Modular Verification with Shared Abstractions

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Abstract

Modular verification of shared data structures is a challenging problem: Side-effects in one module that are observable in another make it hard to analyze each module separately. We present a novel approach for modular verification of shared data structures. Our main idea is to verify that the inter-module sharing is restricted to a user-provided specification which also enables the analysis to handle side-effects.

1. Introduction

In object-based programming languages, it is natural to implement abstract data types using pointers. Pointers permit situations in which the representations of apparently distinct data structures share objects in a way which is observable to their clients. For example, a client may perform operations on a wrapper [10] object, yet have access to, and operate directly on, the underlying object of the wrapper. This form of sharing drastically complicates the task of (modular) reasoning. In particular, naive reasoning in terms of the wrapper's specification may be unsound because of updates to the underlying object that can change the abstract state as specified by the wrapper. Systems for modular reasoning based on hierarchical ownership (see, e.g., [22, 23, 9], for surveys), do not apply to programs in which internal data structures that come from different modules are shared. However such programs are common in practice.

In this paper, we present a novel modular approach for verifying partial correctness of shared data structures for a restricted class of programs. Historically, our starting point is Hoare’s seminal work on modular verification of abstract data types [11]. Hoare’s approach for modular verification is centered around hiding the implementation details of data structures using an abstract value which records the data structure’s abstract (i.e., client-observable) state. The abstract value is computed using an implementation-dependant representation function. Our main insight is that we can allow for modular reasoning involving shared data structures, which Hoare forbids, by combining the following two ideas:

(i) a controlled exposure of the inter-module sharing patterns: The user specifies the permitted inter-module sharing, i.e., the allowed sharing of internal data structures that come from different modules. This information allows to determine which (abstract value of which) data structures may be affected when another data structure is modified, and

(ii) a user provided aggregate model function which allows to update the abstract value of a data structure due to an indirect change. The key idea behind the aggregate model function is that it can (conservatively) compute the new abstract value of a data structure using its old abstract values and the abstract values of its internal data structures. This compositional way for computing abstract values is possible thanks to the information provided by the (controlled) exposure of the inter-module sharing.

Main Contributions. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:

1. We present a novel approach for manual and automatic modular verification of shared composite data structures. The additional proof burden required in our approach is proportional to the expected “degree of sharing”.

2. We define a form of specification and enumerate the proof obligations which suffice for the modular verification of a module. The specification allows to control the permitted inter-module sharing patterns.

3. Based on our approach, we develop a non-standard semantics specifically designed as a foundation for modular analysis: The semantics allows to execute a module m using the specification of the modules used by m, and aborts when m violates its specification.

4. We develop a modular static analysis by abstract interpretation of our non-standard semantics.

Outline The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 and 3, present an extended informal overview of our approach. Sec. 4 describes our programming model. Sec. 5 lists the main restrictions on the class of programs that our approach can handle. Sec. 6 defines the required specification and the proof obligations.

∗ Supported by the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientic Research and Development (G.I.F.).
† This work was done partly when Noam Rinetzky was at Tel Aviv University and supported by the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientic Research and Development (G.I.F.).
in our approach. Sec. 7 presents our non standard semantics. Sec. 8 shortly discusses a static analysis based on an abstract interpretation of our non-standard semantics. Sec. 9 discusses possible ways to overcome some of our limitations. Sec. 10 reviews related works and Sec. 11 concludes.

For clarity, we omit some of the technical details, which can be found in [12].

2. Running Example

Fig 1 shows our running example. The code is written in a Java-like language. The figures shows three modules: a Client module, a Keyset module, and a Map module. Our running example, uses a single instance of each module: a client using a key-set and a map. We refer to a data structure instance as a component and to an internal data structure as a subcomponent. We refer to data structures sharing an internal data structure as siblings. In this example, the key-set and the client are sibling data structures: the map is a shared subcomponent of both of them.

The client initialization procedure. Client, shown in Fig 1(a), uses the map module to associate keys (integers) to values (floats). The set reflects the domain of the map: In the spirit of the keySet() method of a Java's maps, when the set is constructed, it is linked to a map and provides a view of the keys contained in this map. For example, the third invocation of insert associating key 9 to value 1.0, has a side-effect on the key-set, it makes 9 a member of the key-set.

The Keyset class, shown in Fig 1(b), stores in field map a reference to the set's underlying map. This field is initialized upon construction and utilized to delegate methods invoked on the set to its map. Note that after the key-set is initialized, the client keeps—and uses—a reference to its underlying map.

Fig 1(c) shows the signature of the methods in the Map class, whose actual implementation, using a binary search tree, is irrelevant for the purpose of this paper, and thus omitted.

Verification Goal. Our goal is to verify each module separately. In the following, we focus on verifying that all the instances of the Keyset class comply with their specification (explained below). In our approach, we also modularly extracts information about the dependencies between Keyset and Map in a way that allows to verify that all the instances of the client satisfy the assertions. The main challenge we face is the propagation of side-effects due to methods invoked on shared subcomponents. For example, verifying the first assert statement stating that 9 is a member of the key-set requires propagating the side-effects of the third invocation of insert on the map to the key-set.

3. Our Approach

In this section, we provide an informal overview of our approach. Our approach builds on the seminal work of Hoare [11] which allows for manual modular verification of abstract data structures. Hoare proposes the use of a representation function which maps the representation of the data structure’s state to an abstract value. The specification of the data structure’s procedures is given in terms of abstract values. This allows a client of the data structure to be independent of the data structure’s actual implementation. Hoare’s work does not support pointers and dynamically allocated memory. However, it can be extended naturally to nested (encapsulated) data structures, i.e., where subcomponents can be organized only in the form of a tree.

3.1 Controlled exposure of sharing

In this work, we provide an approach for manual and automatic modular verification of composite data structures in the presence of shared subcomponents. In this setting, any sound analysis needs to consider side-effects due to sharing. Our main idea is to have a controlled exposure of the sharing of subcomponents instead of forbidding it or ignoring it.

We support shared subcomponents with the aid of a user specification that: (i) exposes subcomponents that can be referenced by other data structures; (ii) provides the (lack of) effect of every operation invoked on the data structure not only on the abstract value of the data structure, but also on the abstract value of any subcomponent that it may share with others. A key feature of this specification is that it exposes the effect of a procedure call on shared subcomponents, but it need not specify the effect of the procedure on sibling data structures, thus enabling modular reasoning.

3.2 The aggregate model function

The main challenge that we face is the tracking of indirect changes to the abstract values of sibling data structures. Such changes may occur, e.g., when a (shared) subcomponent of two data structures is modified.

We address the above challenge using a user-specified aggregate model function. The aggregate model function allows us to compute a conservative approximation of the (side-affected) data structure’s abstract value after an indirect change. It computes the (updated) data structure’s abstract value based on the abstract values of its internal representation (including unshared subcomponents) and the abstract values of its shared subcomponents. When analyzing sibling data structures the analysis tracks which subcomponents are shared and by whom. When the abstract value of a shared subcomponent is modified, the analysis updates the abstract values of the affected data structures using their aggregate model functions.

Our approach uses two kinds of additional fields to record the abstract value of a data structure and to define the aggregate model function. Model fields are used to record the abstract values of data structures. Model pivot fields are used to record the inter-component reference structure.

Example 3.1. Fig 2(c) shows the (user-provided) interface specification of the Map class. A map implements a partial function from integers to floats. The abstract value of a map is a function from integers to floats. We use the model field map to record this value. The map is an example of a fully-encapsulated data structure, i.e., one which does not expose or share its internal data structures.

The Keyset data structure, whose interface specification is shown in Fig 2(a), is an example of a data structure implementation which allows a controlled exposure of subcomponents. The abstract value of the Keyset is a set of integers. The model field keys records this value. In addition, the Keyset exposes a model pivot field. The model pivot field is a special sort of a model field whose value is a reference to a subcomponent. It is initialized with the map parameter when a key-set is constructed and allows the exposure of the effect of the key-set’s method’s on this (possibly) shared component. For example, the specification of the Keyset’s remove method exposes the fact that removing a key from a key-set also removes it from the (abstract value of the) map.

The aggregate model function of the keys model field of the Keyset class is keysₘ. It is shown in Fig 2(a). It specifies how to compute the value of the model field keys when the abstract value of its underlying map changes. Specifically, it specifies that the value of the key-set’s model field keys should be updated to the domain of the abstract value of the map referenced by the key-set’s model pivot field amap. Recall that the client of the map (and of the key-set) is aware of the connection between the key-set and the map because the key-set exposes its pivot field amap.
3.3 Non-standard semantics

We use our approach to design a static analysis which verifies that a program is correct according to its specification. The analysis is based on an abstract interpretation [6] of $\mathcal{LM}$, a non-standard componentized local-heap hybrid modular semantics. $\mathcal{LM}$ abstracts the standard semantics (instrumented to also track the values of model fields and model pivot fields) by abstracting away the inner structure of subcomponents: $\mathcal{LM}$ records only the abstract values of the subcomponents and their inter-component reference structure. Technically, $\mathcal{LM}$ keeps track only of the model fields of subcomponents and of their pivot model fields.

Example 3.2. (Instrumented Standard Memory States). Fig 3 (s$_c$) depicts a possible memory state that may arise in the execution of the running example before the third invocation of insert according to an (instrumented) standard semantics which is instrumented to track also the values of model fields. The state contains a client object (depicted as a diamond). The client object has two fields, depicted as labeled edges: An s-field pointing to a key-set, depicted as a rectangle, and an m-field pointing to a map, depicted as a hexagon. The key-set’s map-field also points to the map object. The map associates 2 to 5 and 3 to 4.0. Recall that the map is implemented as a binary search tree. Each tree node records an association of a key to a value. Tree nodes are depicted as an oval. Each node is annotated with the key and the value which are stored in the node ($d = \ldots$ and $v = \ldots$, respectively). For example, the node at the root of the tree (i.e., the node pointed to by the root field of the map object) records the association of key 3 with value 4.0. The rectangular frames depict the component-decomposition of the memory state. We say that two objects reside within the same implicit component if they belong to the same module and are connected in the heap via an undirected heap path which only goes through objects that belong to the same module. We say that a component is an unsealed component if it is the current component (its head is pointed to by this) and a sealed component otherwise. The memory state s$_c$ is comprised of three components. The key-set component and the map component are sealed.

The (instrumented) standard semantics records the values of model fields and model pivot fields only for object in sealed components. The value of the model pivot field amap is depicted as an edge emanating from the set object to the map object annotated with name of the pivot field written in italics. The values of the model fields keys and map are depicted inside the key-set and map.
This is the partial function instrumented standard semantics. (bounded) abstractions when analyzing different modules. In our implementation, we use canonical abstraction [29].

We define a modular static analysis based on an abstract interpretation of $LHM$ using a bounded conservative abstraction. Our analysis is parametric in the bounded abstraction and can use different (bounded) abstractions when analyzing different modules. In our implementation, we use canonical abstraction [29].

Our static analysis is conducted in an assume-guarantee manner allowing each module to be analyzed separately. The analysis computes a conservative representation of every possible input state to an intermodule procedure call. This process, in effect, identifies structural module invariants. Our analysis verifies conservatively that a module satisfies its specification and respects the restrictions we impose.

Technically, our analysis computes in a conservative manner all possible input states of intermodule procedure calls by exercising the analyzed module using its most-general-intrusive-client (MGIC): a program that simulates all possible procedure invocations on the analyzed component (thus simulating arbitrary usage contexts) and on its exposed subcomponents (thus simulating all possible side-effects).

### 3.4 Static Analysis

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Example 3.3. ($LHM$ Memory States). The $LHM$ memory states depicted in Fig 3 ($\sigma_c$), Fig 3 ($\sigma_e$), Fig 3 ($\sigma_r$), and Fig 3 ($\sigma_l$), abstract the standard memory states depicted in Fig 3 ($s_c$), Fig 3 ($s_e$), Fig 3 ($s_r$), and Fig 3 ($s_l$), respectively. Note that the $LHM$ memory states represent the abstract values of sealed components, but abstract away their representation. Also note that the inter-component reference structure is maintained by the model pivot fields.

The $LHM$ memory state shown in Fig 3 ($\sigma_l$), representing the memory state when the `insert` procedure terminates, is computed directly from the memory state shown in Fig 3 ($\sigma_c$), representing the memory state when the `insert` is invoked using the specification of `insert`. Furthermore, the model pivot field `amap` exposes the dependency of the value of the key-set’s `keys` model field on the abstract value of the map allows computing the updated value of `keys` using its aggregate model function.

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### 4. Program Model

We reason about imperative object-based (i.e., without subtyping) programs. A program consists of a collection of procedures and a distinguished `main` procedure. The programmer can also define her own types (à la Java classes). We expect to be given a partitioning of the program types and procedures into modules.

**Syntactic domains.** We assume the syntactic domains $x \in V$ of variable identifiers, $f \in F$ of field identifiers, $T \in T$ of type identifiers, $p \in PID$ of procedure identifiers, and $m \in M$ of module identifiers. We assume that types, procedures, and modules have unique identifiers in every program.

**Modules.** We denote the module that a procedure $p$ belongs to by $m(p)$ and the module that a type identifier $T$ belongs to by $m(T)$. A module $m_3$ depends on module $m_2$ if $m_3 \neq m_2$ and one of the following holds: (i) a procedure of $m_3$ invokes a procedure of $m_2$; (ii) a procedure of $m_3$ has a local variable whose type belongs to $m_2$; or (iii) a type of $m_3$ has a field whose type belongs to $m_2$. 

![Figure 3. Possible memory states. ($s_c, s_e, s_r, s_l$) memory states occurring in an invocation of $m$.insert(9, 1.0) on $s_c$ according to the instrumented standard semantics. ($\sigma_c, \sigma_e, \sigma_r$) memory states occurring in an invocation of $m$.insert(9, 1.0) on $\sigma_c$ according to the $LHM$ semantics.](image-url)
Procedures. A procedure $p$ has local variables and formal parameters, which are considered to be local variables. Only local variables are allowed. We assume that the target of a procedure invocation is bound to an implicit `this` parameter. For each field access $x.f$ or $y = x.f$ by a procedure $p$ we require that the type $T$ of the object pointed to by $x$ satisfies $m(p) = m(T)$.

5. Limitations and Simplifying Assumptions

In this section we list the main limitations on the class of programs for which the work presented in this paper can be applied. The goal of some of the limitations is to simplify our approach. Other limitations are more inherent in our approach. See Sec. 9 for a discussion.

1. We assume that the programming language is object-based, i.e., with dynamic memory allocation and procedures, but without inheritance or subtyping.

2. We expect the module dependency relation to be acyclic. (See Sec. 9 for a possible alleviation of this restriction.)

3. Every component has a single object (the component’s header) which dominates the entire component, meaning that any heap path reaching the objects comprising the component passes through the component’s header, except for heap paths reaching the headers of subcomponents. (Note that these heap paths must come from a different module)

4. Every component has a bounded number of exposed (possibly shared) subcomponents.

5. We do not handle deallocation or garbage collection.

In addition, to simplify the presentation, we make the following assumptions:

6. Every module defines a single data structure which can be used by other modules.

7. Every module has a specially-designated initialization procedure which allocates new instances of its data structure and initializes them.

6. Specification and Proof Obligations

In this section, we describe the required user-provided specification and the proof obligations. Any approach, be it manual or automatic, which can establish the proof obligations with the given specification verifies soundly that the module respects its specification.

6.1 Standard Module Specification

In this section, we discuss the more-standard Hoare-style specification that we use.

6.1.1 Interface specification

We expect to have a user-supplied Hoare-style “public” specification of the program’s modules:

- Every module may have model fields. The model fields represent the abstract value of the data structure implemented by the module. A model field should range over a value domain. For example, the (only) model field of the Keyset module is keys and its possible values are sets of integers. The model field of the Map module is map and its possible values are maps of integers to floats.
- Every procedure should have a pre-post specification which describes the effect of the procedure on the model fields of its parameters. A pre-post specification is admissible if it refers to a relation over expressions over the callee’s local model heap — i.e. access paths starting at the procedure parameters and following a sequence of model pivot fields or to the values of model fields that can be reached by traversing such access paths. For example, the specification of the map’s `insert` procedure indicates the abstract value of a map after the invocation of `insert(k,v)`, indicated by a `map'`, is the same as the map’s value before the insertion except that the key $k$ is now associated with the value $v$. As a negative (inadmissible) example — if Map’s specification were to mention the keys field of a Keyset object referring to it, it would be inadmissible as this Keyset is not reachable from the Map. In the following, we assume that procedure specifications are admissible.

6.1.2 Internal specification

We expect an internal module specification which provides a representation function [11] mapping the data structure’s concrete representation to its abstract value. We allow the representation function to be defined only as a function of (i) the values of objects reachable from the component’s header via fields defined in the module and (ii) the values of model fields of subcomponents.

6.2 Additional Specification Burden

In this section, we describe the additional specification burden required by our approach. More specifically, the additional specification burden required by our approach (compared, e.g., to [11]) is the specification of the model pivot fields and the aggregate model fields.

6.2.1 Interface specification

The model pivot fields specify the data structure’s subcomponents that can be shared with other data structures. Any such subcomponent is a relation over expressions over the callees local model heap. An aggregate model function is admissible if it is defined as a function of the values of the component’s local model fields and the model fields of its subcomponents. For example, the aggregate model function associated with the model field keys of the Keyset module specifies that the value of this field is the domain of the abstract value of the key-set’s map. If we change the key-set to be a filtered key-set which contains only keys whose values are bigger than a given threshold, then the threshold value could be exposed by a local model field and the aggregate model function of the filtered key-set would specify that the key-set contains all elements in the domain of its map that are smaller than the (exposed) threshold.

Remark 6.1. In our running example, the model function and the representation function agree. In general, the model function can be less precise than the representation function. This can happen in cases where the representation function can compute a more precise value than the model function thanks to internal knowledge of the data structure implementation.

6.2.2 Internal specification

The internal specification is used only during the verification of the module itself. It links the model pivot fields and model fields with the actual implementation of the module’s data structure.
Every local model field is associated with a representation function that specifies its value. The representation function can depend only on properties of objects that are reachable from the header of the data structure through fields defined in the module.

The representation function for every model pivot field is further limited to only access fields inside the current component (so it depends only on objects which resides also in the current component) and must evaluate to an outgoing pointer. Note that as a result of the above restriction, changes made to one component, cannot have side effects on the values of pivot model fields of another component.

For example, the model pivot field amap is associated with the Keyset’s map-field which points to a Map.

Remark 6.2. We note that the goal of our analysis, described in Sec. 8, is to find module invariants (properties which are expected to hold when the data structure is not being manipulated) in an automatic manner. For example, a module invariant of the Keyset module which our analysis can find is that the field m never has a null value.

6.3 Proof Obligations

In this section, we list the required proof obligations. When verifying a module, we need to verify, as usual, that the post-condition of every procedure p and the module invariant are implied from executing p’s body in any state which satisfies p’s precondition and the module invariant. (When verifying an initialization function only the precondition can be assumed.) In addition, we need to establish the following properties:

Model function consistency evaluating the aggregate model function of a model field mf of component c using the abstract value (of c’s model fields) is conservative with respect to evaluating the representation function of mf over any component that can be represented by c.

Model pivot consistency in any state which satisfies the module invariant, every reachable subcomponent which is not dominated by the data structure’s header (i.e., possibly exposed) is named (pointed to) by a model pivot field.

Single header every component has a single header.

Model function dependency is locally acyclic there is no local dependency cycle between model functions of the same component.

This admissibility of the aggregate model function in addition to the single header requirement and the acyclicity of the module dependency relation ensure that these functions are well defined, i.e., there is no cyclic definition of aggregate model functions.

7. Non-Standard Semantics

In this section we define LHM, a non standard concrete semantics which serve as a foundation for a modular analysis. Specifically, the semantics aborts if a module violates its specification. We note that our analysis establishes that the proof obligations are satisfied according to the LHM semantics. Our restrictions on the program model and on the specification ensure that even though the proof obligations are shown to be satisfied in LHM, the properties that they assert also hold in the standard semantics.

LHM is a store-based semantics (see, e.g., [26]). A traditional aspect of a store-based semantics is that a memory state represents a heap comprised of all the allocated objects. LHM, on the other hand, is a local heap semantics [27]: A memory state which occurs during the execution of a procedure does not represent objects which, at the time of the invocation, were not reachable from the actual parameters.
location to a module: The module that a location \( l \in L \) belongs to in memory state \( \sigma \) is \( m(t(l)) \).

The last four elements of the tuple are specific to \( LHM \), and are used to record the module of the current procedure and the fields of local model fields, model fields, and model pivot fields.\(^1\)

(v) The fifth component, \( m \in M \), is the module of the current procedure. We refer to \( m \) as the current module of \( \sigma \).

(vi) The sixth component, \( ah \in AH \), is the local abstract value map. It records the abstract values of local model fields.

(vii) The seventh component, \( ph \in PH \), is the model pivot heap, recording the reference values of pivot model fields.

(viii) The eighth component, \( ah \in AH \), is the abstract value map. It records the abstract values of non-local model fields.

To exclude states that cannot arise in any program, we now define the notion of admissible states. We note that \( LHM \) preserves the admissibility of memory states.

An \( LHM \) memory state \( \sigma = \langle e, L, h, t, m, ah, ph, ah \rangle \in \Sigma \) is admissible if

(i) The domain of the heap and the local abstract value map, the model pivot heap, and the abstract value map are disjoint, i.e., let \( A = dom(ah) \cup dom(ph) \cup dom(ah) \), then \( dom(h) \cap A = \emptyset \);

(ii) Every object in the domain of the heap belongs to the current module, i.e., for every \( l \in dom(h) \), \( m(t(l)) = m \);

(iii) The type of every object in the (local) abstract values map and the model pivot heap does not come from the current module, i.e., for every \( l \in A \), \( m(t(l)) \neq m \), where \( A \) is as defined above;

(iv) Fields and model fields can point only to allocated locations, i.e., \( \{ h(l) : l \in Loc, ph(l) | l \in L, f \in F \} \subseteq L \); and

(v) The pivot heap is acyclic.

Example 7.1. Figures 3(\( \sigma_e \)) and 3(\( \sigma_\epsilon \)) depict the (admissible) \( LHM \) memory states that arise in the execution of the running example before and after the third invocation of \( \text{insert} \), respectively.

7.2 Operational Semantics

We only discuss the key aspects of the operational semantics, formally defined in [12]. For simplicity, we assume that the procedure of the module are partitioned into public procedures, which can be invoked only by procedures of other modules and private procedures, which can be invoked only be procedures of the module. (Note that, in particular, a public procedure cannot be invoked by another procedure of the module.)

7.2.1 Intraprocedural statements.

Intraprocedural statements are handled, essentially, as usual in a two-level store semantics for pointer programs (see, e.g., [26]). The main difference from the standard semantics is that the semantics checks that the program accesses only fields of objects that belong to the current component.

We note that we simplify the memory management mechanism in our semantics by exploiting the fifth simplifying assumption (i.e., the assumption that memory locations are not reused): Whenever a new location is allocated, the semantics chooses an arbitrary location which was not allocated before. Technically, it utilizes the set of allocated location (i.e., the second component of a memory state, see Fig 4) to accumulate all allocated locations.

7.2.2 Intra-module interprocedural statements.

\( LHM \) is a local-heap semantics [27] which maintains a stack of program states to handle intra-module procedure calls [28]. The program state of the current procedure is stored at the top of the stack, and it is the only one which can be manipulated by intraprocedural statements.

Note that only a intra-module procedure call can invoke only a private procedure.

7.2.3 Inter-module interprocedural statements.

Fig 5 defines the axioms for intermodule procedural calls. When an intermodule procedure call is invoked, \( LHM \) computes the return state \( \sigma_e \) in three steps, as described below.

Computing the callee’s entry state. First, the rule computes an intermediate memory state, \( \sigma_e \), which represents the callee’s (input) local heap but with all components remaining sealed. It does this by restricting the heap to \( L_{rel} \), the part reachable from the actual parameter. Because the module dependency is acyclic, only headers of sealed components (reachable via the pivot heap) can be passed as the values of actual parameters. Thus, \( L_{rel} \) is computed as the set of locations that are reachable from the parameters in the pivot heap. Note that every location in \( L_{rel} \) is the header of a sealed component. Also note that the restriction of the caller’s heap (\( h_c \)) to \( L_{rel} \) necessarily returns an empty heap.

Computing the callee’s exit state. \( LHM \) applies the effect of the invoked procedure in one step: it selects (non-deterministically) any exit state (\( \sigma_e \)) which is a possible outcome of the invoked procedure according to its specification on the computed entry state (\( \sigma_e \)).

Remark 7.2. The notation \( \sigma_e = \langle \ldots, \sigma_e, \ldots \rangle \) is used to express that according to the specification of procedure \( p \), its invocation on an entry state \( \sigma_e \) may result in memory state \( \sigma_e \). In particular, it denotes that \( \sigma_e \) satisfies \( p \)'s preconditions (and that the semantics aborts otherwise.)

Note that this notation also makes it clear that the specification cannot refer to the current component, as it should hold in any (arbitrary) calling context in which \( p \) is invoked on \( \sigma_e \).

Computing the caller’s return state. \( LHM \) computes the return state \( \sigma_e \) of the invocation \( y = p(x_1, \ldots, x_k) \) by, essentially, carrying out the local heap passed to the callee from the call heap and replacing it with the callee’s heap at the exit site. The replacement is mostly straightforward:

(i) Updating the caller’s environment amounts to assigning the return value of the procedure \( (x_e, \text{return}) \) to \( y \).

(ii) The module of the caller’s function at the return state is the same as in the call state \( (m_e) \), and thus does not change.

(iii) The caller’s set of allocated locations is set to that of the callee \( L_e \) to account for the locations which were allocated during the procedure invocation. (Recall that \( L_e \subseteq L_{rel} \))

(iv) The caller’s heap at the return state is the same heap as at the call heap \( h_c \) because the callee could not have modified it. (Recall the \( h_c \) contains only the objects inside the caller’s component, and that the callee could not have reached them.)

(v-viii) The caller’s type map at the return memory state is defined to be the same as the call state, except for location which are in the callee’s local heap, whose type is taken from the type map of the callee at the exit state \( (L_e) \). We note that the callee could not have allocated a location which appears in the caller’s heap because these locations are accumulated in the set of allocated locations passed to the callee in its input state. The caller’s local abstract value map \( (ah_c) \) and model

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\(^1\) Recall that model fields are used to record the abstract values of sealed components and that pivot model fields are used to record the inter-component reference structure between sealed components. Specifically, the model pivot fields of a component specify which of its subcomponents is externally-visible and thus can be shared with other components. We remind the reader that we refer to a model field whose value does not depend on model fields of externally-visible subcomponents as a local model field. See Sec. 6.2.1.
pivot map \((ph_r)\) are constructed in a similar way. We note the straightforward update of these maps is possible thanks to (a) the restrictions that we impose on these maps (See Sec. 6.2.2 and Sec. 6.2.2) and (b) the fact that the callee could not have reached the components which were not passed to it in its input state.

The most challenging aspect of our semantics is the computation of the caller’s abstract value map \((ah_r)\): The computation has to account for operations by the callee that might have change the abstract value of components which the callee could not have reached.

To correctly propagate the side effect of the invoked procedure on the (aggregate) model fields the semantics updates the value of every model field pertaining to an object which was not passed to the callee using the \textit{update} procedure. The invocation of \textit{update}(l, ah_c, alh_r, ph_r, ah_r) updates the model fields of \(l\) by first (recursively) computing \(ah_{sub}\), an abstract value map containing the updated values of model fields of every subcomponent of \(l\). (Note that to determine the subcomponents, the semantics uses the updated pivot heap.) \(LHM\) then computes the value of every model field \(f\) of \(l\) using \(m_f\), the aggregate model function of \(f\). Note that this computation is well defined because of the acyclicity of model field dependencies promised by our assumptions.

Remark 7.3. We note that the above definition recomputes values of fields that cannot be modified. In [12], we present a more complicated version of the axioms for intermodule procedural calls. The latter updates only fields that depend on potentially modified fields, and behaves better under abstraction. The version in [12] also handle some delicate issues that may occur when the model function is less precise than the representation function.

The procedure call rule for \textit{public} procedures also checks that usual Hoare requirement: i.e., it executes a procedure only if the entry state satisfies its precondition and checks that its exit state satisfies the post condition. The semantics computes the abstract value of the current component using the representation functions defined in the module internal representation. For example, Fig 2(b) shows the internal specification of the KeySet module. For brevity, we omit this standard part from Fig 5. For details, see [12, App. C.].

7.3 Observational Soundness

Our goal is to verify (modularly) properties of modules according to the standard semantics. The admissibility of \(LHM\) memory states, our programming model, and the conditions checked by the operational semantics, ensure that if the \(LHM\) semantics never aborts when executing a module, then for any memory state \(s\) that can arise according to the standard semantics (in a program comprised only of such “well-behaved” modules) there exists a \(LHM\) memory state \(\sigma\) which arises during the execution of the program in the \(LHM\) semantics which abstracts \(s\).

An immediate consequence of the above is that any assertion regarding properties of objects reachable from component headers which is shown to hold with respect to \(LHM\) semantics also holds with respect to the standard semantics. For a formal definition of the observational soundness theorem, see [12].

8. Static Analysis

This section presents key aspects of our (conservative) modular static analysis. The analysis is obtained as an abstract interpretation of \(LHM\) using a \textit{bounded} conservative abstraction. Our analysis is parametric in the bounded abstraction and can use different (bounded) abstractions when analyzing different modules. In our implementation, we use canonical abstraction [29].

Our static analysis is conducted in an assume-guarantee manner allowing each module to be analyzed separately. The analysis, computes a conservative representation of every possible input state to an intermodule procedure call. This process, in effect, identifies

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2 In addition, the rule checks that every component of the module has a single header. This check is similar to the one done in [28].
structural module invariants. Our analysis verifies conservatively that a module satisfies its specification and respects the restrictions we impose.

The main challenge in our analysis lies in finding all the possible input states to an intermodule procedure calls. We overcome this challenge by utilizing the fact that in $\mathcal{LM}$ whenever a program passes a component of the analyzed module a parameter to an intermodule procedure call, it must be a sealed component which was previously generated by the program. (This is derived from the fact that every component has a single header and that a component can be manipulated only by the module which generated it.) In particular, we can **anticipate the possible entry memory states of an intermodule procedure call**; Note that components are sealed only when an intermodule procedure call returns. Furthermore, the only way a sealed component can be mutated is to pass it back as a parameter to a procedure of its own module. Thus, a partial view of the execution trace, which considers only the executions of procedures that belong to the analyzed module, and collects the sealed components generated when an intermodule procedure invocation returns, can anticipate (conservatively) the possible input states for the next intermodule invocations. Specifically, only a combination of already generated sealed components of the module can be the component parameters in an intermodule procedure invocation.

We conservatively compute the effect of procedure calls on subcomponents using the user-provided specification. The procedure’s pre-post specification allows us to find the effect of the procedure on the components passed to it as parameters (and their subcomponents) and the aggregate model function allows us to propagate side effects to sibling components.

### 8.1 Modularity

Our analysis is modular in two aspects. First, it is modular in the program code: When verifying one module, we only require the code implementing that module and only the specification of the other modules. (Specifically, we determine the effect of an intermodule procedure call on a subcomponent using the procedure’s specification.) Second, it is modular in the program state: when reasoning about a module, we

(i) reason about the **concrete** representation of data structures manipulated by the module,

(ii) represent the **abstract** values and the topologies (sharing patterns) of subcomponents that come from other modules, and

(iii) ignore the data structure context containing the analyzed data structures.

(In comparison, Hoare’s approach, by being targeted to verify only fully encapsulated data structures, can avoid reasoning about sharing patterns.) A key reason for the modularity of our analysis in the program state is the heterogeneous memory representation of the hybrid states. This allows our analysis to require only the specification of dependant modules and not their implementation (as is required, e.g., in [31]).

### 8.2 Most-General-Intrusive Client

We conduct modular static analysis by performing an interprocedural analysis of a module together with its most-general-intrusive client (MGIC). The module’s MGIC is defined outside the module and invokes a sequence of arbitrary (intermodule) procedures calls to the module using arbitrary input arguments. (In this respect, the most-general-intrusive-client is similar to the most-general-client of a class [28].) However, it also invokes procedures directly on the exposed subcomponents of the analyzed module. (In this respect, the client is intrusive as it bypasses the component and directly interacts with its subcomponents.) This allows to simulate conservatively any arbitrary context in which components of the module can be used. In our analysis, the MGIC takes the role of the $\mathcal{LM}$ semantics in verifying that the preconditions and post-conditions (specified using abstract values) are respected. This allows our analyzer to verify that every intermodule procedure call made by the MGIC respects the procedure’s specification.

**Example 8.1.** The MGIC for the Keyset of the running example is shown in Fig 6. The MGIC first allocated a map, and invokes an arbitrary sequence of operations on the map, thus generating any possible map that can be passed to the KeySet when the latter is initialized. The MGIC executes a loop in which it invokes the KeySet methods (cases 2 and 3) acting as a client of the KeySet. It also invokes, “intrusively”, methods on the underlying map (cases 0 and 1), simulating indirect changes to the underlying map.

We note that the analysis considers the actual implementation of the KeySet, but only the abstract view (i.e., the model fields) of the underlying map.

Pre and post conditions are checked before/after each call (in the model space). The last assertion checks that the model function over-approximates the representation function.

### 8.3 Bounded abstraction

We provide an effective conservative abstract interpretation [6] which determines module invariants by devising a bounded abstraction of $\mathcal{LM}$ memory states. An abstraction of a $\mathcal{LM}$ memory state, being comprised essentially of an environment of a single procedure and a subheap, is very similar to an abstraction of a standard two-level store. The additional elements that the abstraction tracks are the model pivot fields (which can be abstracted in a similar manner to standard concrete fields) and model fields representing abstract values of data structures. Thus, the abstract domain is expected to be able to (conservatively) represent the abstract values used in the specification.

Abstracting a $\mathcal{LM}$ memory state is simpler than abstracting standard memory states: Instead of abstracting the representation of a data structure (e.g., the representation of a map as a tree) the abstraction needs to record the essential properties of the data structure, e.g., the association between keys and values, the elements in the domain of the map, etc. Furthermore, we believe that a key reason for the success of our analyzer is the fact that while a procedure call might have a complicated effect on the concrete heap, e.g., inserting a node to a tree, its effect on the abstract value of the data structure can be much more limited, e.g., adding an association to a map.

### 8.4 Experimental evaluation

We have experimented with expressing several examples in our system. We realized our system by developing a proof-of-concept modular analyzer using canonical abstraction [29] within the TVLA system [19]. Our analyzer was able to verify the **Keyset** module in 10 seconds running on a machine with a 2.66 Ghz Core 2 Duo processor and 2 Gb memory. The verification proved that any Keyset component in any context using any map that conforms to the Map specification would behave as in its specification.

### 9. Future Work

In our work we chose to focus on one of the main challenges in object-invariant-based modular verification of object-oriented programs: invariants that span multiple data structures where sharing is allowed [9]. Our approach can handle programs that employ certain popular programming idioms, e.g., the wrapper [10], decorator [10], and passive-model-view-controller [4] design patterns. However, other popular design patterns, such as iterators and the
Our requirement that the module dependency relation be acyclic is used to simplify the presentation. The fundamental requirement is field dependency acyclicity— that can be enforced modularly. A simple and practical way to achieve this is to require that model field dependency is acyclic by type (meaning the dependency relation for model field types is acyclic) however this disallows some existing programming patterns such as alternating lists. A more general way is to require local acyclicity (among model fields of the same type) and require acyclicity whenever an object is abstracted (e.g., this on return from function) as a proof obligation. This requires more verification work but allows more programs.

A particular challenging issue with cyclic import is that this can be passed (e.g., in callbacks) as an argument. In this situation, any knowledge of the current component (including local variables pointing into it) is lost upon return unless it is passed as immutable (even if the specification does not specify any modification to its model fields).

**Multiple headers.** Our restriction that every component should have a single header simplifies our semantics and analysis as it prevents us from tracking the relation between different entry points into the same component. However, is quite severe as it disallows, e.g., iterators. We believe it can be removed if all headers of the component (e.g. List and its Iterators) are defined in the same module and verified with knowledge of each other. Specifically, each should have a pivot to other one. (This means pivots and representation functions in general will no longer only reference reachable heap as, e.g., an iterator does not have to have a pointer to a List’s header but only to a Node). We hope it is possible to allow multiple headers per component with the above mentioned restrictions and some additional modifications to the formulation. In particular, we believe that this is doable if we restrict the number of headers.

**Subtyping.** Subtyping is challenging because an upcast loses specification information. The main problem that our approach faces because of subtyping is that information pertaining model fields which appear only in the subtype is lost on upcast (e.g., when calling a function that receives a supertype as a parameter) and hence has to be reconstructed on return. We believe that with some restrictions on subtyping and modifications to the call rule, our system can support subtyping. In particular, we suggest to consider a stricter subtyping model where downcasts are forbidden, subtype-added methods are the only ones allowed to modify subtype-added model fields. By a stricter subtyping model we mean that subtypes may have additional constructs (concrete functions and specification model fields) and stricter specification for constructs: stricter pre-post for functions, stricter specification for model fields, i.e., less dependencies, and stricter model functions, i.e., more deterministic ones.

**10. Related Work**

In this section, we review closely related works.

**Modular verification.** In [2], Barnett and Naumann presented a verification approach that supports state dependencies across ownership boundaries. A component can grant “friends” the right to depend on their state. Thus, the dependency is publicly visible and treated in a modular way. The downside of this technique is that the granting component needs to know its clients. To overcome this restriction, Leino and Schulte developed a technique based on history invariants [18] which allow component invariants to depend on other non-encapsulated components, which resembles our method. However, the expressible dependencies are weaker than the ones allowed by our method because they need to be captured by a history constraint.

A modular solution for model fields and non-shared abstractions is developed by Müller in [21] and by Müller and Leino in [17]. The focus of their work is the verification of object oriented programs using object invariants. They face a similar challenge to the one faced in this work: maintaining consistency between the abstract values of component and their concrete state. Indeed, These works inspired some of our definitions for when an abstraction has to hold and the ideas of pivots and dependencies. However, the methods shown in these works are more suitable for manual verification or theorem provers rather than analysis.
In [14], Kassios presents a framework for modular reasoning supporting abstraction, data-hiding, and subtyping. The framework allows asserting properties such as disjointness and inclusion between the domains of different representation functions and to prove non-modification of model fields in a modular fashion. Classes can have “public” invariants which encode similar information to our “public” model function, however, in a less restrictive way. We give explicit rules for pivots and rely on pivot equality while Kassios uses frames which are sets of pointers and relies on set operations (inclusion, disjointness etc) which we believe are harder to use in practice. Our restrictions give us simpler proof obligations with simpler propagation of side-effects which can be verified automatically.

Cameron et al. [5] describe an ownership system that support multiple owners. Their work supports programs with concurrency, subtyping, inheritance and cyclic module import work supports. Our work is similar to theirs in the sense that in both works the ownership graph is required to be a dag. However, they focus on verifying non-modification, whereas we focus on verifying more general partial correctness assertions.

Local reasoning O’Hearn et al. [24] and Bierman and Parkinson [3] allow to conduct modularly (manual) local reasoning [26] about abstract data structures and abstract data types with inheritance, respectively. The reasoning requires user-specified resource invariants and loop invariants. Our analysis automatically infers these invariants based on user provided interface specification and representation functions (and an instance of the bounded shape abstraction). Bierman and Parkinson [3], however, allows for more sharing than in our model. Their system can encode “public” invariants of aggregates and model pivots, but does not have an inherent notion of aggregate representation function. Lately, a verification tool [8] based on abstract predicates [3] was developed by Distefano and Parkinson.

Modular static analysis Cousot and Cousot [7] describe the fundamental techniques for modular static program analysis. These techniques allow to compose separate analyses of different program parts. We use their techniques, in particular, we use user provided specification to communicate the effect and side effects of mutations done by different modules. Lam et al. [16] and Wies et al. [30] also utilize user-specified pre- and post-conditions to achieve modular shape analysis which can handle a bounded number of flat set-like data structures. Our approach, allows for separately-analyzed arbitrarily-nested and possibly shared sets.

Logozzo [20] presents a modular analysis which infers class invariants. The determined invariants do not concern properties of shared sub-objects.

Yorsh et al. [31] provide a method for computing the effect of a procedure call which is modular in the program code — but not in the program state: A theorem prover is used to propagate the effect of a procedure call on the abstract field of the caller by inferring it from the call’s effect on the concrete fields of the callee. Intuitively, their approach requires maintaining the values of concrete fields for subcomponents.

Rinetzky et al. [28] present a modular shape analysis which identifies structural (shape) invariants for dynamically encapsulated programs: heap-manipulating programs which forbids sharing between components via live (i.e., used before set) references. This paper allows shared components but requires that every shared subcomponent be named by a model pivot field. This may restrict our approach from handling data structures which hold object data which are transferred as parameters. One way we can overcome this restriction is by incorporating in our approach dynamic encapsulation for certain kinds of object parameters.

11. Conclusions

We present a novel approach for modular verification of programs with shared data structures. The essence of our work is the propagation of the side-effects on the abstract values of sibling data structures. The aggregate model function provides a conservative approximation of the data structure’s abstract value based on the abstract values of its internal, unshared parts and the abstract values of its shared subcomponents.

The additional proof burden that we place (beyond the one imposed, e.g., by Hoare’s approach for verifying abstract data types [11]) is proportional to (i) the allowed sharing, i.e., to the number of subcomponents of the verified data structure which are allowed to be shared externally and the interconnection between them, and (ii) the actual sharing, i.e., the sharing between the data structure subcomponents.

References


