivation in a pure calculus G is defined as usual, where in addition to applications of the pure rules of G , the following standard application schemes may be used: ${ }^{2}$

$$
\text { (wEAK) } \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma^{\prime}, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \Delta^{\prime}} \quad \text { (id) } \frac{\text { (cUT) } \frac{\Gamma_{1} \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta_{1}}{\Gamma, \psi \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta} \quad \Gamma_{2}, \psi \Rightarrow \Delta_{2}}{\Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}, \Delta_{2}}
$$

Note that the structural rules (сUT), (ШЕАк) and (id) can be simulated by pure rules: $\Rightarrow p_{1} ; p_{1} \Rightarrow$ $/ \Rightarrow$ for (CUT), $\Rightarrow / \Rightarrow p_{1}$ and $\Rightarrow / p_{1} \Rightarrow$ for (WЕAK), and $/ p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{1}$ for (ID). However, it is technically convenient to distinguish them from the other pure rules.

Henceforth, unless stated otherwise, we consider only pure rules and pure calculi, and may refer to them simply as rules and calculi. By an $\mathcal{L}$-rule ( $\mathcal{L}$-calculus) we mean a rule (calculus) that mentions only connectives of $\mathcal{L}$. For an $\mathcal{L}$-calculus G , a set $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ of formulas, a set $S$ of $\mathcal{F}$-sequents and an $\mathcal{F}$-sequent $s$, we write $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} s$ if there is a derivation of $s$ from $S$ in G consisting only of $\mathcal{F}$-sequents. For $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{L}} s$ (i.e., $\mathcal{F}=\mathcal{L}$ ), we may also write $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}$. As before, we often omit the curly braces, writing, e.g., $\Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow p_{2} \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} \Rightarrow p_{2}$.

Next, we present several examples of pure sequent calculi. The most fundamental example is Gentzen's system for classical logic [25]:

Example 2.3 (Classical logic). The propositional fragment of Gentzen's sequent calculus for classical logic can be directly presented as the following pure calculus, denoted henceforth by LK:

$$
\begin{array}{cccc}
(\neg \Rightarrow) & \Rightarrow p_{1} / \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow & (\Rightarrow \neg) & p_{1} \Rightarrow / \Rightarrow \neg p_{1} \\
(\wedge \Rightarrow) & p_{1}, p_{2} \Rightarrow / p_{1} \wedge p_{2} \Rightarrow & (\Rightarrow \wedge) & \Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \wedge p_{2} \\
(\vee \Rightarrow) & p_{1} \Rightarrow ; p_{2} \Rightarrow / p_{1} \vee p_{2} \Rightarrow & (\Rightarrow \vee) & \Rightarrow p_{1}, p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \vee p_{2} \\
(\supset \Rightarrow) & \Rightarrow p_{1} ; p_{2} \Rightarrow / p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow & (\Rightarrow \supset) & p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{2} \\
(\perp \Rightarrow) & / \perp \Rightarrow & (\Rightarrow \top) & / \Rightarrow T
\end{array}
$$

Besides LK there are many sequent calculi for non-classical logics that fall in this framework. These include calculi for well-known three and four-valued logics, various calculi for paraconsistent logics, and all canonical and quasi-canonical sequent calculi [8-10, 12].

[^1]Example 2.4 (Primal infon logic). Primal infon logic [19] was designed to efficiently reason about access control policies, by taking much weaker disjunction and implication, but still expressive enough to describe access control policies. The quotations-free fragment of its sequent calculus [11] can be presented as a pure calculus, which we denote by $\mathbf{P}$. It is obtained from the negation-free fragment of $L K$ by dismissing the rule $(\vee \Rightarrow)$, and replacing the rule $(\Rightarrow \supset)$ with: $\Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{2}$. Quotations, whose rules are not pure, can be seen as modal operators, and are handled in §6 (in particular, see Example 6.15).

Example 2.5 (The paraconsistent logic C1). The calculus for da Costa's historical paraconsistent logic C 1 from [8] is a pure calculus, which we call $\mathrm{C}_{1}$. It consists of the rules of $\mathbf{L K}$ except for $(\neg \Rightarrow)$ that is replaced by the following rules:

$$
\begin{array}{cr}
p_{1} \Rightarrow / \neg \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow & \\
\Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow \neg p_{1} / \neg\left(p_{1} \wedge \neg p_{1}\right) \Rightarrow & \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow ; \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \\
\neg p_{1} \Rightarrow ; p_{2}, \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow & p_{1}, \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow ; \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \\
p_{1} \Rightarrow ; p_{2}, \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow & p_{1}, \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow ; \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow
\end{array}
$$

Example 2.6 ( $£$ ukasiewicz three-valued logic). A sequent calculus for Łukasiewicz three-valued logic was presented in [5]. This calculus, which we call $£ 3$, can be directly presented as a pure calculus. For example, the rules involving implication are the following:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\neg p_{1} \Rightarrow ; p_{2} \Rightarrow & ; \Rightarrow p_{1}, \neg p_{2} / p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow & p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{2} ; \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow \neg p_{1} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{2} \\
p_{1}, \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow & & \Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow \neg p_{2} / \Rightarrow \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Next, we present a useful lemma that establishes structural properties of pure sequent calculi.
Lemma 2.7. If $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}}$ s, then:
(1) $\sigma(S) \vdash_{G}^{\sigma(\mathcal{F})} \sigma(s)$ for every substitution $\sigma$.
(2) $\left\{s^{\prime} \cup c \mid s^{\prime} \in S\right\} \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F} \cup f r m(c)} s \cup c$ for every sequent $c$.

Proof. By induction on the length of derivations.

### 2.3 Semantics

In this section we introduce a semantic interpretation of pure calculi, based on (possibly nondeterministic) two-valued valuation functions. This semantics will be used to characterize analyticity in pure calculi and provide a decision procedure for analytic pure calculi.

Our semantics follows [12] and uses bivaluations-functions assigning a binary truth value to each formula. The simple framework of bivaluations is applicable to a wide variety of propositional logics. The price for this simplicity and generality is the loss of truth-functionality: the truth value assigned to a compound formula is not always uniquely determined by the truth values assigned to its subformulas. Accordingly, it does not suffice to define bivaluations over atomic formulas, as done in ordinary truth-tables semantics.

For the purpose of characterizing analyticity, we extend the bivaluation framework by considering also partial bivaluations that assign truth values to some formulas. These allows us to have finite models which are essential in semantic decision procedures. Next, we precisely define (partial) bivaluations, and provide a general soundness and completeness theorem, supplying each pure calculus G and a set $\mathcal{F}$ of formulas with a set of partial bivaluations for which G is sound and complete when only $\mathcal{F}$-formulas may appear in derivations.

Definition 2.8. A bivaluation is a function $v$ from some set of propositional formulas, denoted $\operatorname{dom}(v)$, to $\{0,1\}$. A bivaluation $v$ is extended to $\operatorname{dom}(v)$-sequents by: $v(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta)=1$ iff $v(\varphi)=0$ for
some $\varphi \in \Gamma$ or $v(\varphi)=1$ for some $\varphi \in \Delta$. A bivaluation $v$ is extended to sets (of dom(v)-formulas or of sequents) by $v(X)=\min \{v(x) \mid x \in X\}$, where $\min \emptyset=1$. Given a set $\mathcal{F}$ of formulas, by an $\mathcal{F}$-bivaluation we refer to a bivaluation $v$ with $\operatorname{dom}(v)=\mathcal{F}$.

To relate sequent calculi and bivaluations, we simply read pure rules as semantic constraints on bivaluations. This is formally defined as follows:

Definition 2.9. A bivaluation $v$ respects a rule $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s$ if $v\left(\left\{\sigma\left(s_{1}^{\prime}\right), \ldots, \sigma\left(s_{n}^{\prime}\right)\right\}\right) \leq v(\sigma(s))$ for every subsequents $s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$ and substitution $\sigma$ such that $\sigma\left(f r m\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}(v)$. A bivaluation $v$ is called G -legal for a calculus G if it respects all rules of G .

Example 2.10. A $\left\{p_{1}, \neg \neg p_{1}\right\}$-bivaluation $v$ respects the rule $p_{1} \Rightarrow / \neg \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow$ iff either $v\left(p_{1}\right)=$ $v\left(\neg \neg p_{1}\right)=0$ or $v\left(p_{1}\right)=1$. A $\left\{p_{1}, p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right\}$-bivaluation $v$ respects the rule $\Rightarrow p_{1}, p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \vee p_{2}$ iff either $v\left(p_{1}\right)=0$ or $v\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right)=1$ (note that $p_{2} \notin \operatorname{dom}(v)$ ). It is easy to verify that LK-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluations (where $\mathcal{L}$ is the language of $\mathbf{L K}$ ) coincide with the well-known classical valuations.

Next, we prove a general soundness and completeness theorem, that ties the domain of bivaluations to the set of formulas that are allowed to appear in derivations.

Theorem 2.11 (Soundness and Completeness). $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} s$ iff $v(S) \leq v(s)$ for every G -legal $\mathcal{F}$ bivaluation $v$.

Proof. To prove soundness, let $v$ be a G-legal $\mathcal{F}$-bivaluation, such that $v(S)=1$. We prove that $v(s)=1$ by induction on the length of the derivation of $s$ from $S$ in G (which consists only of $\mathcal{F}$-sequents). If $s \in S$, or $s$ is the conclusion of an application of (id), (CUT), or (WEAK), then this is straightforward. If $s$ is the conclusion of an application of some rule $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s_{0} \in \mathbf{G}$, then there are subsequents $s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$, a substitution $\sigma$, and $\mathcal{F}$-sequents $c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n}$ such that $s=\sigma\left(s_{0}\right) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}, \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s_{0}\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \mathcal{F}$, and $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} \sigma\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{i}$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. By the induction hypothesis, $v\left(\sigma\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{i}\right)=1$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. If $v\left(c_{i}\right)=1$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$, then $v\left(\sigma\left(s_{0}\right) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)=1$. Otherwise, for every $1 \leq i \leq n, v\left(\sigma\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$. Since $v$ is G-legal, $v\left(\sigma\left(s_{0}\right)\right)=1$ and hence $v\left(\sigma\left(s_{0}\right) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)=1$.

To prove completeness, assume that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} s$. We construct a G-legal $\mathcal{F}$-bivaluation $v$ such that $v(S)=1$ and $v(s)=0$. Since $\mathcal{F}$ may be infinite, this construction requires the following generalization of sequents: An $\omega$-sequent is a pair $\langle L, R\rangle$, denoted $L \Rightarrow R$, where $L$ and $R$ are (possibly infinite) subsets of $\mathcal{F}$. We write $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow R$ if $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ for some finite $\Gamma \subseteq L$ and $\Delta \subseteq R$. Other definitions and notations for sequents are adapted for $\omega$-sequents in the obvious way.

Call an $\omega$-sequent $L \Rightarrow R$ maximal unprovable if the following hold:

- $L \cup R \subseteq \mathcal{F}$
- $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow R$
- $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} L, \varphi \Rightarrow R$ for every $\varphi \in \mathcal{F} \backslash L$
- $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow \varphi, R$ for every $\varphi \in \mathcal{F} \backslash R$

It is routine to extend $s$ to a maximal unprovable $\omega$-sequent $L \Rightarrow R$. Using (cut), it can be easily shown that $L \cup R=\mathcal{F}$. Then, a countermodel $v$ is defined by $v(\varphi)=1$ if $\varphi \in L$, and $v(\varphi)=0$ if $\varphi \in R$. Clearly, $v(S)=1$ and $v(s)=0$. It remains to show that $v$ is G-legal. Let $r=\Gamma_{1} \Rightarrow$ $\Delta_{1}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n} \Rightarrow \Delta_{n} / \Gamma_{0} \Rightarrow \Delta_{0}$ be a rule of $\mathrm{G}, \Gamma_{1}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{n}^{\prime}$ respective subsequents of $\Gamma_{1} \Rightarrow$ $\Delta_{1}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n} \Rightarrow \Delta_{n}$, and $\sigma$ a substitution, such that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{\Gamma_{1}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{n}^{\prime}, \Gamma_{0} \Rightarrow \Delta_{0}\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ and $v\left(\sigma\left(\Gamma_{i}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{i}^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. We prove that $v\left(\sigma\left(\Gamma_{0} \Rightarrow \Delta_{0}\right)\right)=1$. By our assumption, for every $1 \leq i \leq n$, there exists either $\varphi \in \Gamma_{i}^{\prime}$ such that $v(\sigma(\varphi))=0$ (and then $\left.\sigma(\varphi) \in R\right)$ or $\varphi \in \Delta_{i}^{\prime}$ such that $v(\sigma(\varphi))=1$ (and then $\sigma(\varphi) \in L$ ). We construct a sequent $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ as follows. For every $1 \leq i \leq n$, we include in $\Gamma$ a formula $\sigma(\varphi)$ for some $\varphi \in \Delta_{i}^{\prime}$ such that $v(\sigma(\varphi))=1$, or, if $\operatorname{such} \varphi$ does
not exist, we include in $\Delta$ a formula $\sigma(\varphi)$ for some $\varphi \in \Gamma_{i}^{\prime}$ such that $v(\sigma(\varphi))=0$. Then, we have $(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta) \subseteq(L \Rightarrow R)$. In addition, using ( ID ), we have $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} \sigma\left(\Gamma_{i}^{\prime}\right), \Gamma \Rightarrow \sigma\left(\Delta_{i}^{\prime}\right), \Delta$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. By applying the rule $r$ with $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ as a context sequent, we obtain that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} \sigma\left(\Gamma_{0}\right), \Gamma \Rightarrow \sigma\left(\Delta_{0}\right), \Delta$. Since $S \forall_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow R$, we have $\sigma\left(\Gamma_{0} \Rightarrow \Delta_{0}\right) \nsubseteq L \Rightarrow R$, and so either $v(\psi)=0$ for some $\psi \in \sigma\left(\Gamma_{0}\right)$ or $v(\psi)=1$ for some $\psi \in \sigma\left(\Delta_{0}\right)$. Either way, we have $v\left(\sigma\left(\Gamma_{0} \Rightarrow \Delta_{0}\right)\right)=1$.

Well-known soundness and completeness theorems from the literature can be obtained as particular instances of Thm. 2.11, by taking $\mathcal{F}$ to be the entire propositional language. Examples include, e.g., soundness and completeness of LK with respect to the classical truth tables, and soundness and completeness of $\mathbf{P}$ (Example 2.4) with respect to the non-deterministic semantics from [19].

### 2.4 Streamlining Pure Calculi

In many cases, two calculi allow for exactly the same sequents to be derived, although they employ different derivation rules. In this section we present several useful streamlining transformations that transform one calculus into another, without affecting the induced derivability relation.

Definition 2.12 (Equivalent calculi and rules). Two calculi $\mathrm{G}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{G}_{2}$ are called equivalent if $\vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{1}}^{\mathcal{F}}+_{\mathrm{G}_{2}}^{\mathcal{F}}$ for every set $\mathcal{F}$ of formulas. Equivalence is naturally defined also between single rules (and between a rule and a calculi) by identifying a rule $r$ with the calculus $\{r\}$.

Lemma 2.13 (Basic equivalences). The following hold:
(1) $S / \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta$ is equivalent to $S ; \psi \Rightarrow / \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$.
(2) $S / \Gamma, \psi \Rightarrow \Delta$ is equivalent to $S ; \Rightarrow \psi / \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$.
(3) $\left\{S ; s_{1} / s, S ; s_{2} / s\right\}$ is equivalent to $S ; s_{1} \cup s_{2} / s$.

Proof. All claims are handled similarly. We show only the left-to-right direction of the third claim. Using Thm. 2.11, it suffices to show that every bivaluation that respects the rule $S ; s_{1} \cup s_{2} / s$ also respects the rules $S ; s_{1} / s$ and $S ; s_{2} / s$. Let $v$ be a bivaluation that respects $S ; s_{1} \cup s_{2} / s$. We prove, w.l.o.g., that it respects the rule $S ; s_{1} / s$. Let $S=\left\{q_{1}, \ldots, q_{n}\right\}$. Let $q_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq q_{1}, \ldots, q_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq q_{n}$, and let $s^{\prime}$ be a subsequent of $s_{1}$, and $\sigma$ a substitution such that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left\{q_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, q_{n}^{\prime}, s^{\prime}, s\right\}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}(v)$. Suppose that $v\left(\sigma\left(q_{i}^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$ and that $v\left(\sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$. Clearly, $s^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1} \cup s_{2}$. Since $v$ respects $S ; s_{1} \cup s_{2} / s$, we have that $v(\sigma(s))=1$.

Note that the use of subsequents in applications of pure rules is essential for the poof of Lemma 2.13.

We call a rule axiomatic if it has an empty set of premises. In turn, call a calculus axiomatic if it consists solely of axiomatic rules (the non-axiomatic schemes (WEAK) and (CUT) are allowed). We point out a useful application of Lemma 2.13, which allows us to convert every calculus to an axiomatic one. In particular, it will allow us to consider only axiomatic calculi in $\S 4$ and $\S 7$.

Example 2.14. The rule $\Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \wedge p_{2}$ of $\mathbf{L K}$ is equivalent to the axiomatic rule $\emptyset / p_{1}, p_{2} \Rightarrow p_{1} \wedge p_{2}$, and the rule $\neg p_{1} \Rightarrow ; p_{2} \Rightarrow ; \Rightarrow p_{1}, \neg p_{2} / p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow$ of $£ 3$ (Example 2.6) is equivalent to the axiomatic rules $\emptyset / p_{1}, p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, p_{2}$ and $\emptyset / \neg p_{2}, p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, p_{2}$.

Theorem 2.15. Every calculus is equivalent to an axiomatic calculus.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that no rule of $G$ includes an empty premise. If such a rule exists, it can be simply omitted. Consider the following transformations of pure rules (all of them are instances of the equivalences in Lemma 2.13):
(1) $S ; \psi \Rightarrow / \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta \longmapsto S / \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta$
(2) $S$; $\Rightarrow \psi / \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta \longmapsto S / \Gamma, \psi \Rightarrow \Delta$
(3) $S ; \Gamma, \psi \Rightarrow \Delta / s \longmapsto\{S ; \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta / s, S ; \psi \Rightarrow / s\}$ for $\Gamma \cup \Delta \neq \emptyset$ and $\psi \notin \Delta$
(4) $S ; \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta / s \longmapsto\{S ; \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta / s, S ; \Rightarrow \psi / s\}$ for $\Gamma \cup \Delta \neq \emptyset$ and $\psi \notin \Gamma$

Given a calculus $G$, we apply these four transformations on the rules of $G$ as long as it is possible. By Lemma 2.13, each step in this process results in a calculus which is equivalent to G. Observing that at least one transformation is applicable to any non-axiomatic rule, it remains to establish termination. For each rule $S / s$, let $\|S / s\|=\sum_{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta \in S}(|\Gamma|+|\Delta|)$. For every set $R$ of rules, we associate the multiset $M_{R}$, given by $M_{R}=\lambda n \in \mathbb{N}$. $|\{r \in R \mid\|r\|=n\}|$. We prove that if $R_{2}$ is obtained from $R_{1}$ by one of the transformations, then $M_{R_{2}}<M_{R_{1}}$, where $<$ is the Dershowitz-Manna well founded ordering over multisets of natural numbers [21]. Clearly, $R_{2}=\left(R_{1} \backslash\{r\}\right) \cup R$ for some set $R$ that is obtained from $r$ by one of the transformations. If the transformation is 1 or 2, then, w.l.o.g., $r$ has the form $S \uplus\{\psi \Rightarrow\} / \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ and $R$ has the form $\{S / \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta\}$. This means that $M_{R_{2}}$ is obtained from $M_{R_{1}}$ by replacing one copy of $\|S ; \psi \Rightarrow / \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta\|$ with a new copy of $\|S ; \psi \Rightarrow / \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta\|-1$. If the transformation is 3 or 4, then, w.l.o.g., $r$ has the form $S \uplus\{\Gamma \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta\} / s$ where $\psi \notin \Delta$ and $\Gamma \cup \Delta \neq \emptyset$, and $R$ has the form $\{S ; \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta / s, S ; \Rightarrow \psi / s\}$. This means that $M_{R_{2}}$ is obtained from $M_{R_{1}}$ by replacing a copy of $\|S ; \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta / s\|$ with a copy of $\|S ; \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta / s\|$ and a copy of $\|S ; \Rightarrow \psi / s\|$. Both are smaller than $\|S ; \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta / s\|$.

Transformations 3 and 4 in the proof of Theorem 2.15 replace one rule by two rules, and thus, translating a calculus into an equivalent axiomatic calculus may require exponential time.

Using the rewriting rules in the proof of Theorem 2.15, written as pure rules, (cut) can be translated into (ID). This, however, has nothing to do with cut-elimination, as our notion of equivalence (Definition 2.12) allows the use of (cut).

## 3 ANALYTICITY

Analyticity is a crucial property of proof systems. In the case of fully-structural propositional sequent calculi, analyticity often implies their decidability and consistency (the fact that the empty sequent is not derivable). Roughly speaking, a calculus is analytic if whenever a sequent $s$ is derivable in it from a set $S$ of sequents, $s$ can be proven using only the "syntactic material available inside $S \cup\{s\}$ ". This "material" is usually taken to consist of all subformulas occurring in $S \cup\{s\}$, and then analyticity amounts to the subformula property. However, weaker restrictions on the formulas that are allowed to appear in derivations of a given sequent may also suffice for decidability and consistency. For example, in $\mathrm{C}_{1}$ and $£ 3$ (Examples 2.5 and 2.6), there are sequents whose derivations require not only subformulas, but also of negations of subformulas of the derived sequent.

In this section we provide a generalized definition of analyticity, which is parametrized by a distinguished set of unary connectives and a natural number. This generalized notion holds for a larger family of calculi and still suffices to ensure decidability and consistency. We then equip this definition with a semantic characterization, which, in addition to providing another viewpoint of (generalized) analyticity, is our main tool for proving this property.

In what follows, $\odot$ denotes an arbitrary subset of unary connectives in $\diamond_{\mathcal{L}}^{1}$ and $k$ denotes an arbitrary positive integer. We denote the set of strings over $\odot$ of length at most $k$ by $\odot^{\leq k}$ (e.g., $\{\neg, \circ\} \leq 2=\{\epsilon, \neg, \circ, \neg \neg, \circ \circ, \neg \circ, \circ \neg\}$, where $\epsilon$ denotes the empty string). For convenience, we use the following notations: for a unary connective $\circ$ and a set $\mathcal{F}$ of formulas, $\circ \mathcal{F}=\{\circ \varphi \mid \varphi \in \mathcal{F}\}$, and for a set $\odot$ of unary connectives, $\odot \varphi=\{\circ \varphi \mid \circ \in \odot\}, \odot \mathcal{F}=\bigcup_{\circ \in \odot} \circ \mathcal{F}, \odot \leq k \varphi=\{\bar{\circ} \varphi \mid \bar{\circ} \in \odot \leq k\}$, and $\odot{ }^{\leq k} \mathcal{F}=\bigcup_{\varphi \in \mathcal{F}}{ }^{\circ}{ }^{\leq k} \varphi$.

Definition 3.1. A formula $\varphi$ is an immediate $\odot-k$-subformula of a formula $\psi$ if either $\psi \in \odot \varphi$, or $\psi=\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right)$ and $\varphi \in \odot{ }^{\leq k} \psi_{i}$ for some $n$-ary connective $\diamond \notin \odot$, formulas $\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}$, and
$1 \leq i \leq n$. The ©- $k$-subformula relation is the reflexive transitive closure of the immediate ©-$k$-subformula relation. We denote the set of $\odot-k$-subformulas of a formula $\psi$ by $s u b_{k}^{\odot}(\psi)$. This notation is naturally extended to sequents, sets of sequents, etc.

Intuitively, ๑- $k$-subformulas of formulas whose main connective is not in © are obtained by prefixing ordinary subformulas with a sequence of ©-elements of length $\leq k$. For formulas whose main connective is in $\odot$, we only take usual subformulas (until we reach a connective outside of $\odot$ ).

Note that $\odot=\emptyset($ and so $\odot \leq k=\{\epsilon\}$ for any $k$ ), the $\odot-k$-subformula relation amounts to the usual subformula relation. In this case we call $\varphi$ a subformula of $\psi$.

Example 3.2.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{sub}_{1}^{\{\neg\}}\left(\neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right)\right) & =\left\{p_{1}, p_{2}, \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2}, p_{1} \supset p_{2}, \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right)\right\} \\
\operatorname{sub}_{2}^{\{\neg\}}\left(\circ p_{1}\right) & =\left\{p_{1}, \neg p_{1}, \neg \neg p_{1}, \circ p_{1}\right\} \\
\operatorname{sub}_{2}^{\{\neg, \circ\}}\left(\circ p_{1}\right) & =\left\{p_{1}, \circ p_{1}\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Before defining analyticity, we study the properties of this generalized subformula relation. The first step is to define an adequate complexity measure $c c$ on formulas. For every $\psi \in \mathcal{L}$, denote by $\bar{o}_{\psi}$ the longest (possibly empty) prefix of $\psi$ consisting of $\odot$-elements, and by $b_{\psi}$ the formula in $\mathcal{L} \backslash \odot \mathcal{L}$ for which $\psi=\bar{\sigma}_{\psi} b_{\psi}$. Let $c: \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be a usual complexity measure on formulas (so that $c(\varphi)<c(\psi)$ whenever $\varphi$ is a proper subformula of $\psi)$. The function $c c: \mathcal{L} \rightarrow(\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N})$ is then given by $c c(\psi)=\left\langle c\left(b_{\psi}\right),\right| \bar{\sigma}_{\psi}| \rangle$, where $\left|\bar{o}_{\psi}\right|$ denotes the length of $\bar{o}_{\psi}$.

Proposition 3.3. $c c(\varphi)<c c(\psi)$ whenever $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of $\psi$ (where $<$ is the standard lexicographic order over $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ ).

Proof. We consider the case that $\varphi$ is an immediate $\odot-k$-subformula of $\psi$. The claim then follows by standard induction. First, if $\psi=\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right)$ and $\varphi \in \odot{ }^{\leq k} \psi_{i}$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $\diamond \notin \odot$, then $c\left(b_{\varphi}\right)=c\left(b_{\psi_{i}}\right) \leq c\left(\psi_{i}\right)<c(\psi)=c\left(b_{\psi}\right)$, and so $c c(\varphi)<c c(\psi)$. Second, if $\psi=\circ \varphi$ for $\circ \in \odot$, then $\bar{\sigma}_{\psi}=\circ \bar{o}_{\varphi}$, and $b_{\psi}=b_{\varphi}$. Hence, $c\left(b_{\psi}\right)=c\left(b_{\varphi}\right)$, but $\left|\bar{o}_{\psi}\right|=\left|\bar{o}_{\varphi}\right|+1$, and so $c c(\varphi)<c c(\psi)$.

Using this complexity measure, it easily follows that the $\odot-k$-subformula relation is antisymmetric. Since every formula has finitely many immediate ©- $k$-subformulas, it also follows (by König's lemma) that $\operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(\psi)$ is finite for every $\psi \in \mathcal{L}$.

In addition, we have the following useful property of the generalized relation:
Lemma 3.4. $\sigma\left(s u b_{k}^{\odot}(\psi)\right) \subseteq s u b_{k}^{\odot}(\sigma(\psi))$ for every formula $\psi$ and substitution $\sigma$.
Next, we define our generalized notion of analyticity.
Definition 3.5 (Analyticity). A calculus G is called $\odot-k$-analytic if $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s$ implies $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\operatorname{sub} \wp_{k}^{\ominus}(S \cup\{s\})} s$ for every set $S$ of sequents and a sequent $s$.
Just like the usual subformula property, ©-k-analyticity of a pure calculus entails its decidability. ${ }^{3}$ Formally:

Definition 3.6. The derivability problem for an $\mathcal{L}$-calculus G is given by:
Input: A finite set $S$ of $\mathcal{L}$-sequents and an $\mathcal{L}$-sequent $s$.
Question: Does $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s$ ?

[^2]Proposition 3.7. The derivability problem is decidable for every $\odot-k$-analytic pure calculus.
Proof. For every $\odot-k$-analytic calculus $G$, finite set $S$ of sequents, and sequent $s$, we have that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s$ iff $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} s$ for $\mathcal{F}=s u b_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})$. Since $\mathcal{F}$ is finite, the latter can be checked by an exhaustive search for derivations of $s$ from $S$ in G that include only $\mathcal{F}$-formulas.

Moreover, ©- $k$-analyticity guarantees the consistency of the calculus provided that the calculus is not trivial:

Proposition 3.8. The empty sequent is not derivable in any $\bigcirc-k$-analytic calculus that does not include the rule $\emptyset / \Rightarrow$.
Proof. A proof of the empty sequent in a ©-k-analytic calculus would entail the existence of a proof that includes no formulas at all. This is only possible in the presence of the rule $\emptyset / \Rightarrow$.
$\emptyset-k$-analytic calculi are calculi that enjoy the usual subformula property. We call such calculi simply analytic. Note that whenever two calculi are equivalent (as defined in Def. 2.12), then one is ๑- $k$-analytic iff the other is.

Analyticity of a given calculus is traditionally proved as a corollary of cut-admissibility. Indeed, if all rules in a pure calculus (except for (cut)) admit the local subformula property (i.e., the premises of each rule consist only of subformulas of the formulas its conclusion), then cut-admissibility implies analyticity. This argument can be easily generalized for $\odot-k$-analyticity. For example, the calculi LK, P, $\mathbf{C}_{1}$ and $£ 3$ (Examples 2.3 to 2.6) admit cut-elimination. Taking into account the structure of their rules, this entails that $L K$ and $P$ are analytic, and that $C_{1}$ and $£ 3$ are $\{\neg\}-1$-analytic.

There are cases, however, in which a sequent calculus does not enjoy cut-admissibility, although it is analytic. Examples include, e.g., sequent calculi for the modal logics $S 5$ and $B$ [41, 44], biintuitionistic logic [40], and several calculi for paraconsistent logics [6]. Other methods for proving ©- $k$-analyticity (independent of cut-admissibility) are thus needed.

Next, we provide a semantic characterization of analyticity that is independent of cut-admissibility. Roughly speaking, to apply this criterion, one has to consider partial bivaluations and show that the existence of a countermodel in the form of such a partial bivaluation entails the existence of an (infinite) full countermodel.

Theorem 3.9. An $\mathcal{L}$-calculus G is $\odot-k$-analytic iff every G -legal bivaluation $v$ can be extended to $a \mathrm{G}$-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation, provided that $\operatorname{dom}(v)$ is finite and closed under $\odot-k$-subformulas.

Proof. Suppose that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s$ but $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathscr{F}} s$ for $\mathcal{F}=\operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})$. By Thm. 2.11, there exists a G-legal $\mathcal{F}$-bivaluation $v$ such that $v(S)=1$ and $v(s)=0$, but $u(S) \leq u(s)$ for every G-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation $u$. Therefore, $v$ cannot be extended to a G-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation. In addition, $\operatorname{dom}(v)=\mathcal{F}$ is finite and closed under ©- $k$-subformulas.

For the converse, suppose that $v$ is a G-legal bivaluation, $\operatorname{dom}(v)$ is finite and closed under ©- $k$-subformulas, and $v$ cannot be extended to a G-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation. Let $s=\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$, where $\Gamma=\{\psi \in \operatorname{dom}(v) \mid v(\psi)=1\}$ and $\Delta=\{\psi \in \operatorname{dom}(v) \mid v(\psi)=0\}$. Then, $\operatorname{dom}(v)=\operatorname{frm}(s)=\operatorname{sub} b_{k}^{\odot}(s)$ and $v(s)=0$. We show that $u(s)=1$ for every G-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation $u$. Indeed, every such $u$ does not extend $v$, and so $u(\psi) \neq v(\psi)$ for some $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}(v)$. Then, $u(\psi)=0$ if $\psi \in \Gamma$, and $u(\psi)=1$ if $\psi \in \Delta$. In either case, $u(s)=1$. By Thm. 2.11, $\forall_{\mathrm{G}}^{\text {sub }}{ }_{\mathrm{K}}(s) s$ and $\vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s$.

Notice that the proof of Theorem 3.9 does not rely on any particular property of the $s u b_{k}^{\odot}$ operator, except for the facts that $\operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(\varphi)$ is always finite and $\varphi \in \operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(\varphi)$.

Often, a slightly weaker notion of analyticity is employed, by considering only cases where

$s$. The proof of Thm. 3.9 shows that this seemingly weaker notion is actually equivalent to the stronger one for pure calculi. Indeed, the second direction of the proof actually shows that if G is weakly $\odot-k$-analytic then every G-legal bivaluation $v$ can be extended to a G-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation, provided that $\operatorname{dom}(v)$ is finite and closed under $\odot-k$-subformulas. ${ }^{4}$

Example 3.10. Consider a calculus $G$ consisting of the following rules:

$$
p_{1} \Rightarrow / \circ p_{1} \Rightarrow \quad p_{1} \Rightarrow / \Rightarrow \circ p_{1}
$$

The G-legal bivaluation $v$ defined by $\operatorname{dom}(v)=\left\{p_{1}\right\}$ and $v\left(p_{1}\right)=0$ cannot be extended to a full G-legal bivaluation: the first rule forces $v\left(o p_{1}\right)=0$, while the second requires $v\left(\circ p_{1}\right)=1$. Indeed, G is not analytic, as the sequent $\Rightarrow p_{1}$ is derivable in it, but only using (a cut on) the formula $\circ p_{1}$.

In the next section (§4), we show that $\odot-k$-analyticity also allows for a uniform SAT-based decision procedure. Section 5 studies methods for constructing $\odot-k$-analytic calculi.

## 4 SAT-BASED DECISION PROCEDURE

As shown in §3, the derivability problem of a given calculus is decidable whenever the calculus is $\bigcirc-k$-analytic for some $\odot$ and $k$. However, the mere decidability of this problem does not provide an efficient decision procedure. A great deal of ingenuity is often required for developing efficient proof-search algorithms for sequent calculi (see, e.g., [20]).

In this section we show that for $\odot-k$-analytic pure calculi it is possible to replace proof-search by SAT solving. This is done using a polynomial-time reduction of the derivability problem to the complement of SAT. While SAT is NP-complete, it is considered "easy" when it comes to real-world applications. Indeed, there are many off-the-shelf SAT solvers, that, despite an exponential worstcase time complexity, are considered extremely efficient (see, e.g., [27]). Indeed, our implementation of the reduction, once integrated with a modern SAT solver has good performance.

To achieve the above, we utilize the semantic view of pure sequent calculi (see §2.3), that allows us to reduce the derivability problem in a given analytic sequent calculus to small countermodel search, which can be be easily given in terms of a SAT instance. We start by precisely defining the reduction, proceed by proving its correctness, and its polynomial time complexity. Then we briefly describe the implementation.

SAT instances are taken to be CNFs represented as sets of clauses, where clauses are sets of literals (that is, atomic variables and their negations, denoted by overlines). The set $\left\{x_{\psi} \mid \psi \in \mathcal{L}\right\}$ is used as the set of atomic variables in the SAT instances. The translation of sequents to SAT instances is naturally given by:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{SAT}^{+}(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta)=\left\{\left\{\overline{x_{\psi}} \mid \psi \in \Gamma\right\} \cup\left\{x_{\psi} \mid \psi \in \Delta\right\}\right\} \\
& \operatorname{SAT}^{-}(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta)=\left\{\left\{x_{\psi}\right\} \mid \psi \in \Gamma\right\} \cup\left\{\left\{\overline{x_{\psi}}\right\} \mid \psi \in \Delta\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

This translation captures the semantic interpretation of sequents. Indeed, given an $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation $v$ and a classical assignment $u$ that assigns true to $x_{\psi}$ iff $v(\psi)=1$, we have that for every $\mathcal{L}$-sequent $s: v(s)=1$ iff $u$ satisfies $\operatorname{SAT}^{+}(s)$, and $v(s)=0$ iff $u$ satisfies $\operatorname{SAT}^{-}(s)$. Now, for a bivaluation to be G-legal for some calculus $\mathbf{G}$, it should satisfy the semantic restrictions arising from the rules of G (recall Def. 2.9). These restrictions can be directly encoded as SAT instances (as done, e.g., in [31] for the classical truth tables).

In the following reduction, we assume that the given calculus is axiomatic. If it is not, it can be transformed into an equivalent axiomatic calculus (see Thm. 2.15).

[^3]Definition 4.1. The SAT instance associated with a given axiomatic $\mathcal{L}$-calculus G, a subset © of $\diamond_{\mathcal{L}}^{1}$, a natural number $k \geq 0$, a set of $\mathcal{L}$-sequents $S$ and an $\mathcal{L}$-sequent $s$, denoted $\operatorname{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}(\mathrm{G}, S, s)$, consists of the following clauses:
(1) $\mathrm{SAT}^{+}\left(s^{\prime}\right)$ for every $s^{\prime} \in S$
(2) $\mathrm{SAT}^{-}(s)$
(3) $\operatorname{SAT}^{+}\left(\sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)$ for every rule $\emptyset / s^{\prime}$ of $\mathbf{G}$ and substitution $\sigma$ such that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq s u b_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})$

Example 4.2. Consider the $\{\neg\}$-1-analytic calculus $£ 3$ for $Ł u k a s i e w i c z ~ t h r e e-v a l u e d ~ l o g i c ~(E x a m p l e ~ 2.6) . ~$. Its axiomatic version, $A x(Ł 3)$, contains the rules $\emptyset / p_{1}, p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, p_{2}$ and $\emptyset / \neg p_{2}, p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow$ $\neg p_{1}, p_{2}$ (Example 2.14). Accordingly, $\operatorname{SAT}_{1}^{\{\neg\}}(A x(Ł 3), S, s)$ includes the clauses $\left\{\overline{\chi_{\psi_{1}}}, \overline{x_{\psi_{1}} \supset \psi_{2}}, x_{\neg \psi_{1}}, x_{\psi_{2}}\right\}$ and $\left\{\overline{x_{\neg \psi_{2}}}, \overline{x_{\psi_{1}} \supset \psi_{2}}, x_{\neg \psi_{1}}, x_{\psi_{2}}\right\}$ for every formula of the form $\psi_{1} \supset \psi_{2}$ in sub ${ }_{1}^{\{\neg\}}(S \cup\{s\})$.

The correctness of this reduction directly follows from our definitions and Thm. 2.11:
Theorem 4.3. For any $\odot-k$-analytic axiomatic $\mathcal{L}$-calculus G , we have $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s$ iff $\operatorname{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}(\mathrm{G}, S, s)$ is unsatisfiable.

Proof. Suppose that $S \forall_{\mathrm{G}}$ s. By Thm. 2.11, there exists a G-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation $v$ such that $v(S)>v(s)$. The classical assignment $u$ that assigns true to $x_{\psi}$ iff $v(\psi)=1$ satisfies $\operatorname{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}(\mathrm{G}, S, s)$.

For the converse, let $u$ be a classical assignment satisfying $\operatorname{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}(G, S, s)$. Let $\mathcal{F}=\operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})$. Consider the $\mathcal{F}$-bivaluation $v$ defined by $v(\psi)=1$ iff $u$ assigns true to $x_{\psi} \cdot v$ is G-legal, and $v(S)>v(s)$. By Thm. 2.11, $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathscr{F}}$ s. Since G is $\odot-k$-analytic, we may conclude that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s$.

Now, we show that this reduction is computable in polynomial time.
Definition 4.4. The $\odot-k$-complexity of an axiomatic rule $\emptyset / s$, denoted $c_{k}^{\odot}(\emptyset / s)$, is the minimal size of a set $\Gamma \subseteq f r m(s)$ such that $f r m(s) \subseteq \operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(\Gamma)$. The $\odot-k$-complexity of an axiomatic calculus G , denoted $c_{k}^{\odot}(\mathbf{G})$, is given by $\max \left\{c_{k}^{\odot}(r) \mid r \in \mathrm{G}\right\}$. If $\odot=\emptyset$, we denote $c_{k}^{\odot}$ by $c$.

Example 4.5. $c\left(\emptyset / p_{1}, p_{2} \Rightarrow p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right)=1, c\left(\emptyset / p_{1}, p_{1} \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, p_{2}\right)=2$ and $c_{1}^{\{\neg\}}\left(\emptyset / p_{1}, p_{1} \supset\right.$ $\left.p_{2} \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, p_{2}\right)=1$. By similar calculations for the other rules of LK and $£ 3$, we obtain that $c(A x(\mathbf{L K}))=1, c(A x(\mathrm{E} 3))=2$, and $c_{1}^{\{\neg\}}(A x(\mathrm{E} 3))=1$.

Theorem 4.6. Let G be an axiomatic $\mathcal{L}$-calculus. Given $S$ and $s$, the SAT instance $\operatorname{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}(G, S, s)$ is computable in $O\left(n^{m}\right)$ time, where $n$ is the length of the string representing $S$ and s and $m=c_{k}^{\odot}(\mathrm{G})$.

Proof. The following algorithm computes $\mathrm{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}(\mathrm{G}, S, s)$ :
(1) Build a parse tree for the input using standard techniques. As usual, every node represents an occurrence of some subformula in $S \cup\{s\}$.
(2) Using, e.g., the linear time algorithm from [15], compress the parse tree into an ordered dag by maximally unifying identical subtrees. After the compression, the nodes of the dag represent subformulas of $S \cup\{s\}$, rather than occurrences. Hence we may identify nodes with their corresponding formulas.
(3) Traverse the dag. For every $\bar{\sigma} \in \odot^{\leq k}$ and node $v$ that has a parent that is labeled with an element from $\diamond_{\mathcal{L}} \backslash \odot$, add a new path ending with $v$, such that the concatenation of the path is $\bar{o}$, if such a path does not exist. To do so it is possible to maintain in each node $v$ a constant-size list of all elements of $\odot{ }^{\leq k}$ that end with $v$. Note that after these additions, the nodes of the dag one-to-one correspond to $\operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})$.
(4) $\operatorname{SAT}^{-}(s)$ is obtained by traversing the dag and generating $\left\{x_{\psi}\right\}$ for every $\psi$ on the left-hand side of $s$ and $\left\{\overline{x_{\psi}}\right\}$ for every $\psi$ on the right-hand side of $s$.
(5) For every $s^{\prime} \in S, \operatorname{SAT}^{+}\left(s^{\prime}\right)$ is obtained similarly.
(6)
$\cup\left\{\operatorname{SAT}^{+}\left(\sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \mid \emptyset / s^{\prime} \in \mathrm{G}, \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})\right\}$ is generated by iterating over the rules of G. For each rule $\emptyset / s^{\prime}$, let $\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{m^{\prime}}\left(m^{\prime} \leq m\right)$ be formulas such that frm $\left(s^{\prime}\right)$ consists only of © $\odot$ - $k$-subformulas of $\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{m^{\prime}}$. Go over all $m^{\prime}$-tuples of nodes in the dag. For each $m^{\prime}$ nodes $v_{1}, \ldots, v_{m^{\prime}}$ check whether $v_{1}, \ldots, v_{m^{\prime}}$ match the pattern given by $\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{m^{\prime}}$, and if so, construct a mapping $h$ from the formulas in $s u b_{k}^{\odot}\left(s^{\prime}\right)$ to their matching nodes. Then, construct a clause consisting of a literal $\overline{x_{h(\varphi)}}$ for every $\varphi$ on the left-hand side of $s^{\prime}$, and a literal $x_{h(\varphi)}$ for every $\varphi$ on the right-hand side of $s^{\prime}$. Note that only a constant depth of the sub-dags rooted at $v_{1}, \ldots, v_{m^{\prime}}$ is considered-that is the complexity of $\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{m^{\prime}}$, in addition to nodes on paths that represent elements of $\odot \leq k$. These are independent of the input $S \cup\{s\}$. To see that we generate exactly all required clauses, note that a substitution $\sigma$ satisfies $\sigma\left(f r m\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq s u b_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})$ iff $\sigma\left(\left\{\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{m^{\prime}}\right\}\right) \subseteq s u b_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})$. Thus, there exists a substitution $\sigma$ satisfying $\sigma\left(f r m\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(S \cup\{s\})$ iff there are $m^{\prime}$ nodes matching the patterns given by $\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{m^{\prime}}$.
Steps $1,2,3,4$ and 5 require linear time. Each pattern matching in step 6 is done in constant time, and so handling a rule $r$ with $c_{k}^{\odot}(r) \leq m$ takes $O\left(n^{m}\right)$ time. Thus step 6 requires $O\left(n^{m}\right)$ time.

Remark 1. We employ the same standard computation model of analysis of algorithms used in [19]. An efficient implementation of this algorithm cannot afford the variables $x_{\psi}$ to literally include a full string representation of $\psi$. Thus we assume that each node has a key that can be printed and manipulated in constant time (e.g., its memory address).

Corollary 4.7. For any $\odot-k$-analytic calculus G , the derivability problem for G is in co-NP.

### 4.1 Linear Time Decision Procedure

Theorem 4.6 shows that the SAT instance $\mathrm{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}(\mathrm{G}, S, s)$ can be efficiently generated. Thus, it is natural to identify calculi whose corresponding SAT instances can be also efficiently decided. For example, when the generated clauses are all Horn clauses, satisfiability (HORNSAT) can be decided in linear time [22]. This is the case for Horn calculi, as defined next.

Definition 4.8. A rule is called a Horn rule if the sum of the number of formulas in the right-hand side of the conclusion and the number of premises with a non-empty left-hand side is at most one. A calculus is called a Horn calculus if each of its rules is a Horn rule.

Example 4.9. All rules of LK except for $(\Rightarrow \neg),(\vee \Rightarrow)$ and $(\Rightarrow)$ ) are Horn.
Definition 4.8 captures the structure of a calculus that ensures that its equivalent axiomatic calculus consists solely of single-conclusion sequents (sequents with at most one formula on the right-hand side). In turn, the corresponding SAT-instances (see Def. 4.1) are all Horn clauses:

Proposition 4.10. Let G be a Horn calculus, $S$ a set of single-conclusion sequents, and sa sequent. Then $\mathrm{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}(\mathrm{G}, S, s)$ consists solely of Horn clauses.

Proof. By Thm. 2.15, there exists an axiomatic calculus $\mathrm{G}^{\prime}$ that is equivalent to G . It is easy to verify that $\mathrm{G}^{\prime}$ is also a Horn calculus, and that when $S$ is a set of single-conclusion sequents, $\mathrm{SAT}_{k}^{\odot}\left(\mathbf{G}^{\prime}, S, s\right)$ consists solely of Horn clauses.

As a corollary, we obtain a $O\left(n^{c_{k}^{\odot}(G)}\right)$-time decision procedure for the derivability problem for every $\odot-k$-analytic Horn calculus $G$. When $c_{k}^{\odot}(\mathbf{G})=1$ (that is, when each rule $r$ has some 'main' formula $\varphi$ so that all other formulas that appear in $r$ are $\odot-k$-subformulas of the $\varphi$ ), a linear time decision procedure is obtained.

Example 4.11. [11] presents a reduction from the derivability problem for $\mathbf{P}$ to HORNSAT. This reduction is a particular instance of the reduction presented above, and produces a linear time decision procedure for this logic. One may also require that the disjunction of $\mathbf{P}$ is symmetric by adding the pure axiomatic rule $r=\emptyset / p_{1} \vee p_{2} \Rightarrow p_{2} \vee p_{1}$. The obtained calculus is also analytic and Horn. However, $c(r)=2$, and so the resulting calculus will no longer have a complexity measure of 1 , but of 2 . The algorithm described in Thm. 4.6 will then require quadratic time, and thus the entire decision procedure will also require quadratic time.

Below (see Example 5.14) we also consider an extension of P, called EP, that is still a Horn calculus with $c(\mathbf{E P})=1$, and thus, as $\mathbf{P}$, it admits a linear-time HORNSAT-based decision procedure. Another example presented below is the Horn calculus DY (Example 5.8) for the Dolev-Yao model of intruder deductions, which again admits a linear-time HORNSAT-based decision procedure.

Example 4.12. The linear time decision procedure for dual-Horn clauses can be utilized as well. For example, consider the analytic calculus $\mathbf{P}_{d}$ that consists of the rules $(\vee \Rightarrow),(\Rightarrow \vee),(\wedge \Rightarrow)$ of LK and the following ones for "dual primal implication":

$$
(<\Rightarrow) \quad p_{1} \Rightarrow / p_{1}<p_{2} \Rightarrow \quad(\Rightarrow<) \quad \Rightarrow p_{1} ; p_{2} \Rightarrow / \Rightarrow p_{1}<p_{2}
$$

Clearly, $c\left(\mathbf{P}_{d}\right)=1$. In addition, for any sequent $s$ and a set $S$ of "single-assumption sequents" (sequents of the form $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ with $|\Gamma| \leq 1$ ), $\mathrm{SAT}_{k}^{\top}\left(\mathbf{P}_{d}, S, s\right)$ consists of dual-Horn clauses (for any $k$ ). Thus the derivability problem for $\mathbf{P}_{d}$ can be decided in linear time.

### 4.2 Implementation

We have implemented our reduction in a tool called Gen2sat, available at http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/ research/yoni.zohar/gen2sat.html, and described and evaluated in [46]. Gen2sat is implemented in Java, and uses the SAT-solver sat4j [37]. For a given pure calculus G (possibly augmented by Next-operators as described in §7) and an input sequent $s$, Gen2sat decides whether $s$ is derivable in G. If $s$ is not derivable, the tool provides a countermodel. If it is derivable, the tool provides a sub-calculus in which $s$ is already derivable (using the explanation for the lack of a countermodel given by sat4j). The input to Gen2sat can also be the output of a tool called Paralyzer that transforms Hilbert calculi of a certain general form into equivalent analytic sequent calculi [17]. Gen2sat was recently used for educational purposes in a logic course for Information Systems graduate students at the University of Haifa [45].

## 5 IDENTIFYING AND CONSTRUCTING ANALYTIC CALCULI

Proof theory reveals a wide mosaic of possibilities for non-classical logics, and in particular, for sub-classical logics (logics that are strictly contained in classical logic). By choosing a subset of derivation rules that are derivable in (a proof system for) classical logic, one easily obtains a (proof system for a) sub-classical logic. Various important and useful non-classical logics can be formalized in this way, with the most prominent example being intuitionistic logic. In general, the resulting logics come at first with no semantics, and might be unusable for computational purposes, since the new calculi might not be analytic. This is evident within the framework of Hilbert-style calculi, which are rarely analytic. But, even for Gentzen-type sequent calculi, where the initial proof system for classical logic LK is analytic, there is no guarantee that an arbitrary collection of classically derivable sequent rules constitutes an analytic sequent calculus.

The purpose of this section is to provide a simple criterion for a given calculus to be ©- $k$-analytic, as well as a method for constructing new ©-k-analytic calculi. (Once such calculi are obtained, they are, of course, subject to the reduction to SAT presented in §4.)

While the semantic characterization of $\odot-k$-analyticity from Thm. 3.9 provides meaningful insights on this property, it is not effective for determining $\odot-k$-analyticity, as in order to use it, one needs to go over an infinite set of bivaluations, and check whether they can be fully extended. Therefore, a decidable syntactic criterion for $\odot-k$-analyticity is desired.

In §5.1 we generalize the result of [10] in order to provide a sufficient syntactic criterion for ©- $k$-analyticity. Calculi that admit this criterion are then used in $\S 5.2$ for providing a method to construct $\odot-k$-analytic calculi. Section 5.3 includes a detailed proof of the key lemma that is required for these results.

### 5.1 Sufficient Criterion for Analyticity

In this section we generalize the coherence condition from [10], which was given for canonical calculi, and show that the generalized condition ensures analyticity. Roughly speaking, canonical calculi are pure calculi in which each rule introduces exactly one connective in the conclusion, and all premises include only atomic formulas. Here we relax these requirements, and allow several connectives to be mentioned in one conclusion, as well as non atomic formulas in the premises. We require that all premises include only $\odot-k$-subformulas of the conclusion, and that only one formula appears in the conclusion of the rule.

Definition 5.1. A rule $r$ is called $\odot-k$-ordered if every formula in its premises is a proper $\odot-k$ subformula of some formula in its conclusion. Further, $r$ is called $\odot-k$-directed if it is $\odot-k$-ordered, and its conclusion has the form $\Rightarrow \varphi$ or $\varphi \Rightarrow$ for some formula $\varphi$. A calculus is called $\odot-k$-directed if it consists of $\odot-k$-directed rules. We call a $\emptyset-k$-directed rule (calculus) directed (for any $k$ ).

Example 5.2. The calculi LK and $\mathbf{P}$ (Examples 2.3 and 2.4) are directed, while the calculi $\mathbf{C}_{1}$ and Ł3 (Examples 2.5 and 2.6) are $\{\neg\}$-1-directed.

In [10], a coherence property was defined for canonical calculi, and was shown to be a necessary and sufficient condition for their analyticity. Roughly speaking, a canonical calculus is coherent if whenever two rules share the same formula in their conclusion, but on different sides, the empty sequent is derivable from their premises using only (cut). We generalize this requirement for the case of $\odot-k$-directed calculi:

Definition 5.3. A ©- $k$-directed calculus G is called coherent if for every two rules of G of the forms $S_{1} / \Rightarrow \varphi_{1}$ and $S_{2} / \varphi_{2} \Rightarrow$, and two substitutions $\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}$, if $\sigma_{1}\left(\varphi_{1}\right)=\sigma_{2}\left(\varphi_{2}\right)$, then the empty sequent is derivable from $\sigma_{1}\left(S_{1}\right) \cup \sigma_{2}\left(S_{2}\right)$ using only (cut).

For canonical calculi, this definition coincides with that of [10]. Also, it is decidable whether a given calculus is coherent or not: for each pair of rules $S_{1} / \Rightarrow \varphi_{1}$ and $S_{2} / \varphi_{2} \Rightarrow$, one can first rename the atomic variables so that no atomic variable occurs in both rules, and then it suffices to check the above condition for the most general unifier of $\varphi_{1}$ and $\varphi_{2}$.

Example 5.4. LK, $\mathbf{P}$ and $£ 3$ are coherent, while $\mathbf{C}_{1}$ is not. Indeed, for the rules $p_{1} \Rightarrow / \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}$ and $p_{1} \Rightarrow / \neg \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow$ of $\mathrm{C}_{1}$, if $\sigma_{1}\left(p_{1}\right)=\neg p_{1}$ and $\sigma_{2}\left(p_{1}\right)=p_{1}$, we have $\sigma_{1}\left(\neg p_{1}\right)=\sigma_{2}\left(\neg \neg p_{1}\right)$, but the empty sequent cannot be derived from $\neg p_{1} \Rightarrow$ and $p_{1} \Rightarrow$ using only (cut).

Our notion of coherence suffices for $\odot-k$-analyticity in $\odot-k$-directed calculi:
Theorem 5.5. Every coherent $\odot-k$-directed calculus is $\odot-k$-analytic.
This theorem is obtained as a corollary of Thm. 5.10 below. Before turning to Thm. 5.10 and deriving Thm. 5.5, we present some examples and applications.

Example 5.6. LK and $\mathbf{P}$ are coherent and directed, and hence they are analytic. $£ 3$ is coherent and $\{\neg\}$-1-directed, and hence it is $\{\neg\}$-1-analytic. Similarly, every canonical system (as defined in [10]) is directed, and hence every coherent canonical system is analytic.

Example 5.7 (Hierarchy of double negations). The paper [29] studies an infinite family, denoted $\left\{L 2^{n+2} \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\right\}$, of pure sequent calculi for non-classical logics that admit the double negation principle as well as its weaker forms (e.g., $\neg \neg \neg \psi \leftrightarrow \neg \psi$ ). For example, the calculus $L 4$, whose $\{\neg, \wedge, \vee\}$-fragment captures the relevance logic of first-degree entailment [1], is obtained by augmenting LK $\backslash\{(\neg \Rightarrow),(\Rightarrow \neg)\}$ with the following rules:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& p_{1}, \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \quad \Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow \neg p_{2} / \Rightarrow \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \\
& \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow ; \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \quad \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2} / \Rightarrow \neg\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \\
& \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2} \Rightarrow / \neg\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \quad \Rightarrow \neg p_{1} ; \Rightarrow \neg p_{2} / \Rightarrow \neg\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right) \\
& p_{1} \Rightarrow / \neg \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow
\end{aligned}
$$

This calculus is coherent and $\{\neg\}$-1-directed, and hence, by Thm. 5.5, it is $\{\neg\}$-1-analytic. Moreover, it can be easily observed that for every $n, L 2^{n+2}$ is coherent and $\{\neg\}-n+1$-directed, and thus, it is $\{\neg\}-n+1$-analytic.

Example 5.8 (Dolev-Yao intruder deductions). In [18], a formal deductive system for the Dolev-Yao intruder model was presented. Its language consists of two binary connectives: pairing, denoted $\langle\cdot, \cdot\rangle$, and encryption, denoted [•]. (where the argument in the subscript represents the key). Formulated as an Hilbert calculus, which we call $\mathcal{H}$, this system includes the rules of the first column in the following table:

|  | $\mathcal{H}$ | $\mathrm{G}(\mathcal{H})$ | DY |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Pairing | $p_{1} ; p_{2} /\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle$ | $\Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle$ | $\Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle$ |
| Unpairing | $\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle / p_{1}$ | $\Rightarrow\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle / \Rightarrow p_{1}$ | $p_{1} \Rightarrow /\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle \Rightarrow$ |
|  | $\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle / p_{2}$ | $\Rightarrow\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle / \Rightarrow p_{2}$ | $p_{2} \Rightarrow /\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle \Rightarrow$ |
| Encryption | $p_{1} ; p_{2} /\left[p_{1}\right]_{p_{2}}$ | $\Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow\left[p_{1}\right]_{p_{2}}$ | $\Rightarrow p_{1} ; \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow\left[p_{1}\right]_{p_{2}}$ |
| Decryption | $\left[p_{1}\right]_{p_{2}} ; p_{2} / p_{1}$ | $\Rightarrow\left[p_{1}\right]_{p_{2}} ; \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1}$ | $p_{1} \Rightarrow ; \Rightarrow p_{2} /\left[p_{1}\right]_{p_{2}} \Rightarrow$ |

The middle column of the table provides a pure sequent calculus, denoted $\mathrm{G}(\mathcal{H})$, that is obtained from $\mathcal{H}$ (as sketched in Footnote 3). The right column includes a calculus, which we call DY, obtained from $\mathrm{G}(\mathcal{H})$ by streamlining (see Lemma 2.13). DY is coherent and directed, and thus by Thm. 5.5, it is analytic.

### 5.2 Constructing Analytic Calculi

While Thm. 5.5 allows us to prove that many calculi are ©- $k$-analytic (by observing that they are $\odot-k$-directed and coherent), some calculi are left out. For example, $\mathrm{C}_{1}$ (Example 2.5) is $\{\neg\}-1-$ analytic, but it is not coherent. To capture $\mathrm{C}_{1}$ and other useful calculi, we introduce a more general method to prove $\odot-k$-analyticity, which is, in fact, a method for obtaining calculi that are analytic by construction.
As a motivating example, consider the atomic paraconsistent $\operatorname{logic} P_{1}$ from [42], that allows contradictions on atomic formulas, but forbids them on compound ones. That is, in $P_{1}$ we have that every formula $\varphi$ follows from $\{\psi, \neg \psi\}$ when $\psi$ is compound, but not from $\{p, \neg p\}$. Since the explosion principle is manifested in LK through the rule $(\neg \Rightarrow)$, a natural way to design a sequent calculus for $P_{1}$ is to allow applications of $(\neg \Rightarrow)$ only on compound formulas. This is achieved by the following calculus, denoted P1, obtained from LK by replacing ( $\neg \Rightarrow$ ) with several weaker
variants of it, namely, with its following applications:

$$
\begin{array}{cl}
\Rightarrow \neg p_{1} / \neg \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow & \Rightarrow p_{1} \wedge p_{2} / \neg\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \\
\Rightarrow p_{1} \vee p_{2} / \neg\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow & \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{2} / \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow
\end{array}
$$

As we shall see in what follows, this type of construction is subject to the criterion that we propose in this section. Thus, the analyticity of P1 is established in Example 5.11 below (note that P1 is directed and coherent, and so one could also use Thm. 5.5 above).

The general construction of $\odot-k$-analytic calculi that we present is obtained by joining applications of rules of a certain basic coherent ©- $k$-directed calculus. The derivable rules that are collected to create new calculi will be applications of existing rules. Note that, following our definitions, every pure rule is an application of itself (using the identity substitution and the empty context sequents), and every application of a pure rule constitutes a new, perhaps weaker, pure rule. In particular, we may apply Def. 5.1 to applications of rules, and speak about ©-k-ordered applications (i.e., an application in which every formula that occurs in the premises is a proper ©- $k$-subformula of some formula that occurs in the conclusion). Also observe that an application $\left\langle\sigma\left(s_{1}\right) \cup c_{1}, \ldots, \sigma\left(s_{n}\right) \cup c_{n} / \sigma(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right\rangle$ of a rule $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s$ is ©-k-ordered iff every formula of the context sequents $c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n}$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of some formula in $\sigma(s)$.

Example 5.9. The following are ordered, $\{\neg\}$-1-ordered and $\{\neg\}$-2-ordered applications of the rule ( $\supset \Rightarrow$ ) of LK (respectively):

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{p_{2} \Rightarrow p_{1} \wedge p_{2} \quad p_{1}, p_{2} \Rightarrow}{p_{1}, p_{2},\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \supset p_{2} \Rightarrow} \\
\frac{\neg \neg p_{3} \Rightarrow p_{1} \wedge p_{2}}{\neg \neg p_{3},\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \supset\left(p_{2} \supset p_{3}\right) \Rightarrow \neg\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right)}
\end{gathered}
$$

Our main result for this section is the following theorem that provides a method for constructing ©- $k$-analytic calculi.

Theorem 5.10. Let $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$ be $a \odot-k$-directed coherent calculus. Then, every calculus consisting of rules that are $\odot-k$-ordered applications of rules of $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$ is $\odot-k$-analytic.

First, observe that Thm. 5.5 is obtained as a corollary:
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Every rule of $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$ is a trivial ©- $k$-ordered application of itself, and, by Thm. 5.10, $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$ itself is $\odot-k$-analytic.

Before proving Thm. 5.10, we present several examples. For these examples we collect applications of $\mathbf{L K}$ (i.e., we take $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}=\mathbf{L K}$ ), which is coherent and $\odot-k$-directed for every $\odot$ and $k$.

Example 5.11 (Atomic paraconsistent logic). The calculus P1 described above for Sette's atomic paraconsistent logic can be constructed using the method of Thm. 5.10. Begin with LK $\backslash\{(\neg \Rightarrow)\}$, and add the above ordered applications of $(\neg \Rightarrow)$ to allow left-introduction of negation only for compound formulas. By Thm. 5.10, this calculus is analytic. Note that P1 is equivalent to the calculus given in [2] for this logic.

In some cases, when adding a new rule $r$ to an existing calculus G , some premises of $r$ are already derivable in G. For example, consider augmenting $\mathbf{P}$ (Example 2.4) with the rule $\perp \Rightarrow p_{1} / \Rightarrow \perp \supset p_{1}$, which is an application of $(\Rightarrow \supset)$. Since $\perp \Rightarrow p_{1}$ is derivable in $\mathbf{P}$, it is a redundant premise: one can alternatively add the rule $\emptyset / \Rightarrow \perp \supset p_{1}$. The next proposition is used for omitting such redundant premises in the following examples.

Proposition 5.12. Let G be a pure calculus, and let $r=S / s$ be a rule of G such that $\vdash_{\mathrm{G}} \mathrm{s}^{\prime}$ for some $s^{\prime} \in S$. Let $\mathbf{G}^{\prime}=(\mathbf{G} \backslash\{r\}) \cup\left\{r^{\prime}\right\}$, wherer $r^{\prime}=\left(S \backslash\left\{s^{\prime}\right\}\right) /$ s. Then $\vdash_{G_{G}}=\vdash_{G^{\prime}}$, and if $G$ is $\odot-k$-analytic then so is $\mathrm{G}^{\prime}$.

Proof. To see that $\vdash_{\mathrm{G}}=\vdash_{\mathrm{G}^{\prime}}$, note that every derivation in G is also a derivation in $\mathrm{G}^{\prime}$, and every derivation in $\mathbf{G}^{\prime}$ can be turned into a derivation in $\mathbf{G}$, by first deriving $\sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)$ for an appropriate $\sigma$, and then applying $r$ instead of $r^{\prime}$. Now, suppose that G is $\odot-k$-analytic. We prove that so is $\mathrm{G}^{\prime}$. Let $S_{0}$ be a set of sequents and $s_{0}$ a sequent such that $S_{0} \vdash_{G^{\prime}} s_{0}$. Let $\mathcal{F}=s u b_{k}^{\odot}\left(S_{0} \cup\left\{s_{0}\right\}\right)$. We show that $S_{0} \vdash_{G^{\prime}}^{\mathcal{F}} s_{0}$. Since $\vdash_{G}=\vdash_{G^{\prime}}$, we have $S_{0} \vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s_{0}$. Since G is ©-k-analytic, it follows that $S_{0} \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathcal{F}} s_{0}$. The derivation of $s_{0}$ from $S_{0}$ in $G$ that uses only $\mathcal{F}$-formulas is also a derivation in $\mathbf{G}^{\prime}$, and thus we have $S_{0} \vdash_{\mathrm{G}^{\prime}}^{\mathcal{F}} s_{0}$.

Example 5.13. In [8], it was shown that $\mathbf{C}_{1}$ (Example 2.5) is $\{\neg\}$-1-analytic, as a corollary of cutadmissibility. Using the methods of this section, we provide a simpler proof of the $\{\neg\}$-1-analyticity of $\mathrm{C}_{1}$. For this purpose, we construct a calculus which is equivalent to $\mathrm{C}_{1}$, which we call $\mathrm{C}_{1}{ }^{\prime}$. Take $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$ to be LK , and G to be $\mathrm{LK} \backslash\{(\neg \Rightarrow)\}$. By Thm. 5.5, G is $\{\neg\}$-1-analytic. $\mathrm{C}_{1}{ }^{\prime}$ is obtained by augmenting $G$ with the following rules:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\emptyset / \neg \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{1} & \\
\emptyset / p_{1}, \neg p_{1}, \neg\left(p_{1} \wedge \neg p_{1}\right) \Rightarrow & \emptyset / \neg\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2} \\
\emptyset / \neg\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, p_{2} & \emptyset / \neg\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2} \\
\emptyset / \neg\left(p_{1} \vee p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow p_{1}, \neg p_{2} & \emptyset / \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow p_{1}, p_{2} \\
\emptyset / \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow p_{1}, \neg p_{2} & \emptyset / \neg\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2}
\end{array}
$$

Every rule here has the form $\emptyset / s$, where $s$ is the conclusion of a $\{\neg\}$-1-ordered application of the rule $(\neg \Rightarrow)$ of $G_{B}$, whose premises are all derivable in $\mathbf{G}$. For example, $\neg\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2}$ is the conclusion of the following $\{\neg\}$-1-ordered application of $(\neg \Rightarrow)$, whose premise is derivable in G :

$$
\frac{\Rightarrow p_{1} \wedge p_{2}, \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2}}{\neg\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow \neg p_{1}, \neg p_{2}}
$$

By Thm. 5.10 and Prop. 5.12, $\mathrm{C}_{1}{ }^{\prime}$ is $\{\neg\}$-1-analytic. Using Lemma 2.13, it is easy to see that $\mathrm{C}_{1}{ }^{\prime}$ is equivalent to $C_{1}$, and furthermore, its $\{\neg\}$-1-analyticity entails the $\{\neg\}$-1-analyticity of $\mathrm{C}_{1}$.

Example 5.14. The calculus $\mathbf{P}$ (Example 2.4) is analytic, as shown in Example 5.6. Its analyticity also follows from the fact that it consists of ordered applications of rules of $\mathbf{L K}$ (the only rule in $\mathbf{P}$ which is not in LK is $\Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{2}$, which is an ordered application of $p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{2} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{2}$ ). It is also possible to augment $\mathbf{P}$ with additional rules in order to make it somewhat closer to LK, without compromising its analyticity. For example, an extended calculus, which we denote by EP, is obtained by augmenting $\mathbf{P}$ with the following set of rules, which recover some natural properties of the classical connectives (none of them is derivable in P ):

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\emptyset / \Rightarrow \perp \supset p_{1} & \emptyset / p_{1} \vee p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{1} & \emptyset / \Rightarrow p_{1} \supset p_{1} \\
\emptyset / \perp \vee p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{1} & \emptyset / p_{1}, \neg p_{1} \Rightarrow & \emptyset / \Rightarrow\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \supset p_{1} \\
\emptyset / p_{1} \vee \perp \Rightarrow p_{1} & \emptyset / p_{1} \vee\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \Rightarrow p_{1} & \emptyset / \Rightarrow\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \supset p_{2} \\
\emptyset /\left(p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right) \vee p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{1} & \emptyset / \Rightarrow p_{2} \supset\left(p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right) &
\end{array}
$$

Each of these rules has the form $\emptyset / s$, where $s$ is the conclusion of an ordered application of a rule of LK, whose premises are all derivable in P. By Thm. 5.10 and a repeated application of Prop. 5.12, augmenting $\mathbf{P}$ with these axiomatic rules results in an analytic calculus.

### 5.3 Proof of Theorem 5.10

Let G be a calculus that consists of $\odot-k$-ordered applications of rules of a $\odot-k$-directed coherent calculus $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$. We prove that G is $\odot-k$-analytic. Using Thm. 3.9, it suffices to prove that every G-legal bivaluation $v$ can be extended to a G-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation, provided that $\operatorname{dom}(v)$ is finite and closed under $\odot-k$-subformulas. Thus, in what follows, we fix an arbitrary G-legal bivaluation $v$ such that $\operatorname{dom}(v)$ is finite and closed under $\odot-k$-subformulas.

We extend $v$ iteratively: in each step we add a single formula to the domain of $v$. Thus, we construct a sequence of G-legal bivaluations that extend $v$, and use this sequence in order to define a G-legal $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation that extends $v$.

Since the $\odot-k$-subformula relation is a partial order, $\operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(\psi)$ is finite for every $\psi$, and $\operatorname{dom}(v)$ is finite, there exists an enumeration $\psi_{1}, \psi_{2}, \ldots$ of $\mathcal{L}$ such that:
(1) If $\psi_{i} \in \operatorname{dom}(v)$ and $\psi_{j} \notin \operatorname{dom}(v)$ then $i<j$.
(2) If $\psi_{i}$ is a $\odot-k$-subformula of $\psi_{j}$ then $i \leq j$.

We define a sequence $v_{0}, v_{1}, \ldots$ of bivaluations inductively by:
(1) $v_{0}=v$.
(2) For every $i>0, v_{i}$ is defined over $\operatorname{dom}(v) \cup\left\{\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{i}\right\}$ as follows:
(a) $v_{i}(\varphi)=v_{i-1}(\varphi)$ for every $\varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$.
(b) If $\psi_{i} \notin \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$, then $v_{i}\left(\psi_{i}\right)=1$ iff there exists a rule of the form $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / \Rightarrow \varphi$ in $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$, sequents $s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$, and a substitution $\sigma$ such that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right), \sigma(\varphi)=\psi_{i}$ and $v_{i-1}\left(\sigma\left(s_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$. Otherwise, $v_{i}\left(\psi_{i}\right)=0$.
The following lemma is needed in order to show that each bivaluation in the sequence is G-legal.
Lemma 5.15. Let $\hat{r}=\left\langle\left\{\sigma\left(s_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{1}, \ldots, \sigma\left(s_{n}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{n}\right\}, \sigma(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right\rangle$ be $a \odot-k$-ordered application of $a \odot-k$-directed rule $r=s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s$, and let $\varphi_{s}$ be the single formula in frm(s). Then, all formulas in $\operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}\left(\sigma\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{i}\right)$ are proper $\odot-k$-subformulas of $\sigma\left(\varphi_{s}\right)$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. In particular,

$$
s u b_{k}^{\odot}\left(\left\{\sigma\left(s_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{1}, \ldots, \sigma\left(s_{n}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{n}, \sigma(s)\right\}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}(\sigma(s)) .
$$

Proof. Let $\psi$ be a $\odot-k$-subformula of some $\varphi \in \sigma\left(f r m\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right)\right) \cup f r m\left(c_{i}\right)$. We show that $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of $\sigma\left(\varphi_{s}\right)$. Since $\psi$ is a $\odot-k$-subformula of $\varphi$, it would then follow that $\psi$ is also a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of $\sigma\left(\varphi_{s}\right)$. If $\varphi=\sigma\left(\varphi^{\prime}\right)$ for some $\varphi^{\prime} \in \operatorname{frm}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right)$, then since $r$ is ๑- $k$-directed, $\varphi^{\prime}$ is a proper ©- $k$-subformula of $\varphi_{s}$. By Lemma 3.4, $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of $\sigma\left(\varphi_{s}\right)$. Otherwise, $\varphi \in \operatorname{frm}\left(c_{i}\right)$, and since $\hat{r}$ is $\odot-k$-ordered, $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of some formula in $\operatorname{frm}\left(\sigma(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)$. If $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of some formula in $\operatorname{frm}(\sigma(s))$, then this formula must be $\sigma\left(\varphi_{s}\right)$. Otherwise, let $\theta$ be a formula in $\operatorname{frm}\left(c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)$ such that $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of $\theta$, and $\theta$ has a maximal number of connectives. Since $\hat{r}$ is $\odot-k$-ordered, $\theta$ is also a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of some formula $\theta^{\prime} \in \operatorname{frm}\left(\sigma(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)$. By the maximality of $\theta$, we have that $\theta^{\prime} \in \operatorname{frm}(\sigma(s))$, which means that $\theta^{\prime}=\sigma\left(\varphi_{s}\right)$. Since $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of $\theta$, we also have that $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of $\sigma\left(\varphi_{s}\right)$.

Next, we show by induction on $i$, that each $v_{i}$ is G-legal. For $i=0$, this holds by our assumption regarding $v$. Let $i>0$, and $r$ be a rule of G . Then, there exist a rule $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s$ of $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$, sequents $s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$, a substitution $\alpha$, and sequents $c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n}$ such that $r=\alpha\left(s_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cup c_{1}, \ldots, \alpha\left(s_{n}^{\prime}\right) \cup$ $c_{n} / \alpha(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}$. Let $s_{1}^{\prime \prime} \subseteq s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime \prime} \subseteq s_{n}^{\prime}, c_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq c_{n}$ and $\sigma$ be a substitution such that $\sigma\left(f r m\left(\left\{\alpha\left(s_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, \alpha\left(s_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{n}^{\prime}, \alpha(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i}\right)$. We show that $v_{i}\left(\left\{\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{j}^{\prime}\right) \mid 1 \leq\right.\right.$ $j \leq n\}) \leq v_{i}\left(\sigma\left(\alpha(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)\right)$. If $\psi_{i} \notin \sigma\left(f r m\left(\left\{\alpha\left(s_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, \alpha\left(s_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{n}^{\prime}, \alpha(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)\right\}\right)$ or $\psi_{i} \in \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$, then $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{\alpha\left(s_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, \alpha\left(s_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{n}^{\prime}, \alpha(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$, and hence this holds by the induction hypothesis. Assume now that $\psi_{i} \in \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{\alpha\left(s_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, \alpha\left(s_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup\right.\right.\right.$ $\left.\left.\left.c_{n}^{\prime}, \alpha(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}\right)\right\}\right)$ and $\psi_{i} \notin \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$. Let $\varphi_{s}$ be the single formula in $\operatorname{frm}(s)$. We first prove
that $\psi_{i}=\sigma\left(\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)\right)$. Otherwise, $\sigma\left(\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)\right) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$. By Lemma 5.15, the set of formulas that occur in $r$ is contained in $s u b_{k}^{\odot}\left(\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)\right)$, and by Lemma 3.4, we also have that for every formula $\varphi$ that occurs in $r, \sigma(\varphi) \in \sigma\left(s u b_{k}^{\odot}\left(\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{sub}_{k}^{\odot}\left(\sigma\left(\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)\right)\right)$. $\operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$ is closed under $\odot-k$-subformulas, and $\sigma\left(\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)\right) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$. Thus we have $\psi_{i} \in \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$, which is a contradiction.

Similarly, we show that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$. Indeed, let $\varphi \in \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right)$ and let $\varphi^{\prime} \in \operatorname{frm}\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{j}^{\prime}\right)$ such that $\varphi=\sigma\left(\varphi^{\prime}\right)$. By Lemma 5.15, $\varphi^{\prime}$ is a proper ๑- $k$-subformula of $\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)$, and hence by Lemma 3.4, $\varphi$ is a proper $\odot-k$-subformula of $\psi_{i}=\sigma\left(\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)\right)$. In particular, $\varphi \neq \psi_{i}$. Since $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i}\right)$, it follows that $\varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$.

Now, suppose that $v_{i}\left(\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup c_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$. We prove that $v_{i}\left(\sigma\left(\alpha(s) \cup c_{1} \cup \ldots \cup\right.\right.$ $\left.\left.c_{n}\right)\right)=1$. If $v_{i}\left(\sigma\left(c_{1}^{\prime} \cup \ldots \cup c_{n}^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$, then we are clearly done. Assume otherwise. Hence, we have $v_{i}\left(\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)\right)=1$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$. Since $\sigma\left(\alpha\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$, we have $v_{i-1}\left(\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)\right)=1$ for every such $j$. Distinguish two cases:

- $s=\Rightarrow \varphi_{s}:$ Since $\sigma\left(\alpha\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n, \sigma\left(\alpha\left(\varphi_{s}\right)\right)=\psi_{i}$, and $v_{i-1}\left(\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)\right)=1$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$, by the definition of $v_{i}$ we have $v_{i}\left(\psi_{i}\right)=1$, and so $v_{i}(\sigma(\alpha(s)))=1$.
- $s=\varphi_{s} \Rightarrow$ : To prove that $v_{i}(\sigma(\alpha(s)))=1$, we show that $v_{i}\left(\psi_{i}\right)=0$. By the definition of $v_{i}$, it suffices to prove that for every rule of the form $q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m} / \Rightarrow \varphi^{\prime}$ in $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$, sequents $q_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m}^{\prime} \subseteq q_{m}$ and substitution $\sigma^{\prime}$ such that $\sigma^{\prime}\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(q_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)$ for every $1 \leq j \leq m$ and $\sigma^{\prime}\left(\varphi^{\prime}\right)=\psi_{i}$, we have $v_{i-1}\left(\sigma^{\prime}\left(q_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right)=0$ for some $1 \leq j \leq m$. Let $q_{1}, \ldots, q_{m} / \Rightarrow \varphi^{\prime}$ and $\sigma^{\prime}$ as above. Since $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{B}}$ is coherent, the empty sequent is derivable from $\left\{\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{1}\right)\right), \ldots, \sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{n}\right)\right), \sigma^{\prime}\left(q_{1}\right), \ldots, \sigma^{\prime}\left(q_{m}\right)\right\}$ using only (cut). It can be shown by induction on this derivation that the same holds for $\left\{\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{1}^{\prime}\right)\right), \ldots, \sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{n}^{\prime}\right)\right), \sigma^{\prime}\left(q_{1}^{\prime}\right), \ldots, \sigma^{\prime}\left(q_{m}^{\prime}\right)\right\}$, and in particular, we have $\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{1}^{\prime}\right)\right), \ldots, \sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{n}^{\prime}\right)\right), \sigma^{\prime}\left(q_{1}^{\prime}\right), \ldots, \sigma^{\prime}\left(q_{m}^{\prime}\right) \vdash_{\mathrm{G}}^{\operatorname{dom}\left(v_{i-1}\right)} \Rightarrow$. By Thm. 2.11, since $v_{i-1}$ is G-legal and $v_{i-1}\left(\sigma\left(\alpha\left(s_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right)\right)=1$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$, we have $v_{i-1}\left(\sigma^{\prime}\left(q_{j}^{\prime}\right)\right)=0$ for some $1 \leq j \leq m$.

Finally, let $v^{\prime}$ be the $\mathcal{L}$-bivaluation given by $v^{\prime}\left(\psi_{i}\right)=v_{i}\left(\psi_{i}\right)$ for every $i>0$. Clearly, $v^{\prime}$ extends $v$. To see that it is G-legal, let $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s \in \mathrm{G}, s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$, and $\sigma$ be a substitution. Let $j=\max \left\{i \mid \psi_{i} \in \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)\right\}$. Then, $v^{\prime}(\psi)=v_{j}(\psi)$ for every $\psi \in \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)$. Since $v_{j}$ is G-legal, $v^{\prime}\left(\left\{\sigma\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right) \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\right\}\right)=\min \left\{v_{j}\left(\sigma\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\right)\right) \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\right\} \leq v_{j}(\sigma(s))=v^{\prime}(\sigma(s))$.

## 6 ADDING MODAL OPERATORS TO PURE SEQUENT CALCULI

Useful non-classical logics are beyond the reach of $\odot-k$-analytic pure calculi. For example, the usual sequent rules for the modal operators $\square$ and $\diamond$ in modal logics (e.g., K, KTB, S5 etc.) limit the context sequents, and thus are not pure. In this section, we consider the extensions of pure sequent calculi with rules for introducing modal operators. Our investigation is not limited to a single modal operator, and thus the systems that we study are multimodal. Moreover, the base logic need not be classical, and can be any logic that is described by a pure calculus. In §6.2, we prove a soundness and completeness theorem for the resulting calculi with respect to a Kripke-style semantics that generalizes the bivaluation semantics of §2.3. This semantics is then used in §6.3 in order prove the following result: if a pure calculus is $\odot-k$-analytic, then it remains so when rules for modal operators are added. The main lemma that is used in the proof of this result is proved in Lemma 6.20. The semantics is also used in the next section, where we extend the reduction of $\S 4$ to pure calculi that are augmented with a special kind of modal operators. Note that we focus here on positive, Box-like modal operators. An investigation of Diamond-like modal operators, and of negative modalities (see, e.g., [23]) is left for future research.

Additional reflexivity rule：

$$
\text { (т) } \frac{\Gamma, \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, \square \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta}
$$

Additional corresponding seriality rules：

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}\right) \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow}{\square \Gamma \Rightarrow} & \text { ( } \left.\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{PF}}\right) \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\square \Gamma \Rightarrow \square \Delta} & \text { ( } \left.\mathrm{D}_{4}\right) \frac{\square \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow}{\square \Gamma_{1}, \square \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow} \\
\frac{\square \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \Delta}{\square \Gamma_{1}, \square \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \Delta} & \text { ( } \left.\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{B}}\right) \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \square \Delta}{\square \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} & \text { ( } \left.\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{B} 4}\right) \frac{\square \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \Delta_{1}, \square \Delta_{2}}{\square \Gamma_{1}, \square \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \Delta_{1}, \Delta_{2}}
\end{array}
$$

Fig．1．Application schemes of sequent rules for a modal operator $\square$

Let $⿴ 囗 ⿰ 丿 ㇄$ denote by $\mathcal{L}_{\text {『 }}$ the propositional language obtained by augmenting $\mathcal{L}$ with the modal operators in回．The notations $\square \mathcal{F}$ and $\square \mathcal{F}$ are similar to the notations from $\S 3$ ，and are extended to sequents and sets of sequents in the obvious way．

Unlike the connectives of $\mathcal{L}$ ，which may appear in any pure rule，the modal operators are manipulated according to a predefined set of rules given in Fig．1．These sequent rules were previously shown to correspond to the classical modal logic axioms［30，34，44］．With the exception of（ T ），these are not pure rules，as their applications do not allow arbitrary context sequents．To keep the discussion modular，we assume a given specification function $M$ specifying the derivation rules for every $\square \in \square$ ．For every $\square \in \square, M(\square)$ is either a singleton consisting of one of the rules from the first part of Fig．1，or a pair consisting of such a rule（X）together with either（ T ）or a matching（ $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{x}}$ ） rule．（Note that there is no need to consider the combination of both（T）and a（ $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{x}}$ ）－rule，since，by possibly using cuts，all（ $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{x}}$ ）－rules are derivable in the presence of（ T$)$ ）．We exclude the combination of（ PF ）and（ T ），as we were unable to find an appropriate semantic condition for this combination．${ }^{5}$ Thus，there are $6+6+5=17$ options for rules manipulating each modal operator．

Given a pure calculus G for $\mathcal{L}$ ，we obtain the calculus $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}$ for $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$ by augmenting G with the rules determined by $\mathrm{M}(\square)$ for each $\square \in$ ．For a set $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\square}$ of formulas，we write $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} s$（or $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} s$ when $\mathcal{F}=\mathcal{L}_{\square}$ ）if there is a derivation of a sequent $s$ from a set $S$ of sequents in $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}$ consisting only of $\mathcal{F}$－sequents．

Example 6．1．Sequent calculi for classical modal logics are obtained by taking $\square=\{\square\}$ ，and augmenting LK with the appropriate rules for the modal operators．For example，calculi for the modal logics $K$ and $K D$ are obtained by respectively taking $M(\square)=\{(\kappa)\}$ and $M(\square)=\left\{(\kappa),\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}\right)\right\}$ ． The logics $S 4$ and $S 5$ are captured by respectively taking $\mathcal{M}(\square)=\{(4),(\mathrm{T})\}$ and $\mathcal{M}(\square)=\{(\mathrm{B} 4),(\mathrm{T})\}$ ．

[^4]
### 6.1 Equivalence and Admissible Rules

Interestingly, whether or not different specifications for rules of the modal operators yield "observationally distinct" calculi might depend on the underlying pure calculus. That is, there are (families of) pure calculi for which the addition of different rules for modal operators induces the same derivability relation. In this section, we present two such cases. The first establishes the equivalence of $\left\{(\mathrm{PF}),\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{PF}}\right)\right\}$ and $\left\{(\mathrm{K}),\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}\right)\right\}$ when added to a Horn calculus (see Def. 4.8):

Proposition 6.2. Suppose that $\mathcal{M}(\square)=\left\{(P F),\left(D_{P F}\right)\right\}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}(\square)=\left\{(K),\left(D_{K}\right)\right\}$ for every $\square \in$ 回. Let G be a Horn calculus. Then, $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}}$ s iff $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M^{\prime}}}$ s for every set $S$ of of single-conclusion sequents and sequent $s$.

Proof. The right-to-left direction is trivial. For the left-to-right direction, we prove that if $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$, then $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma \Rightarrow E$ for some singleton or empty set $E \subseteq \Delta$. This allows us to replace any application of ( PF ) or ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{PF}}$ ) with an application of either ( K ) or ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}$ ) on a single-conclusion subsequent, and then obtaining the original conclusion using weakening. We do so by induction on the length of the derivation of $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$.

If $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta \in S$ or $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ is the conclusion of an application of (id), (ШЕАК), (СUT), (К), or ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}$ ) then this is obvious. We consider the case that $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ is the conclusion of an application of some pure rule $\Gamma_{1} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n} \Rightarrow \Delta_{n} / \Gamma_{0} \Rightarrow \Delta_{0}$ of G. Then, there exist a substitution $\sigma$ and sequents $\Gamma_{1}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}^{\prime}, \Gamma_{1}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{n}^{\prime}, \Gamma_{n}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{n}^{\prime \prime}$ such that for every $1 \leq i \leq n, \Gamma_{i}^{\prime} \Rightarrow \Delta_{i}^{\prime} \subseteq \Gamma_{i} \Rightarrow \Delta_{i}$, $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta=\Gamma_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n}^{\prime \prime}, \sigma\left(\Gamma_{0}\right) \Rightarrow \sigma\left(\Delta_{0}\right), \Delta_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, \Delta_{n}^{\prime \prime}$, and $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma_{i}^{\prime \prime}, \sigma\left(\Gamma_{i}^{\prime}\right) \Rightarrow \sigma\left(\Delta_{i}^{\prime}\right), \Delta_{i}^{\prime \prime}$ with shorter derivations for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. Since G is Horn, one of the following holds:
(1) For every $1 \leq i \leq n, \Gamma_{i}^{\prime}=\emptyset$ and $\left|\sigma\left(\Delta_{0}\right)\right| \leq 1$ : In this case, $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}} \Gamma_{i}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow \sigma\left(\Delta_{i}^{\prime}\right)$, $\Delta_{i}^{\prime \prime}$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. By the induction hypothesis, for every $1 \leq i \leq n, S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma_{i}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow E_{i}$ for some singleton or empty set $E_{i} \subseteq \sigma\left(\Delta_{i}^{\prime}\right) \cup \Delta_{i}^{\prime \prime}$. If $E_{i} \subseteq \Delta_{i}^{\prime \prime}$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$, then using (weak) we are done. Otherwise, for every $1 \leq i \leq n$, there exists $\varphi_{i} \in \sigma\left(\Delta_{i}^{\prime}\right)$ such that $E_{i}=\left\{\varphi_{i}\right\}$. Hence for every $1 \leq i \leq n, S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}} \Gamma_{i}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow \varphi_{i}$. Now, we may apply the rule with context sequents $\Gamma_{i}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow$ and get that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}} \Gamma_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n}^{\prime \prime}, \sigma\left(\Gamma_{0}\right) \Rightarrow \sigma\left(\Delta_{0}\right)$, which means that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \sigma\left(\Delta_{0}\right)$.
(2) There exists a single $1 \leq i \leq n$ such that $\Gamma_{i}^{\prime} \neq \emptyset$, and $\Delta_{0}=\emptyset$ : By the induction hypothesis, there exists a singleton or empty set $E_{i} \subseteq \sigma\left(\Delta_{i}^{\prime}\right) \cup \Delta_{i}^{\prime \prime}$ such that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma_{i}^{\prime \prime}, \sigma\left(\Gamma_{i}^{\prime}\right) \Rightarrow E_{i}$. Also by the induction hypothesis, for every $j \neq i$, there exists a singleton or empty set $E_{j} \subseteq \Delta_{j}^{\prime \prime} \cup \sigma\left(\Delta_{j}^{\prime}\right)$ and $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma_{j}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow E_{j}$. If $E_{j} \subseteq \Delta_{j}^{\prime \prime}$ for some $j \neq i$, then using (weak), we get that and $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}} \Gamma \Rightarrow E_{j}$ (and $E_{j} \subseteq \Delta$ ). Otherwise, for every $j \neq i$ there exists $\varphi_{j} \in \sigma\left(\Delta_{j}^{\prime}\right)$ such that $E_{j}=\left\{\varphi_{j}\right\}$. Apply the rule with context sequents $\Gamma_{i}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow E_{i}$ and $\Gamma_{j}^{\prime \prime} \Rightarrow$ for every $j \neq i$ and obtain $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, \Gamma_{n}^{\prime \prime}, \sigma\left(\Gamma_{0}\right) \Rightarrow E_{i}$, and so $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma \Rightarrow E_{i}\left(\right.$ for $\left.E_{i} \subseteq \Delta\right)$.

Next, we provide sufficient conditions for the admissibility of the seriality rules $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}\right),\left(\mathrm{D}_{4}\right),\left(\mathrm{D}_{45}\right)$ and ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{PF}}$ ). Recall that Fig. 1 associates each modal rule (X) with its own seriality rule ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{x}}$ ). Such a rule is needed, for instance, to derive $\square \perp \Rightarrow$, which should be derivable when the accessibility relation is required to be serial. For a certain family of pure calculi, that we call definite calculi, we can prove that $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}\right),\left(\mathrm{D}_{4}\right),\left(\mathrm{D}_{45}\right)$ and $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\text {PF }}\right)$ are redundant:

Definition 6.3. A rule is called definite if at least one of its premises has an empty right-hand side whenever the conclusion has an empty right-hand side. A calculus is called definite if each of its rules is definite.

Example 6.4. All rules of $\mathbf{L K}$ except for $(\neg \Rightarrow)$ and $(\perp \Rightarrow)$ are definite.

Proposition 6.5. Suppose that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}(\square)=\mathcal{M}(\square) \backslash\left\{\left(D_{K}\right),\left(D_{4}\right),\left(D_{45}\right),\left(D_{P F}\right)\right\}$ for every $\square \in$. Let $\mathbf{G}$ be a definite calculus. Suppose that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}}$ s for some set $S$ of sequents with non-empty right-hand sides and sequent $s$. Then, $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M^{\prime}}}$ s.

Proof. First, since $G$ is definite, using induction on the length of the derivation, it can be shown that all sequents in the derivation of $s$ from $S$ in $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}$ have a non-empty right-hand side. Such derivations cannot use ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}$ ) or $\left(\mathrm{D}_{4}\right)$. Moreover, any application of ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{PF}}$ ) whose premise has a non-empty right-hand side is also an application of ( PF ). Finally, consider an application $\left\langle\square \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \Delta, \square \Gamma_{1} \cup \square \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \Delta\right\rangle$ of ( $\mathrm{D}_{45}$ ). Since $\square \Delta \neq \emptyset$, we can use (wEAK) to obtain $\square \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow$ $\psi, \square \Delta$ for some $\psi \in \Delta$, and using (45) we get $\square \Gamma_{1}, \square \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \psi, \square \Delta$, which is $s$.

Note that $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{B}}\right)$ and $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{B} 4}\right)$ are not admissible under the conditions above. Indeed, when augmenting the empty (pure) calculus with these rules, the sequent $\square \square p_{1} \Rightarrow p_{1}$ is derivable using only (ID) and either $\left(D_{B}\right)$ or $\left(D_{B 4}\right)$, while it is not derivable using (в) or (B4).

### 6.2 Kripke Semantics for Modal Operators

In this section we generalize the bivaluations semantics from $\S 2.3$ and elevate it to a Kripke-style semantics. Given a pure calculus and a specification of rules for the modal operators, the semantics of the original connectives is governed by the bivaluation semantics in each possible world, while the semantics of the modal connectives follows their usual meaning in Kripke models. As in the case of bivaluations, we consider partial Kripke models in order to achieve a semantic counterpart of analyticity.

Definition 6.6. A biframe for $\mathcal{M}$ is a tuple $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ where:
(1) $W$ is a set of elements called worlds. Henceforth, we may identify $\mathcal{W}$ with this set (e.g., when writing $w \in \mathcal{W}$ instead of $w \in W$ ).
(2) $\mathcal{R}$ is a function assigning a binary relation on $W$ (called accessibility relation) to every $\square \in$ 回. We write $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ instead of $\mathcal{R}(\square)$, and $\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ for $\left\{w^{\prime} \in W \mid w \mathcal{R}_{\square} w^{\prime}\right\}$. For every $\square \in$, the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ should have particular properties according to $M(\square)$ as indicated in Fig. 1. In particular, if some $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{x}}\right) \in M(\square)$, then $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is serial; and if $(\mathrm{T}) \in M(\square)$, then $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is reflexive. ${ }^{6}$
(3) $\mathcal{V}$ is a function assigning a bivaluation $\mathcal{V}_{w}$ to every $w \in W$, such that $\mathcal{V}(w)(\square \psi)=$ $\min \left\{\mathcal{V}\left(w^{\prime}\right)(\psi) \mid w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]\right\}$ whenever $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{V}(w))$ and $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}\left(w^{\prime}\right)\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w] .{ }^{7}$
If $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)=\mathcal{F}$ for every $w \in W$, we call $\mathcal{W}$ an $\mathcal{F}$-biframe for $\mathcal{M}$.
Notation 6.7. Let $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ be a biframe for $\mathcal{M}$. For a set $W^{\prime} \subseteq W$, we write $\mathcal{V}_{W^{\prime}}(\psi)$ to denote $\min \left\{\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}(\psi) \mid w^{\prime} \in W^{\prime}\right\}$. This notation is extended to sequents and sets of sequents in the natural way (e.g., $\mathcal{V}_{W^{\prime}}(S)=\min \left\{\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}(s) \mid s \in S, w^{\prime} \in W^{\prime}\right\}$ ). In addition, we denote by $\operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W})$ the intersection of all sets $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ for every $w \in W$.

In particular, we have $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}(\psi)$ for every $w \in \mathcal{W}$ and $\psi, \square \psi \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$ such that $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ and $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$.

Next, we adopt the semantic viewpoint of pure rules in order to retain the connection between sequent calculi and their semantics.

Definition 6.8. A biframe $\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ for M is called G -legal for an $\mathcal{L}$-calculus G if $\mathcal{V}_{w}$ is G -legal for every $w \in W$ (see Def. 2.9).

[^5]We turn to proving soundness and completeness．
We note that the rule（4）and its two variants（45）and（B4）are not sound for every possible set $\mathcal{F}$ of formulas．For example，the sequent $\square \varphi \Rightarrow \square \square \varphi$ is derivable using（4）and（id），using only formulas from $\{\square \varphi, \square \square \varphi\}$ ．However，this sequent is not valid in the $\{\square \varphi, \square \square \varphi\}$－biframe $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ ， in which $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is transitive，given by $W=\left\{w_{1}, w_{2}\right\}, \mathcal{R}_{\square}=\left\{\left\langle w_{1}, w_{2}\right\rangle\right\}, \mathcal{V}_{w_{1}}(\square \varphi)=1, \mathcal{V}_{w_{1}}(\square \square \varphi)=0$ ， $\mathcal{V}_{w_{2}}(\square \varphi)=0, \mathcal{V}_{w_{2}}(\square \square \varphi)=1$ ．The reason $\mathcal{W}$ is indeed a biframe is the fact that $\varphi$ is missing from the domains of the bivaluations．Thus，in the presence of any of the rules（4），（45）and（B4），we require that $\mathcal{F}$ is＂closed＂with respect to $\square$ ，that is，$\varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ whenever $\square \varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ for some $\square \in$ 回．

Theorem 6.9 （Soundness）．Let G be an $\mathcal{\mathcal { L }}$－calculus， $\mathcal{F}$ a set of $\mathcal{L}_{\text {■ }}$－formulas，$S$ a set of $\mathcal{F}$－sequents and $s$ an $\mathcal{F}$－sequent．Suppose that for every $\square \in \square$ ，if $\{(4),(45),(B 4)\} \cap M(\square) \neq \emptyset$ ，then $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$ whenever $\square \psi \in \mathcal{F}$ ．If $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{\mathcal{M}}}^{\mathcal{F}}$ ，then $\mathcal{V}_{W}(S) \leq \mathcal{V}_{W}(s)$ for every G －legal $\mathcal{F}$－biframe $\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ for $\mathcal{M}$ ．

Proof．Let $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ be a G－legal $\mathcal{F}$－biframe for $\mathcal{M}$ ．Suppose that $\mathcal{V}_{W}(S)=1$ ．We prove that $\mathcal{V}_{W}(s)=1$ by induction on the length of the derivation of $s$ from $S$ in $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}$（that consists only of $\mathcal{F}$－sequents）．If $s \in S$ ，or $s$ is the conclusion of an application of a non－modal rule，then this is shown like in the proof of Thm．2．11．If $s$ is the conclusion of an application of some rule in $M(\square)$ ， then the proof carries on according to the identity of this rule．We explicitly handle the cases of（ $\kappa$ ）， （4）and（T），leaving the other cases for the reader．
（1）If $s$ is the conclusion of an application of（к）for some $\square \in$ ，then $s$ has the form $\square \Gamma \Rightarrow \square \varphi$ for some $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ and $\varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ ，and $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi$ ．Suppose for contradiction that $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \Gamma \Rightarrow \square \varphi)=0$ for some $w \in W$ ．Then， $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \varphi)=0$ ，and $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \psi)=1$ for every $\psi \in \Gamma$ ．In particular，there exists a world $w^{\prime} \in R[w]$ such that $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}(\varphi)=0$ ，and $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}(\psi)=1$ for every $\psi \in \Gamma$ ，which contradicts the induction hypothesis，according to which $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}(\Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi)=1$ ．
（2）If $s$ is the conclusion of an application of（4）for some $\square \in$ 回，then $s$ has the form $\square \Gamma_{1}, \square \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow$ $\square \varphi$ for some $\Gamma_{2} \subseteq \mathcal{F}, \varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\Gamma_{1}$ such that $\square \Gamma_{1} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ ，and $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} \square \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \varphi$ ．In particular， $\Gamma_{2} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ and $\varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ ．In addition，since（4）$\in \mathcal{M}(\square)$ ，we have $\Gamma_{1} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ as well．Suppose for contradiction that $\mathcal{V}_{w}\left(\square \Gamma_{1}, \square \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \varphi\right)=0$ for some $w \in W$ ．Then， $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \varphi)=0$ ，and $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \psi)=1$ for every $\psi \in \Gamma_{1} \cup \Gamma_{2}$ ．In particular，there exists a world $w^{\prime} \in R[w]$ such that $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}(\varphi)=0$ ，and $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}(\psi)=1$ for every $\psi \in \Gamma_{2}$ ．Now，let $\psi \in \Gamma_{1}$ and $w^{\prime \prime} \in R\left[w^{\prime}\right]$ ． Since（4）$\in \mathcal{M}(\square)$ ，we have that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is transitive，which means that $w^{\prime \prime} \in R[w]$ ．Therefore， $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime \prime}}(\psi)=1$ for every such $w^{\prime \prime}$ ，and hence $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}(\square \psi)=1$ for every $\psi \in \Gamma_{1}$ ．We therefore have $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}\left(\square \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \varphi\right)=0$ ，contradicting the induction hypothesis．
（3）If $s$ is the conclusion of an application of（T）for some $\square \in$ 回，then $s$ has the form $\Gamma, \square \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta$ for some $\Gamma, \Delta \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ and $\varphi \in \mathcal{F}$ ，and $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} \Gamma, \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta$ ．Let $w \in W$ ．By the induction hypothesis， $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\Gamma, \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta)=1$ ，which means that either $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\psi)=0$ for some $\psi \in \Gamma, \mathcal{V}_{w}(\psi)=1$ for some $\psi \in \Delta$ ，or $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\varphi)=0$ ．In the first two cases，we have $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\Gamma, \square \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta)=1$ as well．In the third case，note that since $(\mathrm{T}) \in M(\square)$ we have that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is reflexive．This，together with the fact that $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\varphi)=0$ ，means that $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \varphi)=0$ ，and hence $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\Gamma, \square \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta)=1$ ．

We turn to completeness．Here，we follow the canonical construction of a countermodel，whose worlds are maximal unprovable sequents，but adjust it to the case where only formulas from a certain set $\mathcal{F}$ are allowed in derivations．When $\mathcal{F}$ is infinite，this requires us to use $\omega$－sequents （defined as in the proof of Thm．2．11）．

Theorem 6.10 （Completeness）．Let G be an $\mathcal{L}$－calculus， $\mathcal{F}$ a set of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Q}}$－formulas，$S$ a set of $\mathcal{F}$－sequents and s an $\mathcal{F}$－sequent．If $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}}$ s，then $\mathcal{V}_{W}(S)>\mathcal{V}_{W}(s)$ for some G －legal $\mathcal{F}$－biframe $\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ for $\mathcal{M}$ ．

Proof．We say that an $\omega$－sequent $L \Rightarrow R$ is $\mathcal{M}$－S－F - －maximal unprovable if the following hold：

- $L \cup R \subseteq \mathcal{F}$
- $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow R$
- $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} L, \psi \Rightarrow R$ for every $\psi \in \mathcal{F} \backslash L$
- $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{\mathrm{M}}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow \psi, R$ for every $\psi \in \mathcal{F} \backslash R$

We denote the set of $\mathcal{M}-S-\mathcal{F}$ maximal unprovable $\omega$-sequents by $W(\mathcal{M}, S, \mathcal{F})$. Using (id) and (cut), it is easy to see that $L \cup R=\mathcal{F}$ and $L \cap R=\emptyset$ for every $L \Rightarrow R \in W(M, S, \mathcal{F})$. In addition, it is a routine matter to show that every $\omega$-sequent $L \Rightarrow R$ such that $L \cup R \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ and $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow R$ can be extended to an $M-S-\mathcal{F}$-maximal unprovable $\omega$-sequent.

For every $L \Rightarrow R \in W(M, S, \mathcal{F})$ and $\square \in M$, let

$$
A_{L \Rightarrow R}^{\square}=\left\{L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime} \in W(\mathrm{M}, S, \mathcal{F}) \mid L_{1}^{\square} \cup L_{2}^{\square} \subseteq L^{\prime} \wedge R_{1}^{\square} \cup R_{2}^{\square} \cup R_{3}^{\square} \subseteq R^{\prime}\right\}
$$

where $L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square}, R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}$, and $R_{3}^{\square}$ are given by:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
L_{1}^{\square} & =\{\varphi \in \mathcal{F} \mid \square \varphi \in L\} \\
L_{2}^{\square} & = \begin{cases}\square \mathcal{F} \cap L & \{(4),(45),(\mathrm{B} 4)\} \cap \mathrm{M}(\square) \neq \emptyset \\
\emptyset & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
\end{array} R_{1}^{\square}=\left\{\begin{array}{ll}
\square \mathcal{F} \cap R & \{(45),(\mathrm{B} 4)\} \cap \mathrm{M}(\square) \neq \emptyset \\
\emptyset & \text { otherwise }
\end{array}\right\}
$$

Using these definitions, we define the following countermodel $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$, where:
(1) $W=W(M, S, \mathcal{F})$.
(2) for every $\square \in$ 回, we define $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ by specifying the set $\mathcal{R}_{\square}[L \Rightarrow R]$ for every $L \Rightarrow R \in W$ :
(a) if (PF) $\notin \mathrm{M}(\square)$ then $\mathcal{R}_{\square}[L \Rightarrow R]$ is $A_{L \Rightarrow R}^{\square}$.
(b) If $(\mathrm{PF}) \in \mathrm{M}(\square)$ then $\mathcal{R}_{\square}[L \Rightarrow R]$ consists of a single arbitrary element from $A_{L \Rightarrow R}^{\square}$, unless $A_{L \Rightarrow R}^{\square}$ is empty, in which case so is $\mathcal{R}_{\square}[L \Rightarrow R]$.
(3) For every $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$ and $L \Rightarrow R \in W, \mathcal{V}_{L \Rightarrow R}(\psi)=1$ if $\psi \in L$ and $\mathcal{V}_{L \Rightarrow R}(\psi)=0$ otherwise.

We first show that $\mathcal{V}_{W}(S)>\mathcal{V}_{W}(s)$. For every $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta \in S$ and $L \Rightarrow R \in W$, since $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{\mathcal{M}}}^{\mathcal{F}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$ and $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow R$, there exist some $\psi \in \Gamma \backslash L$ (and then $\mathcal{V}_{L=R}(\psi)=0$ ) or $\psi \in \Delta \backslash R$ (and then $\left.\mathcal{V}_{L \Rightarrow R}(\psi)=1\right)$. Either way, $\mathcal{V}_{L \Rightarrow R}(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta)=1$. In addition, since $s \subseteq L_{s} \Rightarrow R_{s}$ for some $L_{s} \Rightarrow R_{s} \in W(\mathcal{M}, S, \mathcal{F})$, we have $\mathcal{V}_{L_{s} \Rightarrow R_{s}}(s)=0$.

It remains to prove that $\mathcal{W}$ is a G-legal $\mathcal{F}$-biframe for $M$.

- biframe: let $\square \in$ and $\psi, \square \psi \in \mathcal{F}$. Let $L \Rightarrow R \in W$. If $\mathcal{V}_{L \Rightarrow R}(\square \psi)=1$ and $L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime} \in$ $\mathcal{R}_{\square}[L \Rightarrow R]$, then we have $\square \psi \in L$, which means that $\psi \in L^{\prime}$, and hence $\mathcal{V}_{L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime}}(\psi)=1$. For the converse, suppose that $\mathcal{V}_{L \Rightarrow R}(\square \psi)=0$. Then, $\square \psi \in R$. We prove that $S \psi_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathscr{F}} L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow$ $\psi, R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}, R_{3}^{\square}$, extend this sequent to an element $L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime}$ of $\mathcal{R}_{\square}[L \Rightarrow R]$, and then obtain that $\mathcal{V}_{L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime}}(\psi)=0$ (as $\psi \in R^{\prime}$ ). Assume for contradiction that $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow \psi, R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}, R_{3}^{\square}$. Then there exist finite $\Gamma_{1} \subseteq L_{1}^{\square}, \Gamma_{2} \subseteq L_{2}^{\square}, \Delta_{1} \subseteq R_{1}^{\square}, \Delta_{2} \subseteq R_{2}^{\square}$ and $\Delta_{3} \subseteq R_{3}^{\square}$, such that $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \psi, \Delta_{1}, \Delta_{2}, \Delta_{3}$. Let $\Delta_{2}^{\prime}=\left\{\varphi \in \mathcal{F} \mid \square \varphi \in \Delta_{2}\right\}$. By applying the only rule in $M(\square) \cap\{(к),(4),(45),($ в ), (в4), ( $\mathbf{( р )})\}$, we obtain $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}}^{\mathcal{F}} \square \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \psi, \Delta_{1}, \Delta_{2}^{\prime}, \square \Delta_{3}$. Clearly, $\square \Gamma_{1}, \Gamma_{2} \Rightarrow \square \psi, \Delta_{1}, \Delta_{2}^{\prime}, \square \Delta_{3} \subseteq L \Rightarrow R$, and so $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} L \Rightarrow R$, which is a contradiction. Now, $L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow \psi, R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}, R_{3}^{\square}$ can be extended to some element $L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime}$ of $W$, and every such extension is an element of $A_{L \Rightarrow R}^{\square}$. Thus we have some $L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[L \Rightarrow R]$ that extends $L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}, R_{3}^{\square}$. In particular, since $\square \psi \in R$, we must have $\psi \in R^{\prime}$, and so $\mathcal{V}_{L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime}}(\psi)=0$.
- for $M$ : let $\square \in$. We show that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ has the properties that are induced by $M$. We separately consider each of the cases:
- Suppose that $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{x}}\right) \in \mathrm{M}(\square)$ for some $X$. We show that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is serial. Similarly to the proof above that $S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{\mathcal{M}}}^{\mathcal{F}} L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow \psi, R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}, R_{3}^{\square}$, it can be shown that $S{\psi_{\mathbf{G}_{\mathcal{M}}}^{\mathcal{F}}}^{\square} L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow$ $R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}, R_{3}^{\square}$, by applying ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{x}}$ ) rather than $X$, for the only ( $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{x}}$ ) $\in \mathrm{M}(\square)$, and that $L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow$ $R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}, R_{3}^{\square}$ can be extended to some element $L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime}$ in $W$ such that $(L \Rightarrow R) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L^{\prime} \Rightarrow R^{\prime}\right)$.
- Suppose that $(\mathrm{T}) \in M(\square)$. We show that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is reflexive. Let $L \Rightarrow R \in W$. We show that $(L \Rightarrow R) \mathcal{R}_{\square}(L \Rightarrow R)$, that is, $L_{1}^{\square}, L_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow R_{1}^{\square}, R_{2}^{\square}, R_{3}^{\square} \subseteq L \Rightarrow R$. Let $\psi \in L_{1}^{\square}$, and assume for contradiction that $\psi \notin L$, that is, $\psi \in R$. Since $\psi \in L_{1}^{\square}$, we have that $\square \psi \in L$, and therefore, $\square \psi \Rightarrow \psi \subseteq L \Rightarrow R$, which is impossible, as (т) $\in M(\square)$. The facts that $L_{2}^{\square} \subseteq L$ and $R_{1}^{\square} \subseteq R$ are trivial. Now let $\psi \in R_{2}^{\square}$, and assume for contradiction that $\psi \notin R$, that is, $\psi \in L$. Since $\psi \in R_{2}^{\square}$, we have that $\psi=\square \psi^{\prime}$ for some $\psi^{\prime} \in R$, and that $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$. This means that $\psi \Rightarrow \psi^{\prime} \subseteq L \Rightarrow R$, which is again impossible by the presence of (т) in $M(\square)$. Finally, since $(\mathrm{T}) \in \mathrm{M}(\square)$, we have that $(\mathrm{PF}) \notin \mathrm{M}(\square)$, which means that $R_{3}^{\square}=\emptyset \subseteq R$.
In the following items, $L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}, L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}$ and $L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}$ denote arbitrary elements of $W$.
- Suppose that (4) $\in M(\square)$. We show that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is transitive. Suppose that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow\right.$ $\left.R_{b}\right)$ and $\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}\right)$. We prove that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}\right)$, that is, $\left(L_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(R_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square},\left(R_{a}\right)_{3}^{\square} \subseteq L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}$. Since (4) $\in M(\square)$, we have $\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square}=$ $\left(R_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square}=\left(R_{a}\right)_{3}^{\square}=\emptyset$. Now, let $\psi \in\left(L_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square}$. Then both $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\square \psi \in L_{a}$, which means that $\square \psi \in\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \subseteq L_{b}$. Together with the fact that $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$, we have $\psi \in\left(L_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square} \subseteq L_{c}$. Next, let $\psi \in\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square}$. Then $\psi=\square \psi^{\prime}$ for some $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$, and $\psi \in L_{b}$. Therefore, $\psi \in\left(L_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square} \subseteq L_{c}$.
- Suppose that (45) $\in M(\square)$. We show that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is transitive and euclidian.
* Transitivity: suppose that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right)$ and $\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}\right)$. We prove that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}\right)$, that is, $\left(L_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(R_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square},\left(R_{a}\right)_{3}^{\square} \subseteq$ $L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}$. Since (45) $\in \mathrm{M}(\square)$, we have $\left(R_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square}=\left(R_{a}\right)_{3}^{\square}=\emptyset$. Similarly to the case of (4), $\left(L_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \subseteq\left(L_{c}\right)$. Now let $\psi \in\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square}$. Then $\psi=\square \psi^{\prime}$ for some $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\psi \in R_{b}$. Therefore, $\psi \in\left(R_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square} \subseteq R_{c}$.
* Euclideaness: suppose that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right)$ and $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}\right)$. We prove that $\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}\right)$, that is, $\left(L_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(L_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow\left(R_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(R_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square},\left(R_{b}\right)_{3}^{\square} \subseteq$ $L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}$. Since (45) $\in \mathcal{M}(\square)$, we have $\left(R_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square}=\left(R_{b}\right)_{3}^{\square}=\emptyset$. Let $\psi \in\left(L_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square}$. Then $\square \psi \in L_{b}$ and $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$. Hence $\square \psi \notin R_{b}$, and therefore $\square \psi \notin\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square}$. Since we have $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$, this means that $\square \psi \notin R_{a}$, and hence also $\square \psi \in L_{a}$. Again, since $\psi \in \mathcal{F}, \square \psi \in\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \subseteq L_{c}$. Next, let $\psi \in\left(L_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square}$. Then $\psi=\square \psi^{\prime}$ for some $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\psi \in L_{b}$. In particular, $\psi \notin R_{b}$. Since $\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square} \subseteq R_{b}$, we also have $\psi \notin\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square}$. Together with the fact that $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$, we have $\psi \notin R_{a}$. This, in turn, means that $\psi \in L_{a}$, which, together with $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$, means that $\psi \in\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \subseteq L_{c}$. The fact that $\left(R_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square} \subseteq R_{c}$ is proven symmetrically.
- Suppose that (в) $\in \mathbf{M}(\square)$. We show that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is symmetric. Suppose that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow\right.$ $\left.R_{b}\right)$. We prove that $\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right)$, that is, $\left(L_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(L_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow\left(R_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(R_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square},\left(R_{b}\right)_{3}^{\square} \subseteq$ $L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}$. Since (в) $\in \mathcal{M}(\square)$, we have $\left(L_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square}=\left(R_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square}=\left(R_{b}\right)_{3}^{\square}=\emptyset$. Let $\psi \in\left(L_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square}$. Then $\square \psi \in L_{b} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$, and hence $\square \psi \notin R_{b}$, and in particular, $\square \psi \notin\left(R_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square}$. Since $\square \psi \in \mathcal{F}$, we have also $\psi \notin R_{a}$, which means that $\psi \in L_{a}$. Next, let $\psi \in\left(R_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square}$. Then $\psi=\square \psi^{\prime}$ for some $\psi^{\prime} \in R_{b} \subseteq \mathcal{F}$. Hence $\psi^{\prime} \notin L_{b}$, and in particular, $\psi^{\prime} \notin\left(L_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square}$. Since $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$, we also have $\psi \notin L_{a}$, which means that $\psi \in R_{a}$.
- Suppose that ( B 4$) \in \mathrm{M}(\square)$. We show that $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is transitive and symmetric.
* Transitivity: suppose that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right)$ and $\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}\right)$. We prove that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}\right)$, that is, $\left(L_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(R_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square},\left(R_{a}\right)_{3}^{\square} \subseteq$
$L_{c} \Rightarrow R_{c}$ ．First，note that $\left(R_{a}\right)_{3}^{\square}=\emptyset$ ．Second，$\left(L_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(L_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \subseteq L_{c}$ and $\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square} \subseteq R_{c}$ are shown similarly to the case of（45）．Let $\psi \in\left(R_{a}\right)_{2}^{\square} \subseteq R_{b}$ ．Then $\psi \in \mathcal{F}$ ，and $\psi=\square \psi^{\prime}$ for some $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$ ．Hence $\psi \in\left(R_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square} \subseteq R_{c}$ ．
＊Symmetry：suppose that $\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right)$ ．We prove that $\left(L_{b} \Rightarrow R_{b}\right) \mathcal{R}_{\square}\left(L_{a} \Rightarrow\right.$ $\left.R_{a}\right)$ ，that is，$\left(L_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(L_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square} \Rightarrow\left(R_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square},\left(R_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square},\left(R_{b}\right)_{3}^{\square} \subseteq L_{a} \Rightarrow R_{a}$ ．First，note that $\left(R_{a}\right)_{3}^{\square}=\emptyset$ ． Second，$\left(L_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square} \subseteq L_{a}$ and $\left(R_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square} \subseteq L_{a}$ are shown similarly to the case of（в）．Let $\psi \in\left(L_{b}\right)_{2}^{\square}$ ． Then $\psi \in L_{b}$ ，and $\psi=\square \psi^{\prime}$ for some $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$ ．In particular，$\psi \notin R_{b}$ ，and hence also $\psi \notin\left(R_{a}\right)_{1}^{\square}$ ．Together with the fact that $\psi^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}$ ，we have that $\psi \notin R_{a}$ ，which means that $\psi \in L_{a}$ ．The fact that $\left(R_{b}\right)_{1}^{\square} \subseteq R_{a}$ is shown symmetrically．
－Suppose that $(\mathrm{PF}) \in M(\square)$ ．By definition， $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is functional．
－G－legal：For every $L \Rightarrow R \in W$ ，the bivaluation $\mathcal{V}_{L \Rightarrow R}$ is shown to be G－legal similarly to the proof of Thm．2．11．


## 6．3 Analyticity with Modal Operators

In this section we show that in a wide family of calculi $\odot-k$－analyticity is preserved when aug－ menting a pure calculus with rules for the modal operators．Semantics will play a major role here， as what will actually be shown is how to use the ability to extend partial bivaluations in order to extend partial biframes．

We focus on a slightly restricted subfamily of calculi，namely standard calculi，thus ruling out some degenerate cases．Roughly speaking，a calculus is called standard if whenever an atomic formula occurs in one of its rules，it also occurs as a subformula in the same rule．This is formally defined as follows：

Definition 6．11．An atomic variable $p$ is called shared in a rule $r$ if it is a proper subformula of some formula in the conclusion of $r$ ．A rule is called standard if all atomic variables that occur in it are shared in it．A calculus is called standard if each of its rules is standard．

Example 6．12．All calculi considered in examples above are standard．In contrast，$p_{3}$ is not shared in the rule $\Rightarrow p_{1}, p_{3} / \Rightarrow p_{1} \vee p_{2}$ ，and so every calculus that includes this rule is not standard．Aside from such contrived examples，we are not aware of a non－standard calculus in the literature．

The main result of this section is：
Theorem 6．13．Let G be a standard $\mathcal{L}$－calculus．If G is $\odot-k$－analytic then so is $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}$ ．
Note that if $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}$ is $\odot-k$－analytic，then G must also be $\odot-k$－analytic：given that $S$ and $s$ do not include modal operators，$S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}} s$ implies $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} s$ ．The $\odot-k$－analyticity of $\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}$ then means that there
 contain applications of the modal rules，and hence it is also a derivation in $G$ ．

Before turning to its proof，we present several examples of applications of Thm．6．13．
Example 6．14．All sequent calculi for classical modal logics that are obtained from LK by the adding the rules of Fig． 1 are known to be analytic．Thm． 6.13 makes this fact a direct consequence of the analyticity of LK．

Example 6．15．The quotations employed in primal infon logic［19］are unary connectives of the form $q$ said，where $q$ ranges over a finite set of principals．If we take $⿴ 囗 十$ to include these connectives and set $M(q$ said $)=\left\{(\mathrm{PF}),\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{PF}}\right)\right\}$ for every such $q$ ，we have $\vdash_{\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{M}}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi$（see Example 2．4）iff $\psi$ is derivable from $\Gamma$ in the Hilbert system for primal infon logic given in［19］．（This can be shown by induction on the lengths of the derivations．）Since $\mathbf{P}$ is standard and analytic，so is $\mathbf{P}_{\mathrm{M}}$ ．In contrast， the Hilbert system for primal infon logic in［19］admits a similar property that concerns local
formulas（see Def． 7.1 below）rather than subformulas．Similarly，quotations can be added to the extension EP of $\mathbf{P}$（Example 5．14），and the resulting calculus is analytic．

Example 6．16．One can add modal operators to the paraconsistent logic C1（see Example 2．5），by augmenting the calculus $\mathbf{C}_{1}$ with one of the rules for modal operators．The $\{\neg\}$－1－analyticity of $\mathbf{C}_{1}$ will then entail the $\{\neg\}-1$－analyticity of the extended calculus．

Next，we prove Thm．6．13．We use the soundness and completeness theorems and show how to extend partial biframes into full ones．The general notion of biframes（that allows for different domains in each world）and the predefined semantics of the connectives from $⿴ 囗 ⿰ 丿 ㇄$ more challenging than that of Thm．3．9．The following definitions are therefore needed．First，we introduce a more delicate technical notion of closure under ©－$k$－subformulas．

Definition 6．17．A set of $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$－formulas is called $\odot-k$－closed if whenever it contains a formula of the form $\circ \varphi$ for some $\circ \in \odot$ ，it also contains $\varphi$ ，and whenever it contains a formula of the form $\diamond\left(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right)$ for some $\diamond \in \diamond_{\mathcal{L}} \backslash \odot$ it also contains $\odot{ }^{\leq k} \psi_{i}$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$ ．

Note that every set that is closed under $\odot-k$－subformulas is also $\odot-k$－closed．However，since $\psi$ is a subformula of $\square \psi$（i．e．，$\psi \in \operatorname{sub_{k}^{\odot }}(\square \psi)$ for any $\psi \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$ ，๑ $\subseteq \diamond_{\mathcal{L}}^{1}, k>0$ and $\left.\square \in \square\right)$ ，the converse may not hold．For example，$\left\{\left(\square p_{1}\right) \wedge\left(\square p_{1}\right), \square p_{1}\right\}$ is $\emptyset$－$k$－closed for any $k$ ，but it is not closed under $\emptyset$－$k$－subformulas，as $p_{1}$ is missing．

Next，we define $\odot-k$－closed biframes：
Definition 6．18．A biframe $\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ for $M$ is $\odot-k$－closed if the following hold for every $w \in W$ ：
－ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ is $\odot-k$－closed and finite．
－For every $\square \in$ Q，if $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，then $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ ．
Similarly to the case of pure calculi，the ability to extend partial models is essential also when introducing modal operators．We thus explicitly define what it means to extend a biframe．

Definition 6．19．A biframe $\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ for $\mathcal{M}$ extends a biframe $\left\langle W^{\prime}, \mathcal{R}^{\prime}, \mathcal{V}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ for $\mathcal{M}$ if $W=W^{\prime}$ ， $\mathcal{R}=\mathcal{R}^{\prime}$ ，and $\mathcal{V}_{w}$ extends $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}$（i．e．， $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\psi)$ whenever $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\psi)$ is defined）for every $w \in W$ ．

Finally，the main part of the proof of Thm． 6.13 is the following lemma，which is proven in the next section．The theorem immediately follows from this lemma using Theorems 6.9 and 6．10．

Lemma 6．20．Let G be a standard $\odot-k$－analytic $\mathcal{L}$－calculus and $\mathcal{W}$ a G －legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe for $\mathcal{M}$ ．Then， $\mathcal{W}$ can be extended to a G －legal $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$－biframe for $\mathcal{M}$ ．

Before proving the lemma，we use it to prove Thm．6．13．
Proof of Theorem 6．13．Suppose that $S \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{M}} s$ ．Let $S^{\prime}$ be a finite subset of $S$ such that $S^{\prime} \vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\mathrm{M}}} s$ ． We prove that $S^{\prime} \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} s$ for $\mathcal{F}=s u b_{k}^{\odot}\left(S^{\prime} \cup\{s\}\right)$（and so $\left.S \vdash_{\mathbf{G}_{M}}^{\mathcal{F}} s\right)$ ．Otherwise，by Thm．6．10， there exists a G－legal $\mathcal{F}$－biframe $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ for $\mathbb{M}$ such that $\mathcal{V}_{W}\left(S^{\prime}\right)>\mathcal{V}_{w}(s)$ ． $\mathcal{W}$ is $\odot-k-$ closed，and by Lemma 6．20，it can be extended to a G－legal $\mathcal{L}_{\text {■ }}$－biframe $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}=\left\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ for M ． After this extension，we still have $\mathcal{V}_{W}^{\prime}\left(S^{\prime}\right)>\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(s)$ ．By Thm．6．9，we have $S^{\prime} \forall_{G_{M}} s$ ，which is a contradiction．

Note that Lemma 6.20 will also be used in the next section，where we extend the reduction of $\S 4$ ．

## 6．4 Proof of Lemma 6.20

Lemma 6.20 allows one to extend partial biframes into full ones．For the extension method that we propose here，the following property of $\odot-k$－closed sets is useful：

Proposition 6．21．If $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{\square}}$ is $\odot-k$－closed and $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ is $a \odot-k$－subformula of $\psi \in \mathcal{L}$ ，then $\sigma(\psi) \in \mathcal{F}$ implies $\sigma(\varphi) \in \mathcal{F}$ ．

Our extension method is gradual：We add all formulas of the language to the domain of the biframe，not one by one－but many at a time．The following three lemmas establish the required ingredients for the full extension construction．

For the rest of this section，let G be a standard $\odot-k$－analytic $\mathcal{L}$－calculus．
Lemma 6．22．Let $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ be a G －legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe for $\mathcal{M}$ ．Given $p \in A t, \mathcal{W}$ can be extended to a G－legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ for $\mathcal{M}$ ，such that $p \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)$ ．

Proof．Let $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}=\left\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ ，where $\mathcal{V}^{\prime}$ is the function assigning to every $w \in W$ ，the $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right) \cup\{p\}$－bivaluation $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}$ obtained by extending $\mathcal{V}_{w}$ with the value 0 （say）for $p$ whenever $p \notin \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．Clearly， $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is a $\odot-k$－closed biframe for $M$ that extends $\mathcal{W}$ ，and $p \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)$ ．It remains to show that $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is G－legal．Let $w \in W, s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s \in \mathrm{G}, s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$ ，and $\sigma$ a substi－ tution such that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．We prove that $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \leq \mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\sigma(s))$ ． If $p \notin \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)$ or $p \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，then this follows from the fact that $\mathcal{V}_{w}$ is G－legal． The fact that G is standard entails that these are actually the only two options for $p$ ．Indeed，if $p \in \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)$ ，then $p=\sigma\left(p^{\prime}\right)$ for some atomic variable $p^{\prime} \in \operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)$ ．Since $\mathbf{G}$ is standard，$p^{\prime}$ is a proper subformula of some $\varphi \in \operatorname{frm}(s)$ ．Since $\sigma(\varphi) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ and $\sigma(\varphi) \neq p$ ，we have $\sigma(\varphi) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．By Prop．6．21，$p \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．

Lemma 6．23．Let $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ be $a \mathrm{G}$－legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe for $\mathcal{M}$ ．Then， $\mathcal{W}$ can be extended


Proof．For every $w \in W$ ，let $\mathcal{F}_{w}=\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right) \cup$ 酎 $(\mathcal{W})$ ．Let $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}=\left\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ ，where $\mathcal{V}^{\prime}$ is the function assigning to every $w \in W$ ，the $\mathcal{F}_{w}$－bivaluation $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}$ defined by：

$$
\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\psi)= \begin{cases}\mathcal{V}_{w}(\psi) & \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right) \\ \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}(\varphi) & \psi=\square \varphi \in \mathcal{F}_{w} \backslash \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)\end{cases}
$$

We show first that $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is a biframe for $M$ ．Let $w \in W$ ．Let $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ such that $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ ．If $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，then since $\mathcal{W}$ is $\odot-k$－closed，$\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ ．Hence since $\mathcal{W}$ is a biframe for $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}^{\prime}(\psi)$ ． If $\square \psi \notin \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，then by the definition of $\mathcal{V}^{\prime}$ in this case， $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}^{\prime}(\psi)$ ．

Obviously， $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ extends $\mathcal{W}$ and $\square \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W}) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)$ ．It remains to show that $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is $\odot-k$－ closed and G－legal．
（1）$\odot-k$－closed：For every $w \in W$ ， $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ is $\odot-k$－closed and finite．Since we only added a finite number of formulas，all from 回 $\mathcal{L}_{\text {ロ }}, \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ is also $\odot-k$－closed and finite for every $w \in W$ ．Now，suppose that $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．If $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，then $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ since $\mathcal{W}$ is $\odot-k$－closed．If $\square \psi \notin \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，then $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W}) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)$ ，and in particular $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ ．
（2）G－legal：Let $w \in W, s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s \in G, s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$ ，and $\sigma$ a substitution such that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．We prove that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，and then $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \leq \mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\sigma(s))$ follows from the fact that $\mathcal{W}$ is G－legal．Indeed，let $\psi \in \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)$ ．If $\psi \notin$ 回 $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$ ，then $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．Otherwise，$\psi=\sigma(p)$ for some atomic variable $p \in \operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)$ ．Since G is standard，$p$ is a proper subformula of some compound $\mathcal{L}$－formula $\varphi \in \operatorname{frm}(s)$ ．Since $\varphi$ is a compound $\mathcal{L}$－formula，we have $\sigma(\varphi) \notin$ 回 $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$ ， and hence $\sigma(\varphi) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．By Prop．6．21，since $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ is $\odot-k$－closed，$\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．

Lemma 6．24．Let $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ be a G －legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe for $\mathcal{M}$ ．Then， $\mathcal{W}$ can be extended to a G－legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ for $M$ ，such that $\odot \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W}) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)$ ，and for every $\diamond \in$ $\diamond_{\mathcal{L}}^{n} \backslash \odot, \diamond\left(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)$ whenever $\odot \leq k\left\{\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right\} \subseteq \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W})$ ．

Proof．We define $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ in several steps．
Embedding $\mathcal{L}$ in $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$ ：Let $\sigma_{0}$ be some bijection from $A t$ to $A t \cup$ 回 $\mathcal{L}_{\text {ロ }}$ ．As a substitution，$\sigma_{0}$ is naturally extended to apply on all $\mathcal{L}$－formulas．It is straightforward to verify that its extension is a bijection from $\mathcal{L}$ to $\mathcal{L}_{\text {■ }}$ ．
Translating $\mathcal{V}$ ：For every $w \in W$ ，let $\mathcal{F}_{w}=\left\{\varphi \in \mathcal{L} \mid \sigma_{0}(\varphi) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)\right\}$ ．By Prop． 6.21 and the fact that $\mathcal{W}$ is ©－$k$－closed，we have that $\mathcal{F}_{w}$ is closed under $\odot-k$－subformulas for every $w \in W$ ．Since $\sigma_{0}$ is a bijection，we also have that $\mathcal{F}_{w}$ is finite for every $w \in W$ ．Now，for every $w \in W$ ，let $u_{w}$ be the $\mathcal{F}_{w}$－bivaluation given by $u_{w}=\lambda \varphi \in \mathcal{F}_{w} . \mathcal{V}_{w}\left(\sigma_{0}(\varphi)\right)$ ．We show that $u_{w}$ is G－legal for every $w \in W$ ．Let $w \in W, s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s \in \mathrm{G}, s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$ ，and $\sigma$ a substitution such that $\left.\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{w}$ ．We prove that $u_{w}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \leq u_{w}(\sigma(s))$ ． Consider the substitution $\sigma^{\prime}=\sigma_{0} \circ \sigma$ ．It is easy to see that $\sigma^{\prime}(\varphi)=\sigma_{0}(\sigma(\varphi))$ for every formula $\varphi$ ．Therefore，$\sigma^{\prime}\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)=\sigma_{0}\left(\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)\right) \subseteq \sigma_{0}\left(\mathcal{F}_{w}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．Since $\mathcal{W}$ is G－legal，we have $u_{w}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right)=\mathcal{V}_{w}\left(\sigma^{\prime}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \leq \mathcal{V}_{w}\left(\sigma^{\prime}(s)\right)=u_{w}(\sigma(s))$ ．
Extending the translation：Let $w \in W$ ．Then，$u_{w}$ is a G－legal bivaluation whose domain $\mathcal{F}_{w}$ is a finite subset of $\mathcal{L}$ closed under $\odot-k$－subformulas．Since $G$ is $\odot-k$－analytic，by Thm．3．9， $u_{w}$ can be extended to a G－legal $\mathcal{L}$－bivaluation $u_{w}^{*}$ ．
Defining $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ ：For every $w \in W$ ，let $\mathcal{F}_{w}^{\prime}=\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right) \cup \odot \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W}) \cup\left\{\diamond\left(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right) \mid \diamond \in\left(\diamond_{\mathcal{L}}^{n} \backslash\right.\right.$ ©），$\left.\odot^{\leq k}\left\{\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right\} \subseteq \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W})\right\}$ ．Let $\alpha$ be the inverse of the extended $\sigma_{0} . \alpha$ is a bijection from $\mathcal{L}_{\boxminus}$ to $\mathcal{L}$ ．Let $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}=\left\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ ，where $\mathcal{V}^{\prime}$ is the function assigning to every $w \in W$ ， the $\mathcal{F}_{w}^{\prime}$－bivaluation $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}$ defined by：

$$
\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\psi)= \begin{cases}\mathcal{V}_{w}(\psi) & \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right) \\ u_{w}^{*}(\alpha(\psi)) & \psi \in \mathcal{F}_{w}^{\prime} \backslash \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)\end{cases}
$$

First，we prove that $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is a biframe for $M$ ．Let $w \in W$ and $\psi, \square \psi \in \mathcal{L}_{\text {■ }}$ ．Suppose that $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ and $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ ．Then，since $\square \psi \in$ 回 $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$ ，we have $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．Since $\mathcal{W}$ is $\odot-k$－closed，$\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ ．Since $\mathcal{W}$ is a biframe， $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}^{\prime}(\psi)$ ．
Clearly， $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ extends $\mathcal{W}$ ，$\odot \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W}) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)$ ，and for every $\diamond \in \diamond_{\mathcal{L}}^{n} \backslash \odot, \diamond\left(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right) \in$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)$ whenever $\odot \leq k\left\{\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right\} \subseteq \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W})$ ．
It remains to show that $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is $\odot-k$－closed and G－legal．
（1）$\odot-k$－closed：Let $w \in W$ ．First， $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ is finite since $\operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W})$ and $\diamond_{\mathcal{L}}$ are finite．Second， let $\circ \varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ for some $\circ \in \bigcirc$ ．If $\circ \varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，then since $\mathcal{W}$ is $\odot-k$－closed，$\varphi \in$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．Otherwise，$\circ \varphi \in \mathcal{F}_{w}^{\prime} \backslash \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，which means that $\varphi \in \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W}) \subseteq$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．Third，let $\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．We show that ${ }^{\leq k} \psi_{i} \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$ ．If $\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ then this holds since $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ is $\odot-k-$ closed．Otherwise，$\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right) \in \mathcal{F}_{w}^{\prime} \backslash \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，which means that $\odot{ }^{\leq} \psi_{i} \subseteq \operatorname{dom}(\mathcal{W}) \subseteq$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$ ．Finally，let $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．Then，since $\square \psi \in$ $\square \mathcal{L}_{\text {回 }} \square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．Since $\mathcal{W}$ is $\odot-k$－closed，$\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]$ ．
（2）G－legal：Let $w \in W, s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s \in \mathrm{G}, s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$ ，and $\sigma$ a substitution such that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．We prove that $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \leq \mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\sigma(s))$ ．For that， we first prove that $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\psi)=u_{w}^{*}(\alpha(\psi))$ for every $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\right)$ ．If $\psi \notin \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ，then this holds by definition．Suppose that $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ ．Since $\sigma_{0}(\alpha(\psi))=\psi, \alpha(\psi) \in \mathcal{F}_{w}$ ．

Hence $u_{w}^{*}(\alpha(\psi))=u_{w}(\alpha(\psi))$ ．By definition，$u_{w}(\alpha(\psi))=\mathcal{V}_{w}\left(\sigma_{0}(\alpha(\psi))\right)=\mathcal{V}_{w}(\psi)$ ．Since $\psi \in$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right), u_{w}^{*}(\alpha(\psi))=\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\psi)$ ．Now，consider the substitution $\sigma^{\prime}=\alpha \circ \sigma$ ．It is easy to see that $\sigma^{\prime}(\psi)=\alpha(\sigma(\psi))$ for every $\psi \in \operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)$ ．Clearly，$\sigma^{\prime}\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right) \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ ．Since $u_{w}^{*}$ is G－legal，we have $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right)=u_{w}^{*}\left(\alpha\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right)\right)=u_{w}^{*}\left(\sigma^{\prime}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \leq$ $u_{w}^{*}\left(\sigma^{\prime}(s)\right)=u_{w}^{*}(\alpha(\sigma(s)))=\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\sigma(s))$ ．

To complete the proof of Lemma 6．20，we use Lemmas 6.22 to 6.24 repeatedly，and construct a full biframe from a partial one．First，recursively construct an infinite sequence $\mathcal{W}^{0}=\left\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{0}\right\rangle, \mathcal{W}^{1}=$ $\left\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{1}\right\rangle, \ldots$ such that：
－ $\mathcal{W}^{0}=\mathcal{W}$ ．
－For every $i, \mathcal{W}^{i}$ is a G－legal ©－$k$－closed biframe for $M$ ．
－Each $\mathcal{W}^{i+1}$ extends $\mathcal{W}^{i}$ ．
－For every $\psi \in \mathcal{L}_{⿷}, \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i}\right)$ for some $i \geq 0$ ．
We begin with $\mathcal{W}^{0}=\mathcal{W}$ ．Given $\mathcal{W}^{i}, \mathcal{W}^{i+1}$ is obtained as follows．By Lemma $6.22, \mathcal{W}^{i}$ can be extended to a G－legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe $\mathcal{W}_{1}^{i}$ for $M$ such that $p_{i} \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{1}^{i}\right)$ ．In turn，Lemma 6.23 gives us that $\mathcal{W}_{1}^{i}$ can be extended to a G－legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe $\mathcal{W}_{2}^{i}$ for $\mathcal{M}$ such that $\operatorname{a} \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{1}^{i}\right) \subseteq$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{2}^{i}\right)$ ．Finally，by Lemma $6.24, \mathcal{W}_{2}^{i}$ can be extended to a G－legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe $\mathcal{W}_{3}^{i}$ for $\mathcal{M}$ such that $\odot \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{2}^{i}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{3}^{i}\right)$ ，and for every $\diamond \in \diamond_{\mathcal{L}}^{n} \backslash \odot, \diamond\left(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{3}^{i}\right)$ whenever ${ }^{\odot}{ }^{\leq k}\left\{\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right\} \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{2}^{i}\right)$ ．We take $\mathcal{W}^{i+1}=\left\langle\mathcal{W}, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{i+1}\right\rangle$ to be $\mathcal{W}_{3}^{i}$ ．

Clearly，for every $i \geq 0, \mathcal{W}^{i+1}$ is a G－legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe for $M$ that extends $\mathcal{W}^{i}$ ．We prove that for every $\psi \in \mathcal{L}_{\text {『 }}$ there exists some $i \geq 0$ such that $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i}\right)$ ，by induction on the complexity of $\psi$ ：
（1）If $\psi \in A t$ then $\psi=p_{i}$ for some $i \geq 1$ ．By our construction，$p_{i} \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{1}^{i}\right)$ and hence $p_{i} \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i+1}\right)$ ．
（2）If $\psi=\square \varphi$ then by the induction hypothesis，$\varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i}\right)$ for some $i \geq 0$ ．By our construction， $\square \varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{2}^{i}\right)$ and hence $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i+1}\right)$ ．
（3）If $\psi=\circ \varphi$ ，then by the induction hypothesis，there exists $i$ such that $\varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i}\right)$ ．By our construction，$\circ \varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{3}^{i}\right)$ ，and hence $\circ \varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i+1}\right)$ ．
（4）If $\psi=\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right)$ then by the induction hypothesis，there exist $i_{1}, \ldots, i_{n}$ such that $\psi_{j} \in$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i_{j}}\right)$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$ ．Let $i=\max \left\{i_{1}, \ldots, i_{n}\right\}$ ．By our construction，there exists $i_{0}>i$ such that $\odot^{\leq k} \psi_{j} \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i_{0}}\right)$ for every $1 \leq j \leq n$（in each step we add $\circ \varphi$ for every $\varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i}\right)$ and $\circ \in$ ©．Since $\odot^{\leq k}$ is finite，we exhaust it at some point）．Hence $\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}_{3}^{i_{0}}\right)$ ，which means that $\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right) \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i_{0}+1}\right)$ ．
We now define $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}=\left\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ ，a G－legal $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$－biframe for $M$ that extends $\mathcal{W}$ ．For every $\psi \in \mathcal{L}_{⿷}$ ，let $i_{\psi}$ denote the first $i$ such that $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{i}\right)$ ．For every $w \in W, \mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}$ is defined by $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{w}^{i_{\psi}}(\psi)$ ．

We prove that $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is a G－legal $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$－biframe for $M$ that extends $\mathcal{W}$ ．Clearly， $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{W}^{\prime}\right)=\mathcal{L}_{\square}$ and $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ extends $\mathcal{W}$ ．We prove that $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is a biframe：Let $w \in W$ and $\psi, \square \psi \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$ ．Let $k=\max \left\{i_{\psi}, i_{\square \psi}\right\}$ ． Since $\mathcal{W}^{i}$ extends $\mathcal{W}^{i-1}$ for every $i$ ，we have $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{\prime}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{k}(\psi)$ and $\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{\prime}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{w^{\prime}}^{k}(\square \psi)$ for every $w^{\prime} \in W$ ．Since $\mathcal{W}^{k}$ is a biframe， $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{w}^{k}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}^{k}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}[w]}^{\prime}(\psi)$ ．It remains to show that $\mathcal{W}^{\prime}$ is G－legal．Let $w \in W, s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} / s \in \mathbf{G}, s_{1}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime} \subseteq s_{n}$ ，and $\sigma$ a substitution． We prove that $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \leq \mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\sigma(s))$ ．Let $k=\max \left\{i_{\psi} \mid \psi \in \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)\right\}$ ．Since $\mathcal{W}^{i}$ extends $W^{i-1}$ for every $i$ ，we have $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{w}^{k}(\psi)$ for every $\psi \in \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}, s\right\}\right)\right)$ ．Since $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{k}$ is G－legal， $\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right)=\mathcal{V}_{w}^{k}\left(\sigma\left(\left\{s_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right\}\right)\right) \leq \mathcal{V}_{w}^{k}(\sigma(s))=\mathcal{V}_{w}^{\prime}(\sigma(s))$ ．

## 7 DECISION PROCEDURE FOR PURE CALCULI WITH NEXT OPERATORS

In this section we extend the reduction from §4 to standard pure calculi with modal operators that are defined by（ PF ）and $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{PF}}\right)^{8}$ The implementation described in $\$ 4.2$ includes this extension．

Semantically，such calculi are characterized by biframes in which the accessibility relations are total functions．We call such operators Next operators，as they are often employed in temporal logics to express the＂next state＂．Recall，that the quotations employed in primal infon logic［19］are also governed by these rules，and hence quotations are Next operators（Example 6．15）．

We start by defining a useful variant of the ©－$k$－subformula relation in §7．1．This relation is used in $\S 7.2$ in order to extend the reduction of $\S 4$ ，and to prove the correctness of the extended reduction．In what follows，we denote the specification function $M$ that assigns $\left\{(\mathrm{PF}),\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{PF}}\right)\right\}$ to every $\square \in \square$ by Next．In turn，biframes for Next are called totally functional biframes．

## 7．1 Local Formulas

To generalize the reduction in $\S 4$ ，we replace $\odot-k$－subformulas by $\odot-k$－local formulas．This notion generalizes the local formulas relation from［28］．A sequence $\bar{\square}=\square_{1} \ldots \square_{m}(m \geq 0)$ of elements of回 is called a 回－prefix．We say that is a $\square$－prefix of a formula $\varphi$ if $\varphi$ has the form $\bar{\square} \psi$ for some $\psi \in \mathcal{L}_{⿷ 匚}$ ．The notation $\square \mathcal{F}$ is naturally extended to prefixes $\bar{\square}$ ．

Definition 7．1．Denote by $\bar{\square}_{\psi}$ the longest（possibly，empty）回－prefix of $\psi$ ，and by $b_{\psi}$ the formula for which $\psi=\bar{\square}_{\psi} b_{\psi}$ ．A formula $\varphi$ is immediately $\odot-k$－local to a formula $\psi$ if $\varphi=\bar{\square}_{\psi} \varphi^{\prime}$ for some immediate $\odot-k$－subformula $\varphi^{\prime}$ of $b_{\psi}$ ．The $\odot-k$－local formula relation is the reflexive transitive closure of the immediate $\odot-k$－local formula relation．We denote the set of $\odot-k$－local formulas of a formula $\psi$ by $l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(\psi)$ ．This notation is naturally extended to sequents，sets of sequents etc．When $\bigcirc=\emptyset$ ，we call $\varphi$ a local formula of $\psi$ ．

Note that for ${ }^{\square}=\emptyset$ ，we have $l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(\psi)=s u b_{k}^{\odot}(\psi)$ for every formula $\psi$ ．
Example 7．2．loc ${ }_{1}^{\{\neg\},\{\square, \boxtimes\}}\left(\square\left(\boxtimes p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right)\right)=\left\{\square \boxtimes p_{1}, \square \neg \boxtimes p_{1}, \square p_{2}, \square \neg p_{2}, \square\left(\boxtimes p_{1} \supset p_{2}\right)\right\}$ ．
Similarly to $\odot-k$－subformulas，since every formula has finitely many immediate $\odot-k$－local formu－ las，we have that $l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(\psi)$ is finite for every $\psi \in \mathcal{L}$ ．The following lemma provides an alternative inductive definition of $l o c_{k}^{\ominus, \text { ，}}$（ $(\psi)$ ：

Lemma 7．3．（1）$l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(p)=\{p\}$ for every $p \in A t$ ．
（2）$l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(\circ \psi)=\{\circ \psi\} \cup l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(\psi)$ for every $\circ \in \odot$ ．
（3）$l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}\left(\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right)\right)=\left\{\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right)\right\} \cup \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq n} \odot{ }^{\leq k} \psi_{i} \cup l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}\left(\psi_{i}\right)$ for every $\diamond \in \diamond_{\mathcal{L}} \backslash \odot$ ．
（4）$l o c_{k}^{\varrho, \text { ，}}(\square \psi)=\square l o c_{k}^{@, \square}(\psi)$ ．

## 7．2 Extending The Reduction

For the case that the set of assumptions is empty，we extend the reduction from $\S 4$ to sequent calculi with Next operators．As before，we assume $G$ is axiomatic．

Definition 7．4．The SAT instance associated with a given axiomatic $\mathcal{L}$－calculus G and an $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Q}^{-}}$－ sequent $s$ ，denoted $\mathrm{SAT}_{k}^{\odot, 『}(\mathrm{G}, s)$ ，consists of the following clauses：
（1） $\mathrm{SAT}^{-}(s)$
（2） $\operatorname{SAT}^{+}\left(\square \sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)$ for every rule $\emptyset / s^{\prime}$ of $\mathbf{G}$ ，substitution $\sigma$ and $\square$－prefix $\bar{\square}$ such that $\bar{\square} \sigma\left(f r m\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq$ $l o c_{k}^{\text {＠，『 }}(s)$ ．

[^6]The following theorem states that the reduction is correct．
Theorem 7．5．Let $\mathbf{G}$ be a standard $\odot-k$－analytic $\mathcal{L}$－calculus ands an $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$－sequent．Then $\vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{\text {Next }}}$ siff $\mathrm{SAT}_{k}^{\odot, \text { ，}}(\mathrm{G}, s)$ is unsatisfiable．

Proof．For a totally functional biframe $\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ and a world $w \in W$ ，we denote by $\mathcal{R}_{\square}(w)$ the（unique）world $w^{\prime}$ such that $\left\langle w, w^{\prime}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{R}_{\square}$ ．Then，we have $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\square \psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}(w)}(\psi)$ whenever $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{w}\right)$ and $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{R}_{\square}(w)}\right)$ ．
$(\Rightarrow)$ ：Suppose that $\forall_{G_{\text {Next }}}$ s．By Thm．6．10，we have $\mathcal{V}_{w}(s)=0$ for some G－legal $\mathcal{L}_{\square}$－biframe $\mathcal{W}=\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ for Next and $w \in W$ ．Consider the classical assignment $u$ that assigns true to $x_{\psi}$ iff $\mathcal{V}_{w}(\psi)=1$ ．Since $\mathcal{V}_{w}(s)=0, u$ satisfies $\operatorname{SAT}^{-}(s)$ ．It remains to prove that $\mathcal{V}_{w}\left(\square \sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ for every $\emptyset / s^{\prime} \in \mathrm{G}$ ，substitution $\sigma$ and $\square$－prefix $\bar{\square}$ such that $\bar{\square} \sigma\left(f r m\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq l o c_{k}^{\ominus, 『}(s)$ ．Suppose that $\bar{\square}=\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}$ ，and let $w=w_{0}, w_{1}, \ldots, w_{n}$ be a sequence of worlds of $\mathcal{W}$ such that $\mathcal{R}_{\square_{i}}\left(w_{i-1}\right)=w_{i}$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$ ．Then $\mathcal{V}_{w_{0}}\left(\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n} \psi\right)=\mathcal{V}_{w_{1}}\left(\square_{2} \ldots \square_{n} \psi\right)=\ldots=\mathcal{V}_{w_{n}}(\psi)$ for every $\psi \in \mathcal{L}_{⿷}$ ． Since $\mathcal{W}$ is G－legal，the bivaluation $\mathcal{V}_{w_{n}}$ is G－legal，and therefore， $\mathcal{V}_{w}\left(\square \sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=\mathcal{V}_{w_{n}}\left(\sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ ．
$(\Leftarrow)$ ：Let $u$ be an assignment that satisfies $\operatorname{SAT}_{k}^{\odot, \square}(\mathrm{G}, s)$ ．Define the following biframe $\mathcal{W}=$ $\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}\rangle$ ：
（1）$W$ is the set of all $\square$－prefixes．
（2）For every $\square \in$ 回 and $\bar{\square} \in W, \mathcal{R}_{\square}(\bar{\square})=\bar{\square} \square$ ．
（3） $\mathcal{V}_{\square}$ is defined by induction on the length of $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\epsilon}\right)=l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(s)$ and $\mathcal{V}_{\epsilon}(\psi)=1$ iff $u$ satis－ fies $x_{\psi} ; \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\right)=\left\{\varphi \mid \square_{n} \varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n-1}}\right)\right\}$ and $\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}(\psi)=\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n-1}}\left(\square_{n} \psi\right)$ ． Clearly， $\mathcal{R}_{\square}$ is a total function for every $\square \in \square$ ．Since $u$ satisfies $\operatorname{SAT}^{-}(s), \mathcal{V}_{\epsilon}(s)=0$ ．We prove that $\mathcal{W}$ is a G－legal $\odot-k$－closed biframe for Next（see Def．6．18）．
（1）biframe for Next：By the definition of $\mathcal{V}$ ．
（2）G－legal：We prove that $\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}$ is G－legal for every $\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n} \in W$ ．Let $\emptyset / s^{\prime} \in$ G and $\sigma$ be a substitution such that $\sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\right)$ ．We prove that $\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\left(\sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ ． We actually prove a stronger claim，namely that $\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\left(\square \sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ for every $\square$－prefix $\bar{\square}$（including $\epsilon$ ）such that $\bar{\square}\left(f r m\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\right)$ ．We do so by induction on $n$ ．For $n=0$ we have $\mathcal{V}_{\epsilon}\left(\square \sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ because $u$ satisfies SAT ${ }^{+}\left(\square \sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)$ ．Now，let $n \geq 1$ ．Since $\bar{\square} \sigma\left(\operatorname{frm}\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\right)$ ，we have $\square_{n} \bar{\square} \sigma\left(f r m\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n-1}}\right)$ ．By the induction hypothesis， $\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n-1}}\left(\square_{n} \square \sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ ．By $\mathcal{V}^{\prime}$ s definition， $\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\left(\square \sigma\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right)=1$ ．
（3）$\odot-k$－closed： $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square}\right)$ is finite for every $\bar{\square}$ since $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\epsilon}\right)=l o c_{k}^{\odot, \text { ，}}(s)$ is finite．In addition，if $\square \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\bar{\square}}\right)$ then by our construction，$\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square \square}\right)$ ．It remains to prove that for every $\bar{\square} \in W$ ， $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square}\right)$ is $\odot-k$－closed．First，note that every set which is closed under $\odot-k$－local formulas is also $\odot-k$－closed．This holds since $\psi$ is $\odot-k$－local to $\circ \psi$ for every $\circ \in \odot$ ，and $\bar{\circ} \psi_{i}$ is $\odot-k$－local to $\diamond\left(\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}\right)$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $\bar{\sigma} \in \odot \leq k$ ．Therefore，it suffices to prove that $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square}\right)$ is closed under $\odot-k$－local formulas for every $\bar{\square} \in W$ ．We do so by induction on the length of $\square$ ．First，we have that $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\epsilon}\right)=l o c_{k}^{\varrho \text { ，■ }}(s)$ is closed under $\odot-k$－local formulas．Now，let $\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n} \in W(n \geq 1)$ ．We prove that $l o c_{k}^{\text {＠，}}(\psi) \subseteq \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\right)$ for every $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\right)$ ．Let $\psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\right)$ ．Then，$\square_{n} \psi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n-1}}\right)$ ．By the induction hypothesis， $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n-1}}\right)$ is closed under $\odot-k$－local formulas．Therefore，$l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}\left(\square_{n} \psi\right) \subseteq$ $\operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n-1}}\right)$ ．Now，let $\varphi \in l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(\psi)$ ．Then，by Lemma 7．3，$\square_{n} \varphi \in \square_{n} l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}(\psi)=$ $l o c_{k}^{\odot, \square}\left(\square_{n} \psi\right)$ ．Hence $\square_{n} \varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n-1}}\right)$ ．By $\mathcal{V}$＇s definition，$\varphi \in \operatorname{dom}\left(\mathcal{V}_{\square_{1} \ldots \square_{n}}\right)$ ．
Now，since G is $\odot-k$－analytic，By Lemma $6.20, \mathcal{W}$ can be extended to a G－legal $\mathcal{L}_{\mathfrak{Q}^{-} \text {－biframe }}$ $\left\langle W, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{V}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ for Next．By Thm．6．9，since $\mathcal{V}_{\epsilon}^{\prime}(s)=0$ ，we have $\forall_{G_{\text {Next }}} s$ ．
Note that Thm． 7.5 is restricted to derivability problems with an empty set of assumptions．The main difficulty with encoding a countermodel for the derivability of $s$ from $S$ is that every element
of $S$ must hold in every world of the countermodel. This is in contrast to the rules of G, which are required to hold only in worlds whose domains include the instances of the rules. We leave the handling of non-empty sets of assumptions for future work.

For the case that $\odot=\emptyset$ (and $S=\emptyset$ ), the polynomial time algorithm from Thm. 4.6 can be modified to accommodate Next operators. In particular, the derivability problem for such calculi is also in co-NP.

Theorem 7.6. Let G be an axiomatic $\mathcal{L}$-calculus, such that $c_{k}^{\odot}(\mathrm{G})=m$. Given an $\mathcal{L}_{\square}{ }^{-}$-sequent $s$, it is possible to compute $\mathrm{SAT}_{k}^{\natural, \square}(\mathrm{G}, s)$ in $O\left(n^{m}\right)$ time, where $n$ is the length of the string representing the input sequent.

Proof. The algorithm in the proof of Thm. 4.6 is reused with several modifications. As in [19], an auxiliary trie (an ordered tree data structure commonly used for string processing) for 回-prefixes is constructed in linear time, and every node in the input parse tree has a pointer to a node in this trie. Now, each node in the parse tree corresponds to an occurrence of a formula that is local to $s$. The tree is then compressed to a dag as in the proof of Thm. 4.6. The nodes of the dag one-to-one correspond to the local formulas of $s$. The rest of the algorithm is exactly as in the proof of Thm. 4.6.

Example 7.7. Following Example 4.11, our general reduction provides linear time algorithms for the extensions of $\mathbf{P}$ and $\mathbf{E P}$ with any finite set of Next operators. (A different linear time algorithm was developed in [19] for P.)

To conclude, we note that in some cases, Propositions 6.2 and 6.5 allow for modal operators other than Next operators to be applicable for the reduction to SAT. Indeed, for Horn calculi (Def. 4.8), Next is equivalent to a specification $M$ in which $M(\square)=\left\{(\mathrm{K}),\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}\right)\right\}$; and if the calculus is also definite (Def. 6.3), $\left(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{K}}\right)$ can be eliminated, leaving just $\{(\mathrm{\kappa})\}$.

## 8 CONCLUSIONS

We have studied the family of pure sequent calculi focusing on (generalized) analyticity (rather than the more traditional cut-elimination property). The key tool in this general study is a modular and uniform semantic interpretation of pure sequent calculi. The semantics was used to characterize analyticity, provide useful sufficient criteria for it, as well as to obtain an effective SAT-based decision procedure for derivability in analytic pure calculi. We then further considered the extension of pure calculi with various rules for modal operators, and showed that such extension always preserves analyticity. This result, together with the criteria for analyticity in pure calculi, provides simple approach to develop analytic-by-construction calculi for non-classical logics with modal operators. Finally, the SAT-based decision procedure was extended for a restricted type of modal operators that correspond to Next operators in temporal logics.

Further research is required for extending the methods of this paper to provide analyticity conditions and decision procedures for many-sided sequent calculi, that are more expressive than ordinary two-sided calculi, as well as for richer languages, which employ, e.g., diamond-like modalities, negative modalities, and quantifiers.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The first author was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant number 5166651), and by Len Blavatnik and the Blavatnik Family foundation. The contribution of the second author is part of his Ph.D. thesis research conducted at Tel Aviv University.

## REFERENCES

[1] Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap. 1975. Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Vol.I. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[2] Ofer Arieli and Arnon Avron. 2015. Three-Valued Paraconsistent Propositional Logics. In New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic: 5th WCP, Kolkata, India, February 2014, Jean-Yves Beziau, Mihir Chakraborty, and Soma Dutta (Eds.). Springer India, New Delhi, 91-129. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2719-9_4
[3] Arnon Avron. 1991. Simple consequence relations. Information and Computation 92, 1 (may 1991), 105-139. https: //doi.org/10.1016/0890-5401(91)90023-u
[4] Arnon Avron. 1993. Gentzen-type systems, resolution and tableaux. Fournal of Automated Reasoning 10, 2 (1993), 265-281. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00881838
[5] Arnon Avron. 2003. Classical Gentzen-type Methods in Propositional Many-valued Logics. In Beyond Two: Theory and Applications of Multiple-Valued Logic, Melvin Fitting and Ewa Orłowska (Eds.). Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, Vol. 114. Physica-Verlag HD, Heidelberg, 117-155. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1769-0_5
[6] Arnon Avron. 2007. Non-deterministic semantics for families of paraconsistent logics. Handbook of Paraconsistency 9 (2007), 285-320.
[7] Arnon Avron. 2014. Paraconsistency, paracompleteness, Gentzen systems, and trivalent semantics. Fournal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24, 1-2 (2014), 12-34. https://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2014.911515
[8] Arnon Avron, Beata Konikowska, and Anna Zamansky. 2012. Modular Construction of Cut-free Sequent Calculi for Paraconsistent Logics. In Logic in Computer Science (LICS), 2012 27th Annual IEEE Symposium on. 85-94. https: //doi.org/10.1109/LICS. 2012.20
[9] Arnon Avron, Beata Konikowska, and Anna Zamansky. 2013. Cut-free Sequent Calculi for C-systems with Generalized Finite-valued Semantics. fournal of Logic and Computation 23, 3 (2013), 517-540. https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exs039
[10] Arnon Avron and Iddo Lev. 2005. Non-deterministic multi-valued structures. Journal of Logic and Computation 15 (2005), 241-261.
[11] Lev Beklemishev and Yuri Gurevich. 2014. Propositional primal logic with disjunction. Fournal of Logic and Computation 24, 1 (2014), 257-282. https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exs018
[12] Jean-Yves Béziau. 2001. Sequents and bivaluations. Logique et Analyse 44, 176 (2001), 373-394.
[13] Nikolaj Bjørner, Guido de Caso, and Yuri Gurevich. 2012. From primal infon logic with individual variables to datalog. In Correct Reasoning. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 72-86.
[14] Andreas Blass and Yuri Gurevich. 2013. Abstract Hilbertian deductive systems, infon logic, and Datalog. Information and Computation 231 (2013), 21-37.
[15] Jiazhen Cai and Robert Paige. 1995. Using multiset discrimination to solve language processing problems without hashing. Theoretical Computer Science 145, 1-2 (1995), 189-228. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3975(94)00183-J
[16] Carlos Caleiro, Walter Carnielli, Marcelo E. Coniglio, and João Marcos. 2007. Two's Company: "The Humbug of Many Logical Values". In Logica Universalis: Towards a General Theory of Logic, Jean-Yves Beziau (Ed.). Birkhäuser Basel, Basel, 175-194. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7643-8354-1_10
[17] Agata Ciabattoni, Ori Lahav, Lara Spendier, and Anna Zamansky. 2013. Automated Support for the Investigation of Paraconsistent and Other Logics. In Logical Foundations of Computer Science, Sergei Artemov and Anil Nerode (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7734. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg, 119-133. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-642-35722-0_9
[18] Hubert Comon-Lundh and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2003. Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive or. In Logic in Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings. 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on. 271-280. https://doi.org/10.1109/LICS.2003.1210067
[19] Carlos Cotrini and Yuri Gurevich. 2013. Basic primal infon logic. Fournal of Logic and Computation 26, 1 (2013), 117-141. https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/ext021
[20] Anatoli Degtyarev and Andrei Voronkov. 2001. The Inverse Method. Handbook of Automated Reasoning 1 (2001), 179-272.
[21] Nachum Dershowitz and Zohar Manna. 1979. Proving Termination with Multiset Orderings. Commun. ACM 22, 8 (Aug. 1979), 465-476. https://doi.org/10.1145/359138.359142
[22] William F. Dowling and Jean H. Gallier. 1984. Linear-time algorithms for testing the satisfiability of propositional Horn formulae. The fournal of Logic Programming 1, 3 (1984), 267-284.
[23] J. Michael Dunn and Chunlai Zhou. 2005. Negation in the context of Gaggle Theory. Studia Logica 80, 2/3 (2005), 235-264.
[24] Olivier Gasquet, Andreas Herzig, Dominique Longin, and Mohamad Sahade. 2005. LoTREC: Logical Tableaux Research Engineering Companion. In Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods: 14th International Conference, TABLEAUX 2005, Koblenz, Germany, September 14-17, 2005. Proceedings, Bernhard Beckert (Ed.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 318-322. https://doi.org/10.1007/11554554_25

## Pure Sequent Calculi: Analyticity and Decision Procedure

[25] Gerhard Gentzen. 1934. Investigations into Logical Deduction. In German. An English translation appears in 'The Collected Works of Gerhard Gentzen', edited by M. E. Szabo, North-Holland, 1969.
[26] Enrico Giunchiglia, Armando Tacchella, and Fausto Giunchiglia. 2002. SAT-Based Decision Procedures for Classical Modal Logics. Fournal of Automated Reasoning 28, 2 (2002), 143-171. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015071400913
[27] Carla P Gomes, Henry Kautz, Ashish Sabharwal, and Bart Selman. 2008. Satisfiability solvers. Foundations of Artificial Intelligence 3 (2008), 89-134.
[28] Yuri Gurevich and Itay Neeman. 2011. Logic of infons: The propositional case. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic 12, 2, Article 9 (Jan. 2011), 28 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/1877714.1877715
[29] Norihiro Kamide. 2013. A Hierarchy of Weak Double Negations. Studia Logica 101, 6 (2013), 1277-1297. https: //doi.org/10.1007/s11225-013-9533-0
[30] Hiroya Kawai. 1987. Sequential calculus for a first order infinitary temporal logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 33, 5 (1987), 423-432.
[31] Robert Kowalski. 1986. Logic for Problem-solving. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, The Netherlands.
[32] Richard E. Ladner. 1977. The computational complexity of provability in systems of modal propositional logic. SIAM Journal of Computing 3 (1977), 467-480.
[33] Ori Lahav. 2013. Semantic Investigation of Proof Systems for Non-classical Logics. Ph.D. Dissertation. Tel Aviv University.
[34] Ori Lahav and Arnon Avron. 2013. A Unified Semantic Framework for Fully Structural Propositional Sequent Systems. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic 14, 4, Article 27 (Nov. 2013), 33 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2528930
[35] Ori Lahav and Yoni Zohar. 2014. On the Construction of Analytic Sequent Calculi for Sub-classical Logics. In Logic, Language, Information, and Computation, Ulrich Kohlenbach, Pablo Barceló, and Ruy de Queiroz (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 8652. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 206-220. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44145-9_15
[36] Ori Lahav and Yoni Zohar. 2014. SAT-Based Decision Procedure for Analytic Pure Sequent Calculi. In Automated Reasoning, Stéphane Demri, Deepak Kapur, and Christoph Weidenbach (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 8562. Springer International Publishing, 76-90. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08587-6_6
[37] Daniel Le Berre and Anne Parrain. 2010. The Sat4j library, release 2.2. Journal on Satisfiability, Boolean Modeling and Computation 7 (2010), 59-64.
[38] Dale Miller and Elaine Pimentel. 2013. A formal framework for specifying sequent calculus proof systems. Theoretical Computer Science 474 (2013), 98 - 116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.12.008
[39] Hiroakira Ono. 2016. Semantical Approach to Cut Elimination and Subformula Property in Modal Logic. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48357-2_1
[40] Luís Pinto and Tarmo Uustalu. 2009. Proof Search and Counter-Model Construction for Bi-intuitionistic Propositional Logic with Labelled Sequents. In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods (TABLEAUX '09). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 295-309. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-642-02716-1_22
[41] Francesca Poggiolesi. 2010. Gentzen calculi for modal propositional logic. Vol. 32. Springer Science \& Business Media.
[42] Antonio M. Sette. 1973. On the propositional calculus P1. Mathematica Japonicae 18, 13 (1973), 173-180.
[43] Dmitry Tishkovsky, Renate A Schmidt, and Mohammad Khodadadi. 2012. MetTeL2: Towards a Tableau Prover Generation Platform.. In PAAR@ IFCAR. 149-162.
[44] Heinrich Wansing. 2002. Sequent Systems for Modal Logics. In Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd edition, Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner (Eds.). Vol. 8. Springer, 61-145.
[45] Anna Zamansky and Yoni Zohar. 2016. 'Mathematical' Does Not Mean 'Boring': Integrating Software Assignments to Enhance Learning of Logico-Mathematical Concepts. In Advanced Information Systems Engineering Workshops: CAiSE 2016 International Workshops, Ljubljana, Slovenia, June 13-17, 2016, Proceedings, John Krogstie, Haralambos Mouratidis, and Jianwen Su (Eds.). Springer International Publishing, Cham, 103-108. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39564-7_ 10
[46] Yoni Zohar and Anna Zamansky. 2016. Gen2sat: An Automated Tool for Deciding Derivability in Analytic Pure Sequent Calculi. In International foint Conference on Automated Reasoning. Springer, 487-495.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Often, analyticity is obtained as a simple corollary of cut-elimination. Nevertheless, our interest here is on analyticity, which we find more fundamental than cut-elimination in propositional sequent calculi. In fact, there are well-known examples of logics (e.g., the modal logics B and S5) that have a simple analytic sequent calculus, but no (known) cut-free sequent calculus.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ By defining sequents as pairs of sets (rather than lists or multisets) we implicitly include the schemes of exchange and contraction in our calculi.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ Obviously, one cannot expect to have decision procedures for derivability in every pure calculus. Indeed, any Hilbert calculus $H$ (without side conditions on rule applications) can be translated to a pure sequent calculus $\mathrm{G}_{H}$, by taking a rule of the form $\Rightarrow \psi_{1} ; \ldots ; \Rightarrow \psi_{n} / \Rightarrow \psi$ for each Hilbert-style derivation rule that derives $\psi$ from $\psi_{1}, \ldots, \psi_{n}$ (where $n=0$ for axioms). It is easy to show that $\psi$ is derivable from $\Gamma$ in $H$ iff $\vdash_{\mathrm{G}_{H}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi$.

[^3]:    $\overline{{ }^{4} \text { The equivalence of strong and weak analyticity in pure calculi was also proved in [33] by a syntactic argument, similar to }}$ the one in [4] that shows the equivalence of weak and strong cut-admissibility.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ If classical negation is definable，the meaning of $\square$ in the presence of both（PF）and（T）becomes trivial：on the one hand，（T） easily gives us the derivability of $\square \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi$ ．On the other hand，$\varphi \Rightarrow \square \varphi$ can be proved using the rules（ $\neg \Rightarrow$ ）and（ $\Rightarrow \neg$ ）of LK，together with（T），（PF）and（CUT）．

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ An accessibility relation $R$ is called transitive if $w R u$ and $u R v$ imply $w R v$; symmetric if $w R u$ implies $u R w$; functional if $w R u$ and $w R v$ imply $u=v$; euclidian if $w R u$ and $w R v$ imply $u R v$; reflexive if $w R w$ for every $w \in \mathcal{W}$; and serial if for all $w \in W$, we have $w R u$ for some $u$.
    ${ }^{7}$ Recall that min $\emptyset=1$.

[^6]:     known［32］to be PSPACE－complete．

