

Improved Lower Bounds for Non-Utilitarian Truthfulness

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
 - Algorithmic Mechanism Design
 - Our Results

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Algorithmic mechanism design

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- Focuses on the development of **truthful mechanisms**.

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May declare any fallacious input in order to **manipulate** the algorithm in a way that will maximize its own utility.

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Truthful mechanism

A way to motivate the agents to truthfully report their inputs.

- **Allocation algorithm** – attends to the algorithmic issue (solves the underlying algorithmic problem).
- **Payment scheme** – addresses the issue of truthfulness (compensates the agents for revealing the truth).

The goal function affects truthfulness

- Every **utilitarian** goal function admits a mechanism that truthfully implements it (generalized VCG).
- There are **non-utilitarian** goal functions, which cannot be optimally implemented in a truthful manner.

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Truthful implementation of non-utilitarian functions is

- **not a computational difficulty.**
- (in some sense) like an **information theoretic limitation.**

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Truthfulness

Understand the **inherent limitations** in the infrastructure of non-utilitarian truthfulness.

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Workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem

- **Lower bound of 2** for any truthful deterministic mechanism, and any universal truthful randomized mechanism.
- Improve the lower bounds of 1.618 and 1.309, due to Mu'alem and Schapira [SODA '07].

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Workload minimization in inter-domain routing problem

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Unrelated machines scheduling problem

- **Lower bound of $1 + \sqrt{2}$** for any truthful deterministic mechanism when the number of machines is at least 3.
- Comparable to a result by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali [SODA '07]. Our approach is considerably simpler.

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Input:

- n machines, and m tasks.
- The execution time of task j on machine i is t_{ij} .

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} t_{11} & t_{12} & \dots & t_{1m} \\ t_{21} & t_{22} & \dots & t_{2m} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ t_{n1} & t_{n2} & \dots & t_{nm} \end{pmatrix}$$

- Machine 2's execution times.
- Task 1's execution times.

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- Machine 2's execution times.
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$$x = \begin{pmatrix} x_{11} & x_{12} & \dots & x_{1m} \\ x_{21} & x_{22} & \dots & x_{2m} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ x_{n1} & x_{n2} & \dots & x_{nm} \end{pmatrix}$$


- $x_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\sum_{i \in [n]} x_{ij} = 1$.
- $\max_{i \in [n]} \sum_{j \in [m]} x_{ij} t_{ij}$ is minimized.

Objective:

Allocate the tasks to the machines to minimize the makespan (maximum completion time).

Example


- 2 machines and 2 tasks.



$$t = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 4 & 3 \end{pmatrix}$$

Example

- 2 machines and 2 tasks.
- Assign both tasks to machine 1 (makespan value of 2).



$$t = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 4 & 3 \end{pmatrix}, x = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Mechanism design variant

Machines correspond to **agents**, which may be untruthful about their execution times vector.

Example

Machine 2 may be dishonest about the execution times of $t_2 = \langle t_{21}, t_{22}, \dots, t_{2m} \rangle$.

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} t_{11} & t_{12} & \dots & t_{1m} \\ t_{21} & t_{22} & \dots & t_{2m} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ t_{n1} & t_{n2} & \dots & t_{nm} \end{pmatrix}$$

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Weak monotonicity (Bikhchandani et al.)

- A property that every truthful mechanism must satisfy.
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Weak monotonicity for unrelated machines scheduling

Suppose t and t' differ **only** in the execution times of machine i . The associated allocations x and x' (of every truthful allocation algorithm) must satisfy

$$\sum_{j \in [m]} (x_{ij} - x'_{ij})(t_{ij} - t'_{ij}) \leq 0 .$$

Using the weak monotonicity property

Allows us to claim that if we change the execution times of one machine in **a particular way** then the allocation remains (almost) the same.

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Allows us to claim that if we change the execution times of one machine in **a particular way** then the allocation remains (almost) the same.

Claim 1 by example

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} \boxed{1} & \boxed{1} & \boxed{2} \\ \infty & 1 & \mathbf{3} \\ \infty & 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow t' = \begin{pmatrix} \boxed{100} & \boxed{1 - \epsilon_1} & \boxed{2 + \epsilon_2} \\ \infty & 1 & 3 \\ \infty & 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix}$$

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Can **only** be allocated to this machine.

Using the weak monotonicity property

Allows us to claim that if we change the execution times of one machine in **a particular way** then the allocation remains (almost) the same.

Claim 1 by example

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 2 \\ \infty & 1 & 3 \\ \infty & 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow t' = \begin{pmatrix} 100 & 1 - \epsilon_1 & 2 + \epsilon_2 \\ \infty & 1 & 3 \\ \infty & 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix}$$

Allocated w.r.t. t , and have a **lower** execution time w.r.t. t' .

Using the weak monotonicity property

Allows us to claim that if we change the execution times of one machine in **a particular way** then the allocation remains (almost) the same.

Claim 1 by example

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \boxed{2} \\ \infty & 1 & \mathbf{3} \\ \infty & 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow t' = \begin{pmatrix} 100 & 1 - \epsilon_1 & \boxed{2 + \epsilon_2} \\ \infty & 1 & \mathbf{3} \\ \infty & 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix}$$

Not allocated w.r.t. t , and have a **higher** execution time w.r.t. t' .

Using the weak monotonicity property

Allows us to claim that if we change the execution times of one machine in **a particular way** then the allocation remains (almost) the same.

Claim 1 by example

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} \boxed{1} & \boxed{1} & \boxed{2} \\ \infty & 1 & \color{green}{3} \\ \infty & 2 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow t' = \begin{pmatrix} \boxed{100} & \boxed{1 - \epsilon_1} & \boxed{2 + \epsilon_2} \\ \infty & 1 & 3 \\ \infty & 2 & \color{green}{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

Application – a lower bound of 2

- We begin with the following 2-machines 3-tasks instance.
 - It has **one** possible allocation (up to symmetries).

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \infty & 1 \\ \infty & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Application – a lower bound of 2

- We begin with the following 2-machines 3-tasks instance.
 - It has **one** possible allocation (up to symmetries).
- Increasing t_{11} does not change the allocation.
 - We **neglect the ϵ -changes** of t_{12} , t_{13} for simplicity.

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Solution value = 2, Optimal value = 1

Claim 2 by example

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} a & a & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}_{(a>1)} \rightarrow t' = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}$$

Claim 2 by example

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} a & a & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}_{(a>1)} \rightarrow t' = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}$$

The “new” allocation is one of the following...

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}$$

Theorem

No truthful deterministic mechanism for unrelated machines scheduling problem has approximation ratio better than $1 + \sqrt{2}$.

Proof.

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- Clearly, it will also employ the second claim.

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Proof.

- Follows similar approach as the lower bound of 2.
- Clearly, it will also employ the second claim.
- We begin with the following 3-machines 5-tasks instance.

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \infty & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & 0 & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \infty & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & 0 & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

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
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
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$(t_{11} \uparrow)$
 \longrightarrow

$$\begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{2} & \infty & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & 0 & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

Solution = $3\sqrt{2}$, Optimal = $\sqrt{2}$





$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \infty & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & 0 & \text{☺} & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{(t_{11} \uparrow)} \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{2} & \infty & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & 0 & \text{☺} & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

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$$\text{Solution} = 3\sqrt{2}, \text{ Optimal} = \sqrt{2}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \infty & \infty & 1 & 1 \\ \infty & 0 & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

↓ (t₁₄, t₁₅ ↓)

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \infty & \infty & 1 & 1 \\ \infty & 0 & \text{☺} & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{2} & \infty & \infty & 1 & 1 \\ \infty & 0 & \text{☹} & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

↓ (t₁₁ ↑)

$$\text{Solution} = 2 + \sqrt{2}, \text{ Optimal} = \sqrt{2}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \infty & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & 0 & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

$(t_{11} \uparrow)$

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$(t_{14}, t_{15} \downarrow)$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \infty & \infty & 1 & 1 \\ \infty & 0 & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

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$(t_{14} \downarrow)$

$$\begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{2} & \infty & \infty & 1 & 1 \\ \infty & 0 & \infty & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \sqrt{2} & \sqrt{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

$(t_{11} \uparrow)$

Solution = $2 + \sqrt{2}$, Optimal = $\sqrt{2}$

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
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 - Koutsoupias and Vidali [MFCS '2007]

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- Close the **gaps** for both problems...
 - Workload minimization – between 2 and n .
 - Unrelated machines scheduling – between $1 + \sqrt{2}$ and n .
 - Koutsoupias and Vidali [MFCS '2007]
- Study **variants** of these problems – fractional version, domain restricted version, etc.
 - Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács [ICALP '2007]
 - Lavi and Swamy [EC '2007]

Thank You

Slides will be available at my home page
<http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~iftgam>