Seminar in Auctions and Mechanism Design -

Michal Feldman ( and Amos Fiat (
1st Semester, 2014/2015 - Sunday 14:00-16:00, Orenstein 111

List of Papers

Simple versus optimal auction: [Revemue]


Jason Hartline, Tim Roughgarden: Simple versus optimal mechanismsSIGecom Exchanges 8

(1) (2009)

Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design, Shuchi ChawlaJason HartlineDavid MalecBalasubramanian Sivan, STOC 2010

Menu complexity [Revenue]

Hart and N. Nisan. Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. EC 2012.
Hart and N. Nisan. The menu-size complexity of auctions. EC 2013

 [*] Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions, Yiannis GiannakopoulosElias Koutsoupias, EC 2014.

Andrew Chi-Chih Yao, An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications, SODA 2015

Learning the prior (“Prior independent”?)

The sample complexity of revenue maximization, R. Cole T. Roughgarden, STOC 14

Online Auctions

The Value of Knowing a Demand Curve:  Bounds on Regret for On-line Posted-Price Auctions, Kleinberg and Leighton

Dynamic pricing with limited supply: Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins, June 2012, EC '12 (“Detail free” or “Prior free”)

(Bayesian) Price of anarchy of simple auctions [Welfare]

George Christodoulou
Annamária Kovács, Michael Schapira: Bayesian Combinatorial Auction, ICALP 2008

T. Roughgarden, The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information, TEAC '14.

Bhawalkar, K. and Roughgarden, T. (2011).  Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding. In SODA

Hassidim, A., Kaplan, H., Mansour, Y., and Nisan, N. (2011).  Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods. EC ’11.

Michal Feldman, Hu FuNick GravinBrendan LucierSimultaneous auctions are (almost) efficientSTOC 2013: 201-210




Tim Roughgarden:

·       Fantastic source for everything under the sun, and algorithmic game theory in particular

·       See notes, videos, papers

Jason Hartline:

·       Mechanism Design and Approximation

·       Equilibrium

·       Optimal Mechanisms

·       Bayesian Approxmiation

·       Prior-independent Approximation

Anna Karlin and Yuval Peres:

Assigned Talks