List of accepted papers for EC 2011:


Multilateral Matching
John Hatfield, Scott Kominers

A Revealed Preference Approach to Computational Complexity in Economics	
Federico Echinique, Daniel Golovin, Adam Wierman 

The college admissions problem with a continuum of students
Jacob Leshno, Eduardo Azevedo

Non-linear Price Competition and a Common Agency with Informed Principals
Hamid Nazerzadeh, Georgia Perakis

Mechanisms for Multi-Level Marketing
Yuval Emek, Ron Karidi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar

Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment
Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz

An Optimization-Based Framework for Automated Market-Making
Jacob Abernethy, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange
Balseiro Santiago, Jon Feldman, Vahab Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan

Selling Privacy at Auction
Arpita Ghosh, Aaron Roth

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Rank-Order Mechanisms for User-Generated Content
Arpita Ghosh, Patrick Hummel

Polynomial-time Computation of Exact Correlated Equilibrium in Compact Games
Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown

Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks
Ruben Juarez, Rajnish Kumar

Network Formation in the Presence of Contagious Risk
Larry Blume, David Easley, Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg, Eva Tardos

Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design
Paul Duetting, Felix Fischer, David Parkes

The Effects of Exposure Time on Memory of Display Advertisements
Daniel Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri

Economies with Non-Convex Production and Complexity Equilibria
Christos Papadimitriou, Christopher Wilkens

Concordance among Holdouts
Scott Kominers, E. Glen Weyl

Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan

Non-Price Equilibria in Markets of Discrete Goods
Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan

Best-Response Auctions
Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, Aviv Zohar

Single Valued Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets
Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Jared Saia, Piotr Sankowski

Optimal Cost Sharing Protocols for Scheduling Games
Philipp von Falkenhausen, Tobias Harks

Truth, Envy, and Profit
Jason Hartline, Qiqi Yan

Pseudorandom Financial Derivatives
David Zuckerman

Strategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Multiple-Election Paradoxes
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jerome Lang

Axiomatic Attribution for Multilinear Functions
Yi Sun, Mukund Sundararajan

Stochastic Variability in Sponsored Search Auctions: Observations and Models
Furcy Pin, Peter Key

Role of Social Networks in Online Shopping: Information Passing, Price of Trust, and Consumer Choice
Stephen Guo, Mengqiu Wang, Jure Leskovec

GSP Auctions with Correlated Types
Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme

Hiring a Secretary from a Poset
Ravi Kumar, Silvio Lattanzi, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Andrea Vattani

Liquidity in Credit Networks: A Little Trust Goes a Long Way
Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, Ramesh Govindan, Ian Post

Multi-Keyword Sponsored Search
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai

Repeated Matching Pennies with Limited Randomness
Michele Budinich, Lance Fortnow

Mechanisms for Complement-Free Procurement
Shahar Dobzinski, Christos Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer

Bayesian Mechanism Design for Budget-Constrained Agents
Shuchi Chawla, David Malec, Azarakhsh Malekian

Distributed Algorithms and New Convex Programs for Fisher Markets with Linear and Spending Constraint Utilities
Benjamin Birnbaum, Nikhil Devanur, Lin Xiao

Who Moderates the Moderators? Crowdsourcing Abuse Detection in User-generated Content
Arpita Ghosh, Satyen Kale, R. Preston McAfee

On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou

Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
Itai Ashlagi, Alvin Roth

Matching with Couples Revisited
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim

Near Optimal Online Algorithms and Fast Approximation Algorithms for Resource Allocation Problems
Nikhil Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher Wilkens

Only Valuable Experts Can Be Valued
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Nicolas Lambert, Omer Reingold

A Random Graph Model of Kidney Exchanges: Efficiency, Individual-Rationality and Incentives
Toulis Panagiotis, David Parkes

Mean Field Equilibria of Dynamic Auctions with Learning
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan

Money for Nothing: Exploiting Negative Externalities
Changrong Deng, Sasa Pekec

Optimal Auctions with Positive Network Externalities
Nima Haghpanah, Nicole Immorlica, Kamesh Munagala, Vahab Mirrokni

A Truthful Randomized Mechanism for Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Optimization
Shaddin Dughmi

Market Making and Mean Reversion
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns

Does more connectivity help groups to solve social problems?
Daniel Enemark, Mathew McCubbins, Ramamohan Paturi, Nicholas Weller