# Communication Networks (0368-3030) / Spring 2011


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
## **DDoS and Related Attacks**

Several slides adapted from a presentation made by Dan Touitou on behalf of Cisco.

#### **How do DDoS Attacks Start?**




#### The Effects of DDoS Attacks




### Motivation to attack

- Economically driven
  - Extortion
  - Zombie armies for hire
- Cyber-vandalism
- Cyber-terrorism / Cyber-war
- Backdrop for a more sophisticated attack
  - For example, an attacker brings a target down, and can then hijack its identity




Transport Layer

## Three-way handshake & SYN-Flood attacks



Transport Layer

## SYN Cookies – the idea



# SYN Cookies (somewhat simplified)

- A client sends a SYN packet.
- The server does not choose a random SEQ for its reply. Instead, it calculates a H(x) a cryptographic hash of:
  - t a slowly increasing time function (e.g increases every 64 seconds)
  - Server's IP and port
  - Client's IP and port
  - s a secret
- The SEQ returned in the SYN+ACK packet is a concatenation (t, H(x)).

# SYN Cookies (somewhat simplified)


- When a new client sends an ACK with ACK=y, the server decreases 1 and obtains:
  - □ *t* − allows it to ensure this is a recent request
  - the supposed hash result H'(x)
- It can recompute H(x)
- If H(x) = H'(x) the client is legitimate and a TCP connection is opened

# Anti-spoofing


- Spoofing masquerading as a different network user
  - IP spoofing
  - DNS spoofing
  - ARP spoofing
  - **-**
- Malicious clients spoof IP addresses in order to mount DoS attacks.
- An idea to prevent (or at least hinder) spoofing: respond to the client in a way that forces it to reply.

## **Anti-Spoofing Defense**

- One example: HTTP



#### RST cookies – how it works



## **Anti-Spoofing Defense**

- One example: DNS Client-Resolver (over UDP)

