in Auctions and Mechanism Design -
Michal Feldman (firstname.lastname@example.org) and Amos Fiat (
1st Semester, 2014/2015 - Sunday 14:00-16:00, Orenstein 111
Simple versus optimal
Hartline, Tim Roughgarden: Simple versus optimal mechanisms. SIGecom
Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism
Sivan, STOC 2010
Hart and N.
Nisan. Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items.
Hart and N. Nisan. The menu-size complexity of auctions. EC
[*] Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions,
Koutsoupias, EC 2014.
Chi-Chih Yao, An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its
Applications, SODA 2015
Learning the prior (“Prior independent”?)
The sample complexity of revenue maximization,
R. Cole T. Roughgarden, STOC 14
The Value of Knowing a Demand Curve: Bounds on Regret for On-line Posted-Price
Auctions, Kleinberg and Leighton
Dynamic pricing with limited supply: Moshe
Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins, June 2012, EC
'12 (“Detail free” or “Prior free”)
(Bayesian) Price of anarchy of simple auctions
George Christodoulou, Annamária
Kovács, Michael Schapira: Bayesian Combinatorial Auction, ICALP 2008
Roughgarden, The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information,
and Roughgarden, T. (2011). Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item
bidding. In SODA
Kaplan, H., Mansour, Y., and Nisan, N. (2011).
Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods.
Lucier: Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. STOC