I am a Ph.D. student at Tel Aviv University, under the supervision of Michal Feldman.
My reseach area is algorithmic mechanism design.
Recently, my research focuses on the power of simple mechanisms in complex settings.
I am coordinating the algorithms seminar at Tel Aviv University,
send me an Email if you are interested in giving a talk!
|99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. With Michal Feldman, and Aviad Rubinstein|
|A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. With Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and S. Matthew Weinberg||EC 2017 Young EC'17 talk|
|The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. With Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and S. Matthew Weinberg||EC 2017|
|Simple Mechanisms For Agents With Complements. Slides | Arxiv With Michal Feldman, Jamie Morgenstern , and Guy Reiner.||EC 2016|
|A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games. Slides | PDF With Michal Feldman||ICALP 2015|
Effective post-silicon failure localization using dynamic program slicing.
With Wisam Kadry, Arkadiy Morgenshtein, Amir Nahir, Vitali Sokhin.
|Control flow error localization. US Patent 9251045 B2 With Wisam Kadry, Amir Nahir, Vitali Sokhin.|
Updated: April 20, 2017