Generating Concrete Counterexamples for Sound Abstract Interpretation

Guy Erez[1]
School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University, Israel

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[1]guyerez@tau.ac.il

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Abstract

Sound abstract interpretation has been successful in proving interesting properties of programs. Commercially available tools are now able to verify the absence of runtime errors in safety critical applications. The ability to verify the absence of errors comes from the fact that these tools use *conservative* methods, i.e., whenever the algorithm verifies a property, it is guaranteed to hold. However, the algorithm may produce false alarms, i.e., reports of errors that never occur. False alarms, which are a result of the abstraction and are unavoidable in general, make sound abstract interpretation hard to use.

This thesis presents a new algorithm that can be used to increase the usability of abstract interpretation tools by producing concrete counterexamples for the error messages reported. The algorithm performs a limited search using a theorem prover. When the algorithm identifies a concrete input instance, it is guaranteed to be an input for which the program yields the reported error message. This allows the user to identify some of the reported messages as real errors, reducing the number of alarms that have to be manually investigated. The material presented here is an extended version of [EYS04].

In addition, the algorithm can also assist in runtime testing by producing a set of inputs that covers the program according to a certain criteria. For example, we can use the algorithm to find an adequate set of inputs, or even a set of inputs that realizes all the results of the analysis.

The algorithm is generic and applicable to many abstract domains, including polyhedra abstraction, predicate abstraction, and canonical abstraction, which is used in shape analysis. We have implemented a prototype of our algorithm and used it to find counterexamples (and test cases) for several small but interesting example programs, including implementations of sorting algorithms.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

Sound abstract interpretation has been successful in proving interesting properties of programs. The main idea is to compute an over-approximation of the set of reachable program states [CC79]. This assures that the algorithm can verify the absence of runtime errors by checking the over-approximations.

Recently, commercial and academic tools using over-approximations have been successfully applied to verify the absence of runtime errors in safety critical applications (e.g., see [BCC+03b, DRS03, abs, pol]).

While these tools guarantee that no errors are missed (no "false positives"), they are hard to use due to false alarms ("false negatives") which arise from overly conservative over-approximation. Due to the possibility of false alarms, each reported error has to be manually investigated to determine whether it is an actual error or a false alarm.

Bounded model checking (BMC) has been successfully used to locate errors in hardware and software systems [CBRZ01, VJ03]. The basic idea of BMC is to search for a counterexample only in executions up to a certain bounded length. Conceptually, bounded model checking computes an under-approximation of reachable program states and uses it to identify bugs. Thus, it may never produce false negatives but may produce false positives, which are intolerable in certain domains (e.g., safety critical code). In general, the undecidability of checking interesting program properties implies that no algorithm can avoid both false positives and false negatives.

In this thesis, we describe a tool which allows the users of sound abstract interpretation to enjoy the benefits of both worlds by trying to instantiate a concrete input example for each error message reported by the abstract interpretation. Using this tool combined with a sound abstract interpretation guarantees the absence of false positives while reducing the number of alarms that have to be manually investigated.

Our tool can also assist in runtime testing by automatically generating a set of inputs that covers the program according to a certain criteria. For example, we can use the tool to find an adequate [Wey86, Cor02] set of inputs or even a set of inputs that realizes all the results of the analysis.

We have implemented a prototype of our tool, and applied it to several small but interesting benchmark programs, including implementations of various sorting algorithms [LARSW00]

analyzed with the TVLA program analysis framework [LAS00].

For the benchmark programs, our tool was able to identify non-trivial concrete input instances for error messages reported by the program analysis tool. It also produced a set of inputs that realizes the results of the program analysis tool.

The algorithm implemented by our tool can be viewed as a new algorithm for bounded model checking of data-intensive software. Bounded model checking exploits the strength of SAT-solvers to simultaneously check all program paths up to a certain depth. Our algorithm verifies each program path separately, enabling the use of large formulae as symbolic state descriptors.

Our approach is generic and is applicable to any abstract domain that satisfies some reasonable requirements (See Section 3.1). Such domains include polyhedra abstraction, predicate abstraction and canonical abstraction, as used in shape analysis.

1.2 Main Results

The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:

- A new bounded model checking algorithm for a special class of programs and specifications is presented. The algorithm is designed to behave well on deterministic programs with complicated data such as dynamically allocated data-structures.
- We define reasonable requirements on the abstraction that allow bounded model checking to be used for producing concrete input examples.
- We show how to apply our bounded model checking tool to compute a set of concrete inputs that is adequate according to certain criteria.
- We have implemented a prototype of our algorithm and applied it to several small but interesting example programs, including implementations of sorting algorithms.

1.3 A Motivating Example

Figure 1.1 shows an erroneous implementation of the bubble-sort sorting algorithm. In this program, the assignment at label l_{20} erroneously assigns `y` to `p.n` instead of assigning `y.n`. This erroneous assignment causes the implementation to lose list items during execution. For example, the input of Figure 1.2 causes a list item to be lost, violating the assertion at label l_{31}.

This bug is tricky. It only occurs in certain cases when the algorithm is applied to an unsorted list.

To guarantee the absence of errors in such programs, one may use a sound abstract interpretation framework such as TVLA [LARSW00]. TVLA is a static analysis engine that allows generation of sound program analyses from specifications of a concrete operational semantics. Applying TVLA to the example program, an error is indeed reported at label l_{31}, indicating the possibility that some of the original nodes in the list do not appear in the sorted list. The problem is to determine whether this error report is a false negative or an error that could occur in practice. For the bubble-sort program, our algorithm is able to determine that the error reported by the static analysis is indeed a real error and produce a concrete input for which the error occurs.

```
   public static ListItem bugSort(ListItem x) {
l1    recordListNodes(x);
l2    boolean change = true;
l3    ListItem p, yn, t, y, head;
l4    if (x == null)
l5       return null;
l6    while (change) {
l7       p = null;
l8       change = false;
l9       y = x;
l10      yn = y.n;
l11      while (yn != null) {
l12         if (y.data > yn.data) { // swap y and yn
l13            change = true;
l14            t = yn.n;
l15            y.n = t;
l16            yn.n = y;
l17            if (p == null) {
l18               x = yn;
l19            } else {
l20               p.n = y; //BUG: correct code is p.n=y.n
l21            }
l22            p = yn;
l23            yn = t;
l24         } else {
l25            p = y;
l26            y = yn;
l27            yn = y.n;
l28         }
l29      }
l30   }
l31   assert permutation(x);
l32   assert ascendingOrder(x);
l33   return x;
   }
```

Figure 1.1: Erroneous Java implementation of bubble-sort.



Figure 1.2: An input causing a violation of the assertion at l_{31}.

1.4 Thesis Outline

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 defines the basic terms used throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 presents an algorithm `Input-Instance` for generating input instances for a program point and a condition. To simplify the presentation, the algorithms are first presented using the simple domain of constant propagation. Chapter 4 shows how to use the algorithm `Input-Instance` for generating counterexamples for errors reported by abstract interpretation. Chapter 5 shows how to apply the algorithms to the domain of shape analysis and how our tool produces a concrete counterexample for the bubble-sort implementation. Chapter 6 describes the prototype implementation and empirical results. Chapter 7 shows extensions to the algorithms presented and an algorithm for generating a set of test cases realizing analysis results in a program point. Chapter 9 makes some final remarks. Appendix A presents a User Manual for the counterexample tool implemented for the TVLA framework. A proof for the correctness of `Input-Instance` is shown in Appendix B.

Chapter 2

Preliminaries

In this chapter we define the basic terms used throughout the thesis.

A program path is a sequence of program labels starting from an initial ($entry$) label and proceeding such that each label is a successor of its preceding label in the program control flow graph.

Definition 2.1 (Path). *A* path $l_0 \rightarrow l_1 \ldots \rightarrow l_n$ *is a sequence of program labels starting with an initial label* l_0 *and proceeding in such a way that for every* $0 \leq i < n$*, a label* l_{i+1} *is an immediate successor of its preceding label* l_i *in the program control flow graph.*

A labelled program state $\langle \sigma, l \rangle$ consists of a state σ and a program label l. We define an execution of the program to be a sequence of labelled states starting from an initial labelled state and proceeding such that each state can be derived by application of a single statement to its preceding state. We label the transitions between states of the sequence with the corresponding statement.

If a state $\langle \sigma', l_i \rangle$ can be derived from another state $\langle \sigma, l_{i-1} \rangle$ by applying a statement st on it, we say st is *enabled* on $\langle \sigma, l_{i-1} \rangle$.

Definition 2.2 (Execution Path). *An* execution path $\langle \sigma_0, l_0 \rangle \xrightarrow{st_0} \langle \sigma_1, l_1 \rangle \ldots \xrightarrow{st_{n-1}} \langle \sigma_n, l_n \rangle$ *is a sequence of labelled states starting with an initial labelled state* $\langle \sigma_0, l_0 \rangle$ *and proceeding in such a manner that for every* $0 \leq i < n$*, a labelled state* $\langle \sigma_{i+1}, l_{i+1} \rangle$ *can be derived from its preceding labelled state* $\langle \sigma_i, l_i \rangle$ *by application of a single statement labelled by* st_i*. In addition, for every* i*,* st_i *is* enabled *on* $\langle \sigma_i, l_i \rangle$.

In this thesis, we are interested in finding initial states for which there exists an execution path reaching a given program point with a state satisfying a certain condition. In the sequel we assume that the condition is specified as a formula in some underlying logic $\mathcal{L}$, e.g., propositional logic or first-order logic.

Definition 2.3 (Input Instance). *Given a program point* l*, and a condition formula* φ*, an* input instance *is an initial state* σ_0 *for which there exists an execution path* $\langle \sigma_0, l_0 \rangle \xrightarrow{st_0} \langle \sigma_1, l_1 \rangle \ldots \xrightarrow{st_{n-1}} \langle \sigma_n, l_n \rangle$ *such that* $l_0 = entry$*,* $l_n = l$ *and* $\sigma_n \models \varphi$.



Figure 2.1: A simple program demonstrating constant propagation. z is an input parameter.

To demonstrate the basic concepts presented in this chapter, for methodological reasons, we consider the simple domain of constant propagation [Kil73] for programs with integer variables.

For these programs, a program state σ is defined as a mapping of program variables into integer values, i.e., $\sigma\colon Var \to \mathbb{Z}$.

Example 2.1. *Consider the simple example program of Figure 2.1, the state* $\sigma = [z \mapsto 2]$ *is an input instance for the label* l_{11} *and condition* $x < 4$*, because there exists an execution path*
$\langle [z \mapsto 2], l_1\rangle \xrightarrow{y=1} \langle [z \mapsto 2, y \mapsto 1], l_2\rangle \xrightarrow{x=1}$
$\langle [z \mapsto 2, y \mapsto 1, x \mapsto 1], l_3\rangle \xrightarrow{while(y<z)}$
$\langle [z \mapsto 2, y \mapsto 1, x \mapsto 1], l_4\rangle \xrightarrow{if(x>=y)}$
$\langle [z \mapsto 2, y \mapsto 1, x \mapsto 1], l_5\rangle \xrightarrow{x=y+2}$
$\langle [z \mapsto 2, y \mapsto 1, x \mapsto 3], l_9\rangle \xrightarrow{y=y+1}$
$\langle [z \mapsto 2, y \mapsto 2, x \mapsto 3], l_3\rangle \xrightarrow{while(y<z)}$
$\langle [z \mapsto 2, y \mapsto 2, x \mapsto 3], l_{11}\rangle$
reaching l_{11} *and satisfying* $x < 4$.

Direct computation of input instances requires computing the set of reachable program states, which is infeasible for many programs.

Abstract interpretation computes a set of abstract states conservatively representing possible program states at a given program point. Given a domain of abstract states, a concretization mapping γ is defined such that for each abstract state $\sigma^\sharp$, $\gamma(\sigma^\sharp)$ is the (possibly infinite) set of concrete program states represented by s. An abstract interpretation algorithm is *sound* if it produces for every program label l, an abstract state $\sigma^\sharp$ such that $\gamma(\sigma^\sharp)$ contains all the concrete states reachable at label l.

Our technique requires a symbolic representation of the concrete states represented by an abstract state. We therefore require our abstract domain to be equipped with a symbolic concretization function $\hat{\gamma}$ mapping an abstract state to a logical formula. This formula should describe exactly all

the concrete states that are represented by the abstract state, i.e., a state $\sigma \in \gamma(\sigma^\sharp) \iff \sigma \models \hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp)$. We assume that the symbolic concretization could be expressed in some logic $\mathcal{L}$, usually first-order logic.

We demonstrate this with constant propagation. The abstract domain used for constant propagation is an infinite lattice with a finite-height containing all integer values, and the values $\top$ and $\bot$. $\top$ represents any integer value and $\bot$ represents an infeasible value. An abstract state is a partial mapping from variables to values in the constant propagation lattice. That is, $\sigma^\sharp \colon Var \to (\mathbb{Z} \cup \{\top, \bot\})$.

We define the symbolic domain to contain formulae of propositional logic with integer arithmetic.

A symbolic concretization function $\hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp)$ transforms an abstract state into its symbolic representation as follows:

$$\hat{\gamma}_{v_i}(\sigma^\sharp) = \begin{cases} true & \sigma^\sharp(v_i) = \top \\ false & \sigma^\sharp(v_i) = \bot \\ (v_i = \sigma^\sharp(v_i)) & \sigma^\sharp(v_i) \in \mathbb{Z} \end{cases}$$

$$\hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp) = \bigwedge_{v_i \in Var} \hat{\gamma}_{v_i}(\sigma^\sharp)$$

Example 2.2. *The abstract state $\sigma^\sharp = [x \mapsto \top, y \mapsto 3, z \mapsto 3]$ represents an infinite number of concrete states where x can have an arbitrary integer value, y has the value 3, and z has the value 3. The (finite) symbolic representation of $\sigma^\sharp$ is therefore $\hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp) = (y = 3) \wedge (z = 3)$.*

As another example, consider an abstract domain that is based on predicate abstraction [GS97, BMMR01]. Predicate abstraction domains are based on a finite vocabulary $V = \{B_1, \ldots, B_k\}$ of predicate symbols, each associated with a defining formula, i.e., $B_i \triangleq \varphi_i$ for every $1 \leq i \leq k$. An abstract state of a predicate abstraction domain is a mapping of the predicates in V to their truth values, i.e., $\sigma^\sharp \colon V \to \{0, 1\}$. The symbolic concretization $\hat{\gamma}$ of an abstract state $\sigma^\sharp$ is a conjunction of predicate defining formulae as follows:

$$\hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp) = \bigwedge_{\sigma^\sharp(B_i)=1, 1 \leq i \leq k} \varphi_i \wedge \bigwedge_{\sigma^\sharp(B_j)=0, 1 \leq j \leq k} \neg \varphi_j$$

The symbolic concretization assumption is met by a wide range of existing abstract domains. Table 2.1 shows a number of widely used abstract domains and their corresponding symbolic concretization mappings.

Abstract Domain	**Symbolic Concretization**
Predicate Abstraction [GS97, BMMR01]	conjunction of predicate-defining formulae
Polyhedra Abstraction [CH78]	system of linear inequalities
Canonical Abstraction [SRW02]	first order formula with transitive closure (see [Yor03])
Constant Propagation [Kil73]	conjunction of variable value equalities

Table 2.1: Abstract domains and their corresponding symbolic concretization mappings.

Chapter 3

Generating Input Instances

In this chapter we describe the algorithm `Input-Instance` for generating an input instance for a label l and a condition φ. The algorithm uses the results of the static analysis as the starting point for a bounded exploration.

The algorithm could be viewed as a new algorithm for bounded model checking in which path-enumeration is separated from path-verification. This allows us to use larger formulae as state descriptors.

The algorithm is bounded by the maximum length of paths to explore p and by the specific bounds, if any, of the theorem prover used. When no input instance is found, one can increase these parameters until either an input instance is found, or the problem becomes practically intractable.

3.1 Algorithm Prerequisites

`Input-Instance` has the following requirements:

- symbolic concretization — the abstraction has to be accompanied by the ability to compute a symbolic concretization expressed in some logic $\mathcal{L}$.
- weakest precondition computation — $\mathcal{L}$ should provide the ability to compute the weakest precondition (See Section 3.2.2) of every atomic program statement. This requirement holds for first-order logic with any arbitrary atomic statement.
- finite counterexample generation — a theorem prover that is able to produce a finite counterexample for the validity of formulae in $\mathcal{L}$.

3.2 Algorithm Description

The outline of the algorithm is described in Figure 3.1.

The input to `Input-Instance` is the condition φ_l, and the label l. The algorithm assumes that the following values are provided as global variables: the exploration depth (p) and the program's transition system (ts).

The output is an input instance for label l and condition φ_l or $null$, if no such input was found.

```
INPUT-INSTANCE(φ_l, l)
1  path ← GET-NEXT-PATH(l)
2  while |path| ≤ p
3  do
4     φ_0 ← PATH-WEAKEST-PRECONDITION(φ_l, path)
5     model ← THEOREM-PROVER(¬φ_0)
6     if model ≠ null
7       then return model
8     path ← GET-NEXT-PATH(l)
9  return null
```

Figure 3.1: Input-Instance. The algorithm assumes the following global parameters are set: exploration depth p and transition system ts.

The algorithm consists of the following stages:

- Path Generation — create paths leading from program entry to the point of interest l. Paths are generated one by one, starting from the shortest and continuing in an ascending order of length. The maximum length of paths is bounded by the parameter p to guarantee termination.
- Backward Symbolic Execution (Weakest Precondition) — for each path, compute a formula φ_0 describing input states that guarantee that φ is satisfied at point l when the program follows this path. Technically, we use a repeated computation of weakest precondition to compute the formula φ_0.
- Model Generation — given the formula φ_0 describing a (possibly infinite) set of input instances for φ_l at l, we try to find a concrete state (model) that satisfies the formula. We assume the availability of a theorem prover that is able to produce a finite counterexample. In order to obtain a model for φ_0 we use the theorem prover to find a counterexample for the validity of $\neg\varphi_0$. If a model is found, it is an input instance for φ_l at l. To guarantee termination of the theorem prover, we usually have to provide bounds for the theorem prover (for instance, with first-order logic theorem prover, it is usually the maximum model size). If a model is found, we return it as an input instance and stop the search. If a model is not found, we return $null$.

3.2.1 Path Generation

We use a simple breadth-first search starting from l and going backward on the transition system until program entry is reached. Obviously, if the transition system has loops in it, there may be an infinite number of execution paths leading to l, therefore some halting criterion is required. For usability purposes, we prefer a global bound, the maximum length of the paths generated, rather than specifying for each loop the number of iterations to unwind.

Since `Input-Instance` stops once a path yields a model and given the possibly large number of paths whose length is less or equal p, it is more efficient to generate paths on-the-fly, meaning,

statement	WP($\mathtt{st}, \varphi$)
`x = expr`	$\varphi[expr/x]$
`assume expr`	$\varphi \wedge expr$

Table 3.1: Calculating weakest precondition for the statements used in the constant propagation program of Figure 2.1.

we generate the next path only if no input instance was found for the previous path. Paths are generated in increasing length, starting with the shortest path.

Example 3.1. *In the program of Figure 2.1, there is an infinite number of possible paths for label l_{11}. For a maximum length of 8 we get the following paths:*
$l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_{11}$
$l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_4 \rightarrow l_5 \rightarrow l_9 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_{11}$
$l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_4 \rightarrow l_7 \rightarrow l_9 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_{11}$
In the bubble-sort program of Figure 1.1 there are 335 possible paths with a maximum length of 50.

3.2.2 Weakest Precondition

To calculate φ_0 for a given path we use a repeated computation of the weakest precondition [Dij76].

Given a formula φ and a statement `st`, we denote by WP($\mathtt{st}, \varphi$) the weakest precondition of φ with respect to `st`. That is, ψ = WP($\mathtt{st}, \varphi$) is the weakest formula for which any state that satisfies ψ before execution of `st`, is guaranteed to satisfy φ after application of `st`. Formally:

Definition 3.1 (Weakest Precondition). *Given a statement* `st` *and a postcondition Q, P is the weakest precondition of* `st` *and Q iff for all σ, $\sigma \models P \iff [\![\mathtt{st}]\!](\sigma) \models Q$, where $[\![\mathtt{st}]\!](\sigma)$ is the state resulting from applying* `st` *on σ.*

Given a path $l_0 \rightarrow l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow l_n$, and an initial formula φ_n, we compute a sequence of formulae $\varphi_{n-1}, \ldots, \varphi_0$ by repeated application of WP. That is, for every $0 \leq i < n$, φ_i = WP(st_i, φ_{i+1}) where st_i is the statement reaching from l_i to l_{i+1}.

As mentioned earlier, one of the requirements of our algorithm is that WP could be computed for every atomic statement used in the program.

Table 3.1 shows how to compute the weakest precondition for the statements of the simple constant propagation program we introduced before. For convenience, we translate program conditionals to include the appropriate `assume` statements. That is, given a conditional statement `if (c) st_t else st_f`, we augment it with the appropriate `assume` statements resulting with `if (c) {assume c; st_t } else { assume !c; st_f }`.

Section 5.3 shows how to compute the weakest precondition in a shape analysis domain, such as the one used for analyzing the bubble-sort program.

Example 3.2. *Given the path $l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_4 \rightarrow l_5 \rightarrow l_9 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_{11}$ of length 8, and the initial formula $\varphi_7 = x \geq 4$ at label l_{11}, Table 3.2 shows the calculation of φ_0.*

i	label	statement	φ_i
6	l_3	`while (y < z)`	$x \geq 4 \wedge y \geq z$
5	l_9	`y = y + 1`	$x \geq 4 \wedge (y+1) \geq z$
4	l_5	`x = y + 2`	$(y+2) \geq 4 \wedge (y+1) \geq z$
3	l_4	`if (x >= y)`	$(y+2) \geq 4 \wedge (y+1) \geq z$ $\wedge x \geq y$
2	l_3	`while (y < z)`	$(y+2) \geq 4 \wedge (y+1) \geq z$ $\wedge y < z \wedge x \geq y$
1	l_2	`x = 1`	$(y+2) \geq 4 \wedge (y+1) \geq z$ $\wedge y < z \wedge 1 \geq y$
0	l_1	`y = 1`	$(1+2) \geq 4 \wedge (1+1) \geq z$ $\wedge 1 < z \wedge 1 \geq 1$

Table 3.2: Results of WP computation along the example path.

3.2.3 Model Generation

Given the formula φ_0 describing a (possibly infinite) set of input instances for φ_l at l, we try to find concrete states (models) that satisfy the formula.

The theorem prover should be capable of finding a finite satisfying model for the formula φ_0. Any theorem prover that can produce a finite counter example (e.g., [HJJ$^+$95]) could be used to find satisfying models (counterexamples for $\neg\varphi_0$). Our method could be also used with theorem provers that produce symbolic counterexamples (e.g., [DNS03]).

Example 3.3. *Given $\varphi_0 = (1+2) \geq 4 \wedge (1+1) \geq z \wedge 1 < z \wedge 1 \geq 1$ from Table 3.2, the theorem prover Simplify [DNS03] correctly determines that φ_0 does not have a satisfying model (finds that $\neg\varphi_0$ is valid).*

Chapter 4

Generating Counterexamples

One of the main problems in using sound abstract interpretation is the possibility of (conservative) error reports that do not correspond to real errors in the program (false alarms). Manual investigation of each reported error to determine whether it is a real error or a false alarm is a time-consuming process and may deter users from using abstract interpretation.

Given the results of a sound abstract interpretation, and considering a single abstract state $\sigma^\sharp$ satisfying an error condition φ_{err} at a program point l, it may be the case that there is no program execution that produces this violation, and the error report is therefore a false alarm. However, if we can find an input instance σ_0 for φ_{err} at point l such that it reaches point l with a concrete state represented by $\sigma^\sharp$, this would be a concrete example that establishes the error report as a real error. More formally,

Definition 4.1 (Counterexample). *Given an abstract state $\sigma^\sharp$ that satisfies an error condition φ_{err} at label l, we say that a concrete state σ_0 is a counterexample when there exists a concrete execution path $\langle \sigma_0, l_0 \rangle \xrightarrow{st_0} \langle \sigma_1, l_1 \rangle \ldots \xrightarrow{st_{n-1}} \langle \sigma_n, l_n \rangle$ such that:*

1. *$l_n = l$ and $\sigma_n \models \varphi_{err}$ (i.e., σ_0 is an input instance for φ_{err} at label l).*
2. *$\sigma_n \in \gamma(\sigma^\sharp)$*

The tool presented in this chapter examines each error reported by the analysis and tries to produce a concrete counterexample for it. If it succeeds, it is guaranteed that the error is indeed a true error, and there is no need to manually investigate if it is a false alarm. However, if the tool fails to find a counterexample, it could still be the case that the error is a real program error and a counterexample was not found due to the bounded exploration.

Increasing the algorithm bound (exploration depth) or theorem prover bounds (i.e. model size when applicable) may lead to the discovery of more concrete counterexamples at the expense of increased runtime and memory requirements. In our experiments, all counterexamples were found at rather low bounds.

The algorithm for generating counterexamples is shown in Figure 4.1. The algorithm is generic and can be used with any abstract interpretation tool given an interface that provides access to the results of the analysis. The algorithm requires access to the errors reported by the analysis where

GENERATE-COUNTEREXAMPLES()
1 **for each** $(l, \sigma^\sharp, \varphi_{err})$ **in** `Analysis-Errors`
2 **do**
3 `counter` $\leftarrow$ INPUT-INSTANCE$(\hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp) \wedge \varphi_{err}, l)$
4 **if** `counter` $\neq null$
5 **then** REPORT-TRUE-ALARM$((l, \sigma^\sharp, \varphi_{err}),$ `counter`$)$

Figure 4.1: Generate-Counterexamples. The algorithm assumes the following global parameters are set: exploration depth p and transition system ts.

step	**path**	φ_0	**model**
1	$l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_{11}$	$1 \geq 4 \wedge 1 \geq z$	no model
2	$l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_4 \rightarrow l_5 \rightarrow l_9 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_{11}$	$3 \geq 4 \wedge 2 \geq z \wedge 1 \geq 1 \wedge 1 < z$	no model
3	$l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_4 \rightarrow l_7 \rightarrow l_9 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_{11}$	$3 \geq 4 \wedge 2 \geq z \wedge 1 < 1 \wedge 1 < z$	no model
4	$l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_4 \rightarrow l_5 \rightarrow l_9 \rightarrow ...$ $l_3 \rightarrow l_4 \rightarrow l_5 \rightarrow l_9 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_{11}$	$1 \geq 1 \wedge 3 \geq z \wedge 2 \geq 1 \wedge 2 < z$ $\wedge 1 < z$	$[z \mapsto 3]$

Table 4.1: Generating a counterexample for the program in Figure 2.1 for the label l_{11} and $\varphi_{err} = x \geq 4$.

each error consists of: (i) the label l at which the error was reported (ii) the abstract state $\sigma^\sharp$ in which the error occurred; (iii) the error condition φ_{err}.

For every error reported, the algorithm uses `Input-Instance` to find an input instance that satisfies $\varphi = \hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp) \wedge \varphi_{err}$ at label l. An input instance satisfying φ is guaranteed to be a counterexample according Definition 4.1 because it will reach l with a concrete state σ_n that (i) satisfies φ_{err} and (ii) since it satisfies $\hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp)$, it implies $\sigma_n \in \gamma(\sigma^\sharp)$.

Example 4.1. *Consider the program of Figure 2.1 in which* `z` *is given as user input. Using constant propagation in an attempt to verify the assertion at label* l_{11} *will produce an error since the analysis will reach the abstract state* $[x \mapsto \top, y \mapsto \top, z \mapsto \top]$ *at this program label. This abstract state represents any concrete state in which the variables* `x`*,*`y`*, and* `z` *have been assigned a value, including states in which* $x \geq 4$ *that satisfy* φ_{err}.

Table 4.1 describes the running of the counterexample algorithm with a maximum path length of 14. *The counterexample is found on the* 4^{th} *path checked.*

Generally, some programs require a larger number of paths to be verified, for example, in the bubble-sort program of Figure 1.1 the counterexample to the error at label l_{31} *is found along the* 142^{th} *path checked.*

Chapter 5

Applying to Shape Analysis

In this chapter, we demonstrate the application of our techniques to shape analysis [JM81, SRW02]. Shape analysis will allow us to find the bug in the erroneous bubble-sort program of Figure 1.1 and — using `GenerateCounterexamples` algorithm (Figure 4.1)— to produce a counter example for it.

In Section 5.1 we give some background on the concrete and abstract domains used in the shape analysis framework of [SRW02]. Then, in Section 5.2, we show how to answer the first requirement of our algorithm and compute the symbolic concretization for shape analysis. Section 5.3 shows how to answer the second requirement of the algorithm and provides a way to compute the weakest precondition for this symbolic domain. Finally, in Section 5.4, we show how to use these ingredients to successfully produce a concrete counterexample for the bubble-sort program.

5.1 Concrete and Abstract Domains for Shape Analysis

In [SRW02], it is shown how a global state of the program can be naturally expressed as a first-order logical structure in which each individual corresponds to a heap-allocated object and predicates of the structure correspond to properties of heap-allocated objects. We use the predicates of Table 5.1 to record information used by the properties discussed in this thesis.

For each reference variable `x`, we define a unary predicate $x(u)$. The value of $x(u)$ is 1 if the variable `x` points to the list element represented by u.

Reference fields are represented using binary predicates. For example, the `n` field of a `ListElement` is represented using a predicate $n(u_1, u_2)$ that holds when the `n` field of u_1 points

Predicate	**Description**
$x(u)$	Is u pointed-to by x?
$n(u_1, u_2)$	Does the field n of u_1 point to u_2?
$dle(u_1, u_2)$	Is the data of u_1 less-than or equal to the data of u_2?
$r[n, x](u)$	Is u transitively reachable from x using n field?
$inOrder(u)$	Is u part of a non-decreasing list fragment?

Table 5.1: Predicates used to define states.



Figure 5.1: A concrete representation of a sorted linked list.

to u_2. Similarly, we use the unary predicate $dle(u_1, u_2)$ to record inequalities between data values of the list elements. The predicate $dle(u_1, u_2)$ holds when the value of the `data` component of u_1 is less than or equal to the value of the `data` of u_2.

The unary predicate $r[n, x](u)$ holds for list elements that are (transitively) reachable from program variable `x`, possibly using a sequence of `n` fields. This predicate is an instrumentation predicate [SRW02] which is used to refine the abstraction.

Finally, to express sortedness of lists we use the (instrumentation) predicate $inOrder(u)$. The predicate $inOrder(u)$ holds for a node u whose `data` field is less than or equal to the `data` field of its `n`-successor (if one exists).

We depict program states as directed graphs. Each individual of the universe is displayed as a node. A unary predicate $p(u)$ which holds for an individual (node) u is drawn inside the node u. Predicates that can only hold for a single individual (e.g., representing a value of a reference variable) are shown as an edge from the predicate symbol to the node in which it holds. A binary predicate $p(u_1, u_2)$ which evaluates to 1 is drawn as directed edge from u_1 to u_2 labelled with the predicate symbol.

Example 5.1. *The state shown in Figure 5.1 corresponds to a global state of the program containing a sorted linked list of length* 3*, and pointed to by the variable* `x`*. Note how the* $dle(u_1, u_2)$ *binary predicate records the ordering relation between individuals, and how* $inOrder(u)$ *holds for all nodes as a result of the list being sorted. Also note that for all elements of this list r[n,x](u) holds since all elements are (transitively) reachable from* `x` *using a sequence of* `n` *fields.*

In order to guarantee a finite representation, we conservatively represent multiple concrete program states using a single logical structure with an extra truth-value $1/2$ which denotes values which may be 1 or may be 0.

We allow an abstract state to include a *summary node*, i.e., an individual which corresponds to one or more individuals in a concrete state represented by that abstract state. Technically, we use a designated unary predicate *sm* to maintain summary-node information. A summary node u has $sm(u) = 1/2$, indicating that it may represent more than one node.

To abstract a concrete state, we use *canonical abstraction*. Canonical abstraction maps concrete individuals to an abstract individual based on the values of the individuals' unary predicates. All individuals having the same values for unary predicate symbols are mapped to the same abstract individual. Only summary nodes (i.e., nodes with $sm(u) = 1/2$) can have more than one node mapped to them by the abstraction.



Figure 5.2: An abstract representation of a sorted linked list.

Abstract program states are depicted by enhancing the representation of concrete states with a graphical representation for $1/2$ values: a binary predicate $p(u_1, u_2)$ which evaluates to $1/2$ is drawn as dashed directed edge from u_1 to u_2 labelled with the predicate symbol, and a summary node is drawn as circle with double-line boundaries.

Example 5.2. *The abstract state shown in Figure 5.2 represents the concrete state of Figure 5.1. Note that this abstract state (finitely) represents infinitely many concrete states. For example, it represents any state containing a sorted linked-list of length of at least* 2*, which is pointed to be* `x`*. The fact that* $r[n, x](u)$ *holds for the summary node means that all list elements represented by the summary node are reachable from* `x`*. Similarly, the fact that* $inOrder(u)$ *holds for the summary node means that the list suffix represented by the summary node is sorted. The solid (*1*-valued)* $dle(u_1, u_2)$ *edge from the first node to the summary node records the fact that the* `data` *element of the first node is less than (or equal to) the* `data` *element of the rest of the list items.*

5.2 Symbolic Concretization

To compute the symbolic concretization of an abstract state we use the procedure of [Yor03]. The symbolic concretization of an abstract state is a formula in first-order logic with transitive closure (FO^{TC}). The procedure of [Yor03] produces a formula which is linear in the size of the 3-valued structure.

statement	update formulae
`x = null`	$x(v) = 0$
`x = y`	$x(v) = y(v)$
`x = y.n`	$x(v) = \exists v_1 : y(v_1) \wedge n(v_1, v)$
`x.n = null`	$n(v_1, v_2) = n(v_1, v_2) \wedge \neg x(v_1)$
`x.n = y` (assuming `x.n==null`)	$n(v_1, v_2) = n(v_1, v_2) \vee (x(v_1) \wedge y(v_2))$

Table 5.2: Predicate-update formulae for list manipulation statements.

Example 5.3. *The formula*

$$\begin{aligned}
&\exists v_1.node_1(v_1) \wedge \exists v_2.node_2(v_2) \\
&\wedge \forall v.node_1(v) \vee node_2(v) \\
&\wedge \forall v.node_2(v) \iff x(v) \wedge r[n,x](v) \wedge inOrder(v) \\
&\wedge \forall v.node_1(v) \iff \neg x(v) \wedge r[n,x](v) \wedge inOrder(v) \\
&\wedge \forall v_1, v_2.node_2(v_2) \wedge node_1(v_1) \implies dle(v_2, v_1) \\
&\wedge \forall v_1, v_2.node_1(v_2) \wedge node_2(v_1) \implies \neg dle(v_2, v_1) \wedge \neg n(v_2, v_1) \\
&\wedge \forall v_1, v_2.node_2(v_2) \wedge node_2(v_1) \implies dle(v_2, v_1) \wedge \neg n(v_2, v_1) \\
&\wedge \forall v_1, v_2.node_2(v_1) \wedge node_2(v_2) \implies v_1 = v_2 \\
&\wedge \varphi_{hygiene}
\end{aligned}$$

is the symbolic concretization of the abstract state of Figure 5.2. Intuitively, $node_1(u)$ represent concrete nodes pointed to by `x` *and $node_2(u)$ represents concrete nodes not pointed to directly by* `x` *but are reachable from* `x` *and are sorted in an ascending order.*

$\varphi_{hygiene}$ is a conjunction of hygiene conditions which guarantee that the represented first-order structures correspond to legitimate heap states. These hygiene conditions require for example that a reference variable points to at most a single object, that a reference field points at most to a single object, etc. In the formula mentioned above, $\varphi_{hygiene}$ will guarantee that at most one node is pointed-to by `x`*.*

5.3 Weakest Precondition

For the domain of shape analysis, we use formulae of first-order logic with transitive logic (FO^{TC}) to symbolically represent program states.

We assume that a statement is represented using a precondition formula and a set of update formulae. The weakest precondition of a formula φ with respect to a given statement `st`, denoted by WP(`st`, φ) can be then defined via backward substitution of the update formulae and conjoining the action's precondition.

Table 5.2 lists the predicate update formulae for the list manipulation statements used in this thesis. Predicates not assigned a predicate-update formulae in a statement are assumed to maintain their value. Allocation of new nodes can also be modeled, but it is not used here.

Using this expressive logic allows us to easily compute the weakest precondition even for statements that perform destructive updates of heap references, as shown in the following example.

Example 5.4. *Consider the formula* $\varphi = \exists v_1, v_2.x(v_1) \wedge n(v_1, v_2)$ *that requires the existence of an object reference by* `x` *and an object referenced by its* `n` *field.*

The weakest precondition of φ *with respect to the assignment statement* `x=y` *is* $\text{WP}(\texttt{x=y}, \varphi) = \exists v_1, v_2.y(v_1) \wedge n(v_1, v_2)$.

More interestingly, even for a statement performing destructive update such as `x.n = y`, WP *can be computed using simple backward substitution of the predicate update formulae. For this statement,* $\text{WP}(\texttt{x.n=y}, \varphi) = \exists v_1, v_2.x(v_1) \wedge (n(v_1, v_2) \vee x(v_1) \wedge y(v_2))$ [1].

5.4 Generating Counterexamples

We can now use the algorithm of Chapter 4 to find a concrete counterexample for the bubble-sort running example.

The bubble-sort procedure has two assertions as postconditions. These assertions require that: (i) the resulting list is sorted in ascending order (`assert ascendingOrder(x)`); (ii) the resulting list is a permutation of the input list, i.e., no nodes were lost (`assert permutation(x)`).

These assertions are formulated in TVLA using the following FO^{TC} formulae

$$\Phi_{ascending} = \forall v.r[n, x](v) \implies inOrder(v)$$

$$\Phi_{permutation} = \forall v.r[n, x](v) \iff or[n, x](v)$$

The specification for $\Phi_{permutation}$ uses an auxiliary predicate $or[n, x](v)$ that records the nodes that were reachable from `x` on $entry$ to the sorting procedure. The auxiliary predicate $or[n, x]$ is only updated once by the call to `recordListNodes(x)` at line l_1.

Running TVLA using the negation of these formulae as error conditions, an error is reported at label l_{31} with the abstract state shown in Figure 5.3. Note that for the rightmost node in the figure, $r[n, x]$ is $false$ while $or[n, x]$ is $true$, indicating that the node was previously reachable from x and is no longer be reachable, i.e. is lost. Also note that $inOrder(u)$ holds for all list elements, meaning that the resulting list is sorted (although it loses list elements).

We now invoke the algorithm of Figure 4.1 using a maximal path length of $p = 50$. We also limit the first-order theorem prover (See Chapter 6) to a maximal model size of 3.

When reaching line 3 in the algorithm, l has the value l_{31}, $\sigma^\sharp$ corresponds to the structure of Figure 5.3 and $\varphi_{err} = \neg(\forall v, r[n, x](v) \iff or[n, x](v))$. The algorithm now invokes `Input-Instance` with the conjunction of $\hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp)$ and φ_{err} and the label l_{31}. For brevity, the symbolic representation of the abstract state of Figure 5.3 is not shown.

`Input-Instance` starts exploring the possible paths from $entry$ to l_{31}. The paths are sorted from the shortest to the longest. For each path, φ_0 is calculated from $\hat{\gamma}(\sigma^\sharp) \wedge \varphi_{err}$ by repeated computation of the weakest precondition.

The theorem prover fails to find a model for all the first 141 paths checked. On the 142^{th} path, it finds a concrete example as shown in Figure 5.4. The path is $l_1 \rightarrow l_2 \rightarrow l_3 \rightarrow l_4 \rightarrow l_6 \rightarrow l_7 \rightarrow$

[1] This assumes that x.n is reset to null before it is given a new value, otherwise, the update formula would have been $((n(v_1, v_2) \wedge \neg x(v_1)) \vee (x(v_1) \wedge y(v_2)))]$.



Figure 5.3: An abstract state on which the analysis reported the error message of line l_{31}.



Figure 5.4: A concrete counterexample demonstrating the error in the bubble-sort program as found by `Generating-Counterexamples` algorithm.

$l_8 \rightarrow l_9 \rightarrow l_{10} \rightarrow l_{11} \rightarrow l_{12} \rightarrow l_{25} \rightarrow l_{26} \rightarrow l_{27} \rightarrow l_{11} \rightarrow l_{12} \rightarrow l_{13} \rightarrow l_{14} \rightarrow l_{15} \rightarrow l_{16} \rightarrow l_{17} \rightarrow l_{20} \rightarrow l_{22} \rightarrow l_{23} \rightarrow l_{11} \rightarrow l_{12} \rightarrow l_{25} \rightarrow l_{26} \rightarrow l_{27} \rightarrow l_{11} \rightarrow l_6 \rightarrow l_{31}$.

This path corresponds to an execution in which the outer loop (starting at l_6) is visited twice and the inner loop (starting at l_{11}) is visited 4 times (twice for each outer iteration).

The generated counterexample, shown in Figure 5.4, is a list referenced by `x` containing 3 elements such that the last element has the smallest `data` value, and the second element has the largest `data` value. Note that as a result, the $inOrder(u)$ predicate does not hold for the second element. The generated counterexample corresponds to the violating input we initially presented in Figure 1.2.

Chapter 6

Prototype Implementation

We have implemented a prototype of our tool and used it to generate counterexamples for a set of small but interesting example programs.

Our implementation currently interfaces with the TVLA [LAS00] static analysis engine. The model enumerator we are using is Mace4 [McC94, McC03] which is a model enumerator for first-order logic.

Table 6.1 shows our benchmark programs.

The first 2 programs involve sorting of singly linked lists. The next 4 programs perform manipulation and traversing of lists. All of these programs were previously used as benchmarks for various analyses implemented using TVLA [LARSW00, DRS00]. In some programs, we manually introduced bugs to force error reports by the analysis.

The last two programs, `simple1` and `simple2`, were added to the benchmark set to test a case were there is only one possible counterexample and a case where the error is a false alarm.

In every program, one or more of the errors were reported:

PERM The resulting list is not a permutation of the original list.

NULL A possible null dereferencing, i.e. performing x=x.n where x is NULL.

Program	**Description**
bubble-sort Bug	The running example
insert-sort bug 1,2	Insert Sort
rotate	moves the tail of a list to it's end
search	Searches for an item in a list
merge1, 2	Merges two ordered lists
swap	Swaps the first two elements of a list
simple1	Traverses three steps in a list
simple2	Traverses three steps in a list, reset and re-traverse them in a loop. Causes a false alarm.

Table 6.1: Description of benchmark programs.

						Counterexample				φ_0			
Program	CFG Nds	total strct	max len	sz	Error	real err	fnd	sz	path len	ops	cls	paths chk	time (sec)
bubble-sort Bug 1	32	1024	50	3	PERM	T	T	3	44	1913	196	142	42
insert-sort Bug 1	31	1132	100	3	PERM	T	T	2	42	1556	153	42	13
insert-sort Bug 2	31	251	100	3	ORDER	T	T	3	19	851	84	3	1
rotate	15	85	50	4	LEAK	T	T	4	21	1751	140	10	212
search	7	42	30	3	NULL	T	T	2	5	829	59	1	1
merge1	34	374	100	5	INIT	T	T	3	11	1945	96	4	85
merge1	34	374	100	5	LEAK	T	T	3	6	3793	134	1	11
merge1	34	374	100	5	INIT	T	T	3	7	3809	138	2	16
merge1	34	374	100	5	LEAK	T	T	3	15	4255	173	8	244
merge2	35	396	200	3	LEAK	T	T	3	17	1918	123	9	90
swap	12	36	30	3	NULL	T	T	2	5	935	66	1	1
Simple1	8	21	10	3	NULL	T	T	3	7	310	30	1	0
Simple2	12	60	30	3	NULL	F	F	N/A	N/A	594	63	524	133

Table 6.2: Results for finding counterexamples for the benchmark programs.

LEAK There is a possibility that a node is not reachable from any of the program variables.

INIT There is a possibility that a variable value is referenced without being initialized first.

ORDER A possible violation of the list order, meaning the list is not sorted.

Our experiments were conducted on a dual 1Ghz Pentium-III with 2GB of memory running Linux. Table 6.2 shows the results for running the counterexample algorithm on the benchmark programs. Note that `merge` program had 12 bugs at different labels. For brevity, the table specifies the results of only 4 of them.

The column "CFG Nds" shows how many nodes are in the control flow graph of the program, "total strct" is the number of abstract structures found by the analysis, "max len" is the maximum length of the paths, "sz" is the maximum model size used with Mace4, "Error" is the error reported.

The next four columns refer to the counterexample: "fnd" shows whether a counterexample was found, "real err" indicates whether the error is a true or false alarm. "sz" shows the size (in nodes) of the counterexample found. "path len" shows the length of the path on which the counterexample was found.

The next two columns, "ops" and "cls" show the number of operators and number of clauses in the calculated φ_0.

The last two columns are "paths chk", showing how many paths the algorithm checked before finding a counterexample (or stopping because maximum path length was reached), and "time" — the elapsed time of the running of the algorithm in seconds.

In all the benchmarks except for the last, a counterexample was found. In the last benchmark, `simple2` a counterexample was not found, and this error is indeed a false alarm.

For the sorting programs, manual investigation of error messages with so many abstract states created is very difficult. For the first two bugs, one would have to traverse paths of more than 40 nodes in length. It is interesting to note that even for small programs such as `merge`, a large number of abstract states are created, making it hard to reconstruct even short execution paths.

Chapter 7

Extensions

In this chapter, we describe possible extensions of our algorithms. In Section 7.1 we show how to use the algorithm `Input-Instance` to automatically generate a set of test cases that cover the program according to a certain criterion. In Section 7.2 we discuss some variants of `Input-Instance` we have investigated.

7.1 Generating Coverage Test Cases

Code Coverage Analysis [Cor02] tries to find areas of the program not realized by a set of test cases. In this section we show how to use `Input-Instance` to automatically generate test cases that realize all the results of the analysis.

There is a large number of coverage criteria suggested in the literature [GG02], among them:

All-nodes Requires that each node in the control flow graph be executed by some test case.

All-edges Requires each edge in the control flow graph be traversed at least once by some test case.

All-paths Requires that every complete path (from $entry$ to $exit$) be traversed.

It is straightforward to use `Input-Instance` algorithm for producing an adequate All-nodes test case set. To do so, one applies `Input-Instance` at every label on every abstract state created by the analysis until an input instance is found for every label [1].

`Input-Instance` allows generating test cases for more general domains. For instance, in our experiments, we were able to produce an adequate All-nodes test set for the bubble-sort running example.

To produce an All-paths test case set, `Input-Instance` should be applied only on the abstract states at label $exit$. Path exploration depth is directly controlled via the p parameter.

Producing All-edges test case set is similar to All-paths, however a small change is required to avoid checking paths not covering new edges.

[1] In shape analysis, we found it a good heuristic to try the abstract states in ascending order of "complexity" (the number of list nodes in each state).

Leveraging the static analysis results allows considering a new coverage criteria - "All-Abstract-States" defined as follows.

Definition 7.1 (All-Abstract-States). *Denote $\Sigma^\sharp$ as the set of labelled abstract states representing all the possible concrete states at all the labels. A test set Σ is* All-Abstract-States *adequate when for each labelled abstract state $\langle \sigma^\sharp, l \rangle \in \Sigma^\sharp$ there exists an input instance in Σ.*

The algorithm for generating an All-Abstract-States adequate test set uses `Input-Instance` as a procedure. `Input-Instance` is applied for every abstract state at every label of the program.

An adequate All-Abstract-States would have a concrete test case for every possible abstract state the program may reach. We believe this criteria might have an advantage over other criteria, especially in domains involving heap manipulation. Further experiments are needed to compare this criteria with the others.

7.2 Variants Of Input-Instance

7.2.1 Extended Interface with the Static Analysis

The algorithm `Input-Instance` of Chapter 3 uses a limited interface with the static analysis tool. In fact, it only uses information of the reported error — the error label, the error condition, and the abstract state for which the error was reported.

Given a richer interface to the results of the static analysis tool, the algorithm `Input-Instance` could benefit from this interface by restricting the computed weakest precondition only to states that are described by the abstract state descriptors computed by the abstract interpretation.

Technically, at every step of the weakest precondition computation, the result of the weakest precondition is conjoined with the symbolic concretization of the corresponding abstract states.

The resulting φ_0 would therefore be more restricted. This may aid the theorem prover to find a model faster. In our experiments we did not notice any significant performance difference.

7.2.2 Path Pruning

Another interesting variant is *path pruning*. Instead of calculating weakest precondition for the whole path and then run the theorem prover, only to find out the model is inconsistent, one can run the theorem prover after each step of the weakest precondition calculation and stop traversing that path if the formula is unsatisfiable.

Our experiments showed that most paths are pruned relatively late during their exploration, thus the time saved from not exploring path fragments in comparison to the cost of extra calls to the theorem prover made this approach ineffective.

Chapter 8

Related Work

Our work is closely related to bounded model checking (BMC) [CBRZ01, BCC+03a], and could be viewed as a new algorithm for BMC which separates path-enumeration from path-verification. BMC operates by constructing a single propositional formula for a program and a temporal logic specification such that the formula is satisfiable if and only if there exists a program path of up to some bounded length that satisfies the property. An assignment to this formula is both a selection of a program path and a selection of values for state variables. In contrast, our algorithm iterates through the possible paths and constructs a separate formula for each path resulting in a smaller formula. This enables us to use richer (and possibly larger) symbolic state representations.

Jackson and Vaziri [JV00] present a method for verifying structural properties, such as heap relationships, using a constraint solver. Their method consists of three stages: (i) translation of the specification code into first-order logic; (ii) translation from first-order logic to propositional logic using a bound on the number of objects; (iii) running SAT solver to find counterexamples. In the translation, both the control and data are encoded, thus a counterexample describes both the initial configuration and a path to the violating label. This analysis produces concrete counterexamples and no false alarms, but only performs a bounded exploration and therefore may produce false positives.

In [VJ03], Jackson and Vaziri present various optimization techniques (reducing functional representation size and applying logical simplifications) to reduce the complexity of the resulting logical formula and increasing the tool scalability.

Our method differs from [JV00, VJ03] in that it is applied to the results of a sound abstract interpretation, and therefore can guarantee that there are no false positives. Our method helps reduce the number of false alarms needed to be manually investigated. In addition, we take a different approach for reducing formula complexity. Instead of enumerating all possible paths and data states at once, we verify every path separately thus allowing more complex state description formulae. This comes at the expense of more calls to the theorem prover. Our experience shows that this approach works well for the abstract domain tested.

Clarke *et al*. [CGJ+00] uses counterexamples to automatically refine abstraction in model checking. This technique identifies the shortest invalid prefix of a spurious counterexample trace and then refines the abstraction to eliminate invalid transitions out of the last valid abstract state of the prefix.

Microsoft's SLAM [Mic01] implements a process for validating temporal safety properties on software that uses a well defined interface. The SLAM process includes: (i) generating a boolean predicate representation of the C program (C2BP); (ii) using a model checker to find if error states are reachable in the abstract program (BEBOP); (iii) if no reachable error state is found, the property is verified. If a reachable error state is found, NEWTON path simulator is used on the generated abstract trace to check if there exists a directly corresponding concrete trace in the original program. If such a corresponding trace does not exist, a new predicate is added to refine the abstraction.

The SLAM process resembles ours in that it is sound (does not produce false positives), and can therefore prove the absence of errors. It also has the advantage of refining the abstraction in case a counterexample is not found. However, while NEWTON path simulator only checks a single path through the program leading to the error state, our algorithm checks all paths up to a certain bounded length. Thus, in some cases our algorithm will produce a counterexample when the iterative refinement will require a refinement step. In addition, SLAM uses only predicate abstraction, while our algorithm can be applied to many other abstract domains.

Pasareanu et. al. [PDV01] present two techniques for checking the feasibility of a reported abstract counterexample for multithreaded Java programs. Viewing operations on abstract values as being deterministic (returning a single abstract value) or non-deterministic (returning a set of abstract values), the first techniques tries to find program paths in which non-deterministic operations do not occur (*choose-free* paths). Since a choose-free path is guaranteed to be a path in the concrete program, if such path is found, it provides a feasible counterexample. It is interesting to note that our technique applies in many cases in which the operations over the abstract domain are not deterministic. Of course, our technique is admittedly costly due to path-enumeration and the use of a theorem prover. The second technique proposed in [PDV01] performs a counterexample guided simulation similar to NEWTON, but in a setting that allows non-boolean abstractions and handles multithreaded programs.

Chapter 9

Final Remarks

This thesis presents a tool that allows one to enjoy the benefits of sound abstract interpretation (no error is missed) while reducing the number of false alarms that need to be manually investigated. The tool can also be used to generate an adequate test case set according several coverage criteria.

The tool is generic and is applicable to any abstract domain having a symbolic concretization function, an ability to calculate weakest preconditions, and a finite-model counterexample generator.

To find input instances, a new bounded model checking algorithm that separates path-exploration from path-verification is used.

A prototype of the tool was implemented for shape analysis and was able to produce counterexamples for several interesting benchmark programs.

In the future it is planned to implement this tool for other domains. It may also be interesting to investigate further optimizations to `Input-Instance` and also compare the effectiveness of the All-Abstract-States criteria relative to other criteria.

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Appendix A

User's Manual

This appendix is intended as a User Manual to the counterexample generation tool (CETool).

The counterexample tool is implemented in Java as an add-on to the TVLA static analysis framework [LAS00]. The model enumerator Mace4 [McC03] is used as a theorem prover for first-order logic.

This manual assumes the reader's familiarity with the TVLA system. More information on operating TVLA can be found at [LA00].

A.1 Overview

CETool has two modes of operation: post-analysis mode and stand-alone mode.

In post-analysis mode, static analysis is first executed and produces an abstract state at every program label. Two options are available in this mode:

counter In this option, the algorithm for producing a counterexample (See Chapter 4) is invoked.

coverage In this option, the algorithm for producing an All-Abstract-State adequate set (See Section 7.1) is invoked.

Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 describe the operation of the counter and coverage options, respectively.



Figure A.1: Counterexample generation in post-analysis mode.



Figure A.2: Coverage generation in post-analysis mode.



Figure A.3: Counterexample generation in stand-alone mode.

In stand-alone mode, the analysis is not executed. Instead, the user supplies a label, an abstract state, and a message identifier. CETool produces a counterexample that reaches this label with an abstract state satisfying the message condition. This mode is useful when the analysis is expensive and the user wants to experiment with different CETool parameters on the resulting messages without having to rerun the analysis. Figure A.3 describes the operation of stand-alone mode.

By default, CETool operates in post-analysis mode.

A.2 An Example

CETool is demonstrated on the bubble-sort running example from Figure 1.1. The reader is encouraged to download the sources of the example from [Ere04] and run the example as going along this manual.

TVLA takes two input files:

TVP file describes the specification of the program and it's control flow graph.

TVS file describes the input abstract structure(s) for the analysis.

Among the files available electronically, `BubbleBug.tvp` contains the TVP translation of the bubble-sort program and `Unsorted.tvs` is used as the TVS file. TVP translation is not discussed here and it is not critical for the understanding of this manual. It just suffices to note that label $i28$



Figure A.4: The error message reported by TVLA when running the analysis on the bubble-sort program.

in the TVP translation corresponds to l_{31} in the Java program (`assert permutation(x)`), in which we expect the error message (See Section 5.4).

`Unsorted.tvs` represents a general unsorted list of zero or more nodes.

The following command runs TVLA with CETool on the bubble-sort program:

```
tvla BubbleBug Unsorted -counter 3 50
```

`-counter 3 50` invokes CETool in post-analysis mode with a maximum model size 3 for the theorem prover and a maximum path length of 50. First, TVLA analysis is run. As expected, TVLA reports one message at label $i28$. The message and the structure which triggers the message are graphically depicted in the resulting postscript file, as shown in Figure A.4.

After the analysis is completed, CETool is invoked on label $i28$ and the abstract structure of Figure A.4. The results of the tool are shown in Figure A.5.

As expected, the tool found a counterexample for label $i28$ and displays the structure in textual TVS form. The tool also produces .dt files depicting the counterexamples found in a graphic form. This structure is exactly the structure shown in Figure 5.1, with some additional predicates (such as inROrder()) that are used in the analysis but were omitted from the drawing for clarity.

Note the summary at the end of Figure A.5. The "lbl" column shows the label at which the error was reported,"found" column indicates whether a counterexample was found, "ops" and "cls" columns are the number of operators and clauses in the φ_0 formula, repectively. The "pth" column is the number of paths explored during the counterexample generation. "prn" column is the number of paths pruned (if path pruning is used — See Section A.3). The next two columns, "pot" and "exp" roughly indicate the depth of pruning performed. The "pot" column is the total length of all the paths explored; the "exp" column sums up how many nodes of each path were actually

```
Counter example found!(Label: i28 Error Condition:!(((Av).(r[n,x](v) <-> or[n,x,i0](v)))))
Path:i0->i000->i00->i1->i2''->i3'->i4'->i5'->i6'->i7''''->i8''->i21'->i22'->i23'->...
  %n = {_39, _40, _41}
  %p = {
    inac = {_39:1, _40:1, _41:1}
    inOrder[dle,n] = {_39:1, _41:1}
    inROrder[dle,n] = {_40:1, _41:1}
    r[n,x] = {_39:1, _40:1, _41:1}
    x = {_39:1}
    dle = {_41->_39:1, _39->_40:1, _40->_40:1, _41->_40:1, _41->_41:1, _39->_39:1}
    n = {_39->_40:1, _40->_41:1}
  }
lbl      found   ops         cls         pth      prn      pot      exp      sec
===      =====   ===         ===         ===      ===      ===      ===      ===
i28      true    1980        173         142      0        5612     5612     47
Total time:47
Total found:1
```

Figure A.5: CETool printout of the found counterexample for the bubble-sort program.

explored before the path was pruned. The last column, "sec", shows the elapsed time in seconds of the counterexample search.

A.3 Command-line Arguments

Following is a description of the command-line arguments for CETool.

`-counter` $size\ length$ **[**$label\ tvsFile\ msgIndex$ **]** activates CETool with a model size $size$ and a maximum exploration length $length$. $label$, $tvsFile$ and $msgIndex$ are optional arguments.

If $label$, $tvsFile$ and $msgIndex$ are specified, CETool operates in stand-alone mode. In this mode, the analysis is skipped and the counterexample algorithm is invoked at label $label$ on the structure described by the TVS file $tvsFile$. $msgIndex$ is a number indicating which message to use as an error condition. For example, a $msgIndex$ of 1 indicates using the first message in the label.

`-coverage` **[**$label1$**[,** $label2$**,** $label3$**,...** $tvsFile$ **]]** activates the coverage option. The second argument is a comma separated list of labels in the program. A concrete input instance is generated for every abstract state at every label specified. If no labels were specified, then an input instance is created for all the labels. The structures found are written to the TVS file $tvsFile$. If no $tvsFile$ is specified, the value from tvla.counterexample.coverageFileName is used.

This argument must be accompanied by a `-counter` option to provide the parameters for the input instance generation.

`-prune` causes CETool to perform *path pruning* (See Section 7.2.2).

After each step in WP calculation, the resulting formula is checked to be satisfiable. If not, the path is pruned and the next path is checked.

This argument must be accompanied by a `-counter` option to activate input instance generation.

A.4 Java Configuration Properties

It is possible to configure CETool by adding or changing property values in one of TVLA properties file (`tvla.properties`, `version.properties`, `user.properties`) or by adding a `-D`*property*`=`*option* to the `java` command-line running TVLA.

Table A.1 shows general properties pertinent to CETool. Table A.2 shows properties related to CETool coverage option. Table A.3 shows properties of the theorem prover used, Mace4.

Property	Description
tvla.counterexample	If set to "true", CETool is activated for every run of TVLA. This value is overridden by `-counter` command line option, if exists. The default is "false".
tvla.counterexample.maxPathLength	Maximum path length. Used to bound the counterexample search. The default is 50.
tvla.counterexample.force	If set to "true", CETool is run in stand-alone mode trying to find a counterexample for the label specified in tvla.counterexample.forceLabel, the abstract structure specified in tvla.counterexample.forceTvsFile and the message indicated by tvla.counterexample.forceMsgIndex. These values are overridden by the third till fifth command-line arguments to `-counter`, if exists. The default is "false".
tvla.counterexample.forceLabel	If tvla.counterexample.force is set to "true", this property defines the label for which to find a counterexample.
tvla.counterexample.forceTvsFile	If tvla.counterexample.force is set to "true", this property specifies the TVS file containing the abstract structure from which to start the search.
tvla.counterexample.forceMsgIndex	If tvla.counterexample.force is set to "true", this property defines the index of the message in the label tvla.counterexample.forceLabel to use as an error condition. For example, a value of 1 indicates using the first message in the label.
tvla.counterexample.minModelSize	Sets the minimum model size the theorem prover searches for. If supported by the theorem prover (like in Mace4 case), it can save theorem prover run-time if the user knows a counterexample model size cannot be smaller than some value. The default is 2.
tvla.counterexample.maxModelSize	Sets the maximum model size the theorem prover searches for. This value is overridden by the first argument of `-counter` command-line option, if it exists. The default is 3.

Table A.1: CETool general counterexample generation properties.

Property	Description
tvla.counterexample.coverage	If set to "true", CETool tries to find a counterexample for every abstract structure found by the analysis. Structures found are written in TVS format to the file mentioned in tvla.counterexample.coverageFilename. The default is "false".
tvla.counterexample.coverageFilename	The TVS file name for coverage results, if coverage is used. The default is "coverage.tvs".
tvla.counterexample.coverageLocations	A comma separated list of the labels for which to perform coverage. If this value is empty, all labels are examined. This value is overridden by the second argument to `-coverage` command-line option, if exists. The default is an empty string.

Table A.2: CETool coverage related properties.

Property	Description
tvla.tp.mace4.executable	The executable name of Mace4. The default is "mace4.exe".
tvla.tp.mace4.path	The path of Mace4 executable. The default is an empty string.
tvla.tp.mace4.parameters	Additional parameters supplied to Mace4. Note that CETool must have the following parameters set "-m 1 -P" to function properly. These parameters indicate that Mace4 should produce one model and print it in a portabale way CETool can parse. To add a timeout to Mace4, you need to include a "-T sec" parameters, where sec specifies the number of seconds that should pass before a timeout occurs. CETool treats a timeout as if no model was found. The default is "-m 1 -P". See [McC03] for more information on Mace4 parameters.

Table A.3: Mace4 related properties.

Appendix B

Proof

This appendix presents a proof to the correctness of `Input-Instance` algorithm shown in Figure 3.1.

B.1 Proof

We prove both the *completeness* and *soundness* of the algorithm:

1. Completeness — any state found by `Input-Instance` for label l and condition φ_l is an input instance for that label and condition.
2. Soundness — if there exists an input instance for label l and condition φ_l, there exists a maximum length p that allows `Input-Instance` to find some input instance for it.

B.2 Completeness

Theorem B.1. *a concrete state σ_0 found by `Input-Instance` for a label l and a condition φ_l is an input instance according Definition 2.3.*

Proof. Let $p = l_0 \rightarrow l_1 \rightarrow ... \rightarrow l_n$ be the path upon which `Input-Instance` found a concrete state σ_0, where $l_0 = entry$ and $l_n = l$.

Let st_i be the statement leading from l_i to l_{i+1}.
Let $\varphi_i = \text{WP}(st_i, \varphi_{i+1})$ for $0 \leq i < n$ with $\varphi_n = \varphi_l$.
Let $\sigma_i = [\![st_{i-1}]\!](\sigma_{i-1})$, meaning σ_i is the result of applying st_{i-1} on σ_{i-1} starting from σ_0.
We need to prove the following:

i Every statement st_i is enabled on σ_i.

ii $\sigma_n \models \varphi_l$.

We prove (i) in Lemma B.1. (ii) immediately holds.

□

Lemma B.1. *For every* $0 \leq i \leq n$, $\sigma_i \models \varphi_i$ *and for every* $0 \leq i < n$, st_i *is enabled.*

Proof. By induction on i.

Basis. $i = 0$. σ_0 is a model found by `Input-Instance` for φ_0 and therefore $\sigma_0 \models \varphi_0$. $\varphi_0 = \text{WP}(st_0, \varphi_1)$ is the weakest precondition of st_0 and φ_1. If st_0 is not enabled on σ_0 then violates φ_0 being a precondition of φ_1 and st_0 because there exists a model σ_0 satisfying φ_0 but does not guarantee φ_1 (because st_0 cannot be applied on it). st_0 is therefor enabled on σ_0.

Induction step. Assume that the lemma is correct for $0 \leq i - 1 < n - 1$. We prove that the lemma holds for i.

Using the same reasoning as in the basis, we get that st_i is enabled.

According the assumption, $\sigma_{i-1} \models \varphi_{i-1}$. It follows from the definition of weakest precondition (See Definition 3.1) that $\sigma_i \models \varphi_i$. □

B.3 Soundness

Theorem B.2. *If there exists an input instance* σ_0 *for label* l *and condition* φ_l*, there exists a maximum path length* p *for which some input instance* σ' *is found by* `Input-Instance`*.*

Proof. Assume there exists an input instance σ_0 whose execution path is $ep = \langle \sigma_0, l_0 \rangle \xrightarrow{st_0} \langle \sigma_1, l_1 \rangle \ldots \xrightarrow{st_{n-1}} \langle \sigma_n, l_n \rangle$.

Let $p = |ep|$. Since `Input-Instance` explores all paths of length up to p, it must also explore the path $l_0 \rightarrow l_1 \rightarrow ... \rightarrow l_n$.

Since σ_0 is an input instance, $\sigma_n \models \varphi_l$. Let $\varphi_{i-1} = \text{WP}(st_{i-1}, \varphi_i)$ as calculated by `Input-Instance` on the path $l_0 \rightarrow l_1 \rightarrow ... \rightarrow l_n$ with $\varphi_n = \varphi_l$.

Lemma B.2 below shows that for every $0 \leq i \leq n$, φ_i is satisfiable. It follows that `Input-Instance` finds some model $\sigma' \models \varphi_0$. According Theorem B.1, every model found by `Input-Instance` — in this case σ' — is an input instance, thus proving the theorem. □

Lemma B.2. *for every* $0 \leq i \leq n$, φ_i *is satisfiable by* σ_i.

Proof. By induction on i.

Basis. $i = n$. We know that $\sigma_n \models \varphi_l$ and that $\varphi_n = \varphi_l$. Thus $\sigma_n \models \varphi_n$.

Induction step. Assume that the lemma is correct for $0 < i + 1 \leq n$. We prove that the lemma also holds for i.

Assume in contradiction that φ_i is not satisfiable. We know that $\sigma_{i+1} = [\![st_i]\!](\sigma_i)$. According to the assumption, $\sigma_{i+1} \models \varphi_{i+1}$. However, σ_i is not a model of φ_i, in contradiction to φ_i being the weakest precondition of st_i and φ_{i+1} (See Definition 3.1). Thus, we conclude that φ_i is satisfiable. □